RUSSIA UNMOVED BY CONCERNS OVER PRESIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001073 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA UNMOVED BY CONCERNS OVER PRESIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS REF: SECSTATE 40673 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: In April 18 conversations with First Deputy Foreign Minister Denisov and Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser Prikhodko, the Ambassador conveyed reftel concerns and urged Russia to repeal its Presidential Instructions and engage directly with Georgia to reduce tensions. Denisov predicted a Putin-Saakashvili call in "the next few days" and conveyed Georgian DFM Vashakidze's stiff conversation with him on the margins of the April 17 Black Sea Economic Conference. Denisov did not respond to the call for a repeal, but previewed a public statement aimed at highlighting measures taken to ease GOR-GOG relations. Prikhodko was categorical that Russia was acting within international law and responding to the needs of local residents. There is little in the Russian media and expert community to calm Georgian concerns, with most interpreting the instructions as quasi-recognition, taken in response to Kosovo. Putin enjoys broad popular and political support for extending assistance to the separatist territories, and the GOR appears confident for now that it can ride out international upset. End Summary MFA: Bilateral Gestures, but Instructions Remain -------------- --- ¶2. (C) In an April 18 conversation with First Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Denisov, the Ambassador underscored reftel concerns over the new Presidential Instructions to the Russian government on protecting the rights of the residents (including Russian citizens) in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Ambassador noted that despite MFA clarifications, the steps taken by the Russian government provoked serious concerns not just in the U.S., as statements by EU Solana and NATO SYG Scheffer attested. The Russian actions rightly were perceived by Tbilisi as a serious challenge to its sovereignty. While the Secretary continued to underscore the message of restraint and warned against a recourse to military action in her conversations with President Saakashvili, it was important that Russia take Georgian fears seriously. The Ambassador pushed Denisov on the failure of Putin to take Saakashvili's call. ¶3. (C) Denisov responded that Putin's itinerary in Libya had precluded the call, but that they were aiming for a time "in the next few days," following his return from Sardinia. In the interim, Denisov said he had spoke with Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Vashakidze on the margins of the April 17 Black Sea Economic Forum in Kyiv. Denisov acknowledged that Vashakidze did not find Russian assurances of respect for Georgian territorial integrity and sovereignty convincing, with the Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister characterizing Russian actions as unacceptable and a form of gradual annexation. Vashakidze told Denisov that Georgia would press its case in foreign capitals and international institutions, to which Denisov said the GOR was resigned. In response to whether Lavrov had contacted FM Bakradze, Denisov said the GOR was amenable to consultations "in principle," but gave no indications of next steps. The Ambassador pushed for clarification of the "mechanisms" described in the instruction. Denisov did not provide any further detail, but conceded the importance of engaging directly with the GOG. ¶4. (C) Denisov had no comment on the U.S. request for a repeal of the Presidential Instructions, nor did he concede that Russia needed Georgia's permission to undertake the actions outlined by Putin. Reiterating that Russian actions were motivated by the dire economic plight of the residents of the territories, Denisov said that Russia was looking for ways to signal further its interest in improving bilateral relations with the Saakashvili government. Previewing an MFA statement, which could be issued later today, Denisov described what seemed to be a repackaging of previous Russian steps to lift postal and civilian air restrictions, along with further maritime transport links, expert discussions on the lifting of sanctions on wine and agricultural products, and measures to reopen a customs checkpoint. Denisov conceded the Ambassador's point that this would not address Georgian concerns, and would be interpreted simply as an effort in damage limitation. Nonetheless, Denisov insisted, Russia was interested in easing tensions with Tbilisi. Kremlin: Russia Within its Rights -------------- ¶5. (C) In a brief follow-on conversation with Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser Sergey Prikhodko, the Ambassador stressed the serious U.S. concerns provoked by the instructions, noted his conversation with Denisov, and underscored that while the U.S. message to Georgia would continue to be one of restraint, Russia should act to calm the situation. Prikhodko was dismissive. Noting his many conversations with the Ambassador on Georgia, Prikhodko asserted that nothing in the Russian instruction violated international law. Russia was not interested in increasing tensions with Georgia, but was intent on improving the humanitarian situation in the frozen conflict territories, the majority of whose residents carried Russian passports. Expert and Media Spin: Kosovo's Aftermath -------------- ¶6. (SBU) There is little in the Russian press to calm Georgian concerns over Russian intentions. Most press reports have characterized the Russian initiative as a step to award a legal personality to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in the wake of and in answer to the West's recognition of Kosovo. The media has interpreted Putin's instructions as a basis for "halfway" recognition, which would make it difficult for Georgia to reintegrate the separatist territories peacefully. Some analysts staked out a more aggressive line, calling the new move "the last recognition by Putin" or "Putin's course for the integration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Russia." Others saw Putin's imprimatur on the instructions as necessary to settle Russia's foreign policy before Medvedev's inauguration, enabling the new President to treat the separatist republics as Russian Federation subjects. ¶7. (C) Moscow analyst views, although less exaggerated, coincided. Aleksey Bogaturov, Dean at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO),said that the new Putin initiative was within the framework of what the GOR had been warning in the aftermath of Kosovo independence. Tantamount to informal recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the GOR step served Russia's need to react to Kosovo and the two republics' demand for action. Bogaturov said he was only surprised that Putin did not issue the instructions earlier, immediately after the March 13 Duma hearing on the two regions' request for recognition. Another Caucasus expert, Vladimir Degoyev, said that Kosovo acted as a "detonator," and the process was now in motion with its direction not amenable to reliable prediction. According to him, Georgia was paying for the West's refusal to "bargain" on the Kosovo dispute and played down prospects for international success in overturning the instructions. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) The Kremlin is under no pressure domestically to alter its position on the instructions. The combination of public sympathy for the plight of Russian passport holders in the territories and dislike for Saakashvili and his Euro-Atlantic aspirations has produced broad support for continued Russian rhetorical adherence to Georgian sovereignty coupled with on-the-ground actions to expand Russian influence. To date, Russian officials appear confident that they can ride out international objections to their latest initiative, with some not-so-secretly hoping for a Georgian recourse to military action. BURNS