Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW1086
2008-04-18 13:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S MOSCOW COURTESY CALL

Tags:  PGOV PREL UNSC RS 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1086/01 1091327
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181327Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7670
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0410
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001086 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC RS
SUBJECT: UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S MOSCOW COURTESY CALL

REF: A. NEW YORK 348

B. MOSCOW 1055

Classified By: Political M/C/ Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001086 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC RS SUBJECT: UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S MOSCOW COURTESY CALL REF: A. NEW YORK 348 ¶B. MOSCOW 1055 Classified By: Political M/C/ Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: UN Secretary-General Ban's April 9-11 Moscow visit was high on atmospherics and included meetings with a cross-section of Russia's political and business elite, contributing to speculation that the trip was intended to soothe Russian concerns that the SYG was too close to the U.S. Ban met Putin, President-Elect Medvedev, and FM Lavrov, with whom he held a wide-ranging discussion that covered Kosovo, Abkhazia, the Middle East, Cyprus and Africa. Ban told Lavrov of his plan to quietly have EU personnel take over UNMIK duties in Kosovo, and asked the GOR to pressure Abkhazia to allow UN peacekeepers the ability to increase their surveillance capabilities. Lavrov gently rebuffed Ban's request that Russia send additional helicopters to Darfur, and advised that discussion of the political situation in Zimbabwe not be brought to the UNSC. End summary. Why Did Ban Visit Moscow? -------------- ¶2. (U) During his three-day Moscow visit, Ban met Putin, Medvedev, Lavrov, Duma First Deputy Chairman Morozov, the leader of the Russian Orthodox church, representatives of the business and NGO communities, and gave an address at Moscow State University. Press coverage of the visit suggested that Ban came to Moscow to dispel the notion that he was too close to the U.S. and repair damage done by what the GOR considered his failure to respond forcefully to Kosovo's declaration of independence. The GOR denied press reports that Russia would block Ban's appointment to a second term in retaliation for his views on Kosovo or would significantly increase Russia's annual contribution to the UN in order to "entice" the SYG away from his pro-American sentiments. ¶3. (C) MFA Senior Counselor for International Organizations Petr Ilichev told us on April 17 that the MFA thought the "rather odd" timing of Ban's visit fueled speculation about the SYG's real purpose in coming to Moscow. Putin extended Ban an invitation in June 2007, but the SYG waited until after the 2008 elections to meet a "lame duck" President and President-Elect. Ilichev alluded to press reports that Ban decided a trip to Moscow was necessary after a string of public statements displayed an improper "obeisance" to the U.S., but said that MFA off
icials concluded Ban was one of a succession of international political leaders who wanted to meet both outgoing and incoming Presidents. ¶4. (C) Ilichev explained that Ban's meetings with Putin and Medvedev covered a host of issues, none of which were discussed in much depth. Even the most substantive Ban-Lavrov meeting delivered few details. Ban updated the situation in Cyprus for Lavrov and expressed support for the GOR's Moscow Middle East conference, tentatively planned for June. Kosovo and Abkhazia -------------- ¶5. (C) Ilichev told us that Kosovo and Abkhazia were the two issues discussed at some length. Ban explained to Lavrov his plan to have EU police and civilian personnel quietly take over UNMIK responsibilities in Kosovo, but Ilichev could not confirm that Lavrov found Ban's idea acceptable (ref A). Ban asked the GOR to apply pressure on the Abkhaz to allow UNOMIG more reconnaissance capability, including the use of drone aircraft. Lavrov responded that the Abkhaz would be suspicious of such aircraft, which they could easily mistake for Georgian. Ban and Lavrov discussed the possibility of providing computer monitors to the Georgians and Abkhaz that would allow each to view the images from UNOMIG drones as a means to overcome mutual suspicions. Ilichev said that neither Putin nor Lavrov provided Ban with advance notice of the GOR's April 16 announcement that it would increase official contacts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia (ref B). Darfur Peacekeeping, Zimbabwe -------------- ¶6. (C) Ilichev explained that in response to Ban's request that Russia provide eight additional helicopters for Darfur peacekeeping operations, Lavrov said the GOR would take this into consideration but pointed to possible "operational problems" and the threat of "friendly fire incidents" presented by sending additional aircraft to an area where the GOR already had helicopters and peacekeepers. Ilichev went on to express frustration with the complicated inter-agency mechanism that made fulfilling requests for peacekeepers difficult. Both the Defense and Interior ministries have trouble finding English speakers with the necessary training and, because of the improved Russian economy, did not find peacekeeping operations as "lucrative" as they once were. The GOR's consideration to increase the budget for peacekeeping was met by resistance from the Ministry of Finance. ¶7. (C) Ilichev said that Lavrov and Ban's discussion of the current political turmoil in Zimbabwe was limited. Ilichev explained that the GOR considered this a regional matter that should not be brought to the UNSC. In any event, it provided an opportunity for the "Africans to demonstrate that they can handle an African crisis themselves." BURNS

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