RUSSIA UNMOVED BY CONCERNS OVER PRESIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001073

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA UNMOVED BY CONCERNS OVER PRESIDENTIAL
INSTRUCTIONS

REF: SECSTATE 40673

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary: In April 18 conversations with First Deputy
Foreign Minister Denisov and Presidential Foreign Policy
Adviser Prikhodko, the Ambassador conveyed reftel concerns
and urged Russia to repeal its Presidential Instructions and
engage directly with Georgia to reduce tensions. Denisov
predicted a Putin-Saakashvili call in "the next few days" and
conveyed Georgian DFM Vashakidze's stiff conversation with
him on the margins of the April 17 Black Sea Economic
Conference. Denisov did not respond to the call for a
repeal, but previewed a public statement aimed at
highlighting measures taken to ease GOR-GOG relations.
Prikhodko was categorical that Russia was acting within
international law and responding to the needs of local
residents. There is little in the Russian media and expert
community to calm Georgian concerns, with most interpreting
the instructions as quasi-recognition, taken in response to
Kosovo. Putin enjoys broad popular and political support for
extending assistance to the separatist territories, and the
GOR appears confident for now that it can ride out
international upset. End Summary

MFA: Bilateral Gestures, but Instructions Remain
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2. (C) In an April 18 conversation with First Deputy
Foreign Minister Andrey Denisov, the Ambassador underscored
reftel concerns over the new Presidential Instructions to the
Russian government on protecting the rights of the residents
(including Russian citizens) in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The Ambassador noted that despite MFA clarifications, the
steps taken by the Russian government provoked serious
concerns not just in the U.S., as statements by EU Solana and
NATO SYG Scheffer attested. The Russian actions rightly were
perceived by Tbilisi as a serious challenge to its
sovereignty. While the Secretary continued to underscore the
message of restraint and warned against a recourse to
military action in her conversations with President
Saakashvili, it was important that Russia take Georgian fears
seriously. The Ambassador pushed Denisov on the failure of
Putin to take Saakashvili's call.


3. (C) Denisov responded that Putin's itinerary in Libya
had precluded the call, but that they were aiming for a time
"in the next few days," following his return from Sardinia.
In the interim, Denisov said he had spoke with Georgian
Deputy Foreign Minister Vashakidze on the margins of the
April 17 Black Sea Economic Forum in Kyiv. Denisov
acknowledged that Vashakidze did not find Russian assurances
of respect for Georgian territorial integrity and sovereignty
convincing, with the Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister
characterizing Russian actions as unacceptable and a form of
gradual annexation. Vashakidze told Denisov that Georgia
would press its case in foreign capitals and international
institutions, to which Denisov said the GOR was resigned. In
response to whether Lavrov had contacted FM Bakradze, Denisov
said the GOR was amenable to consultations "in principle,"
but gave no indications of next steps. The Ambassador pushed
for clarification of the "mechanisms" described in the
instruction. Denisov did not provide any further detail, but
conceded the importance of engaging directly with the GOG.


4. (C) Denisov had no comment on the U.S. request for a
repeal of the Presidential Instructions, nor did he concede
that Russia needed Georgia's permission to undertake the
actions outlined by Putin. Reiterating that Russian actions
were motivated by the dire economic plight of the residents
of the territories, Denisov said that Russia was looking for
ways to signal further its interest in improving bilateral
relations with the Saakashvili government. Previewing an MFA
statement, which could be issued later today, Denisov
described what seemed to be a repackaging of previous Russian
steps to lift postal and civilian air restrictions, along
with further maritime transport links, expert discussions on
the lifting of sanctions on wine and agricultural products,
and measures to reopen a customs checkpoint. Denisov
conceded the Ambassador's point that this would not address
Georgian concerns, and would be interpreted simply as an
effort in damage limitation. Nonetheless, Denisov insisted,
Russia was interested in easing tensions with Tbilisi.

Kremlin: Russia Within its Rights
--------------


5. (C) In a brief follow-on conversation with Presidential
Foreign Policy Adviser Sergey Prikhodko, the Ambassador
stressed the serious U.S. concerns provoked by the
instructions, noted his conversation with Denisov, and

underscored that while the U.S. message to Georgia would
continue to be one of restraint, Russia should act to calm
the situation. Prikhodko was dismissive. Noting his many
conversations with the Ambassador on Georgia, Prikhodko
asserted that nothing in the Russian instruction violated
international law. Russia was not interested in increasing
tensions with Georgia, but was intent on improving the
humanitarian situation in the frozen conflict territories,
the majority of whose residents carried Russian passports.

Expert and Media Spin: Kosovo's Aftermath
--------------


6. (SBU) There is little in the Russian press to calm
Georgian concerns over Russian intentions. Most press
reports have characterized the Russian initiative as a step
to award a legal personality to Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
in the wake of and in answer to the West's recognition of
Kosovo. The media has interpreted Putin's instructions as a
basis for "halfway" recognition, which would make it
difficult for Georgia to reintegrate the separatist
territories peacefully. Some analysts staked out a more
aggressive line, calling the new move "the last recognition
by Putin" or "Putin's course for the integration of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia to Russia." Others saw Putin's imprimatur
on the instructions as necessary to settle Russia's foreign
policy before Medvedev's inauguration, enabling the new
President to treat the separatist republics as Russian
Federation subjects.


7. (C) Moscow analyst views, although less exaggerated,
coincided. Aleksey Bogaturov, Dean at the Moscow State
Institute of International Relations (MGIMO),said that the
new Putin initiative was within the framework of what the GOR
had been warning in the aftermath of Kosovo independence.
Tantamount to informal recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, the GOR step served Russia's need to react to Kosovo
and the two republics' demand for action. Bogaturov said he
was only surprised that Putin did not issue the instructions
earlier, immediately after the March 13 Duma hearing on the
two regions' request for recognition. Another Caucasus
expert, Vladimir Degoyev, said that Kosovo acted as a
"detonator," and the process was now in motion with its
direction not amenable to reliable prediction. According to
him, Georgia was paying for the West's refusal to "bargain"
on the Kosovo dispute and played down prospects for
international success in overturning the instructions.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) The Kremlin is under no pressure domestically to
alter its position on the instructions. The combination of
public sympathy for the plight of Russian passport holders in
the territories and dislike for Saakashvili and his
Euro-Atlantic aspirations has produced broad support for
continued Russian rhetorical adherence to Georgian
sovereignty coupled with on-the-ground actions to expand
Russian influence. To date, Russian officials appear
confident that they can ride out international objections to
their latest initiative, with some not-so-secretly hoping for
a Georgian recourse to military action.
BURNS