PUTIN'S "INSTRUCTIONS" ON ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001055 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS SUBJECT: PUTIN'S "INSTRUCTIONS" ON ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA REF: MOSCOW 1033 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary. Russia's new move on Abkhazia and South Ossetia was announced on April 16, not as a presidential decree but as instructions by Putin to the Russian government to protect the rights of residents of the two republics (including Russian passport holders) and to establish economic and social ties with the two separatist regions. A clear change from the April 15 MFA confirmation of press reports on the establishment of representative offices, the instructions stipulated that Russian government offices in the Krasnodar region and North Ossetia respectively would handle the work. In an April 16 meeting, MFA officials underscored Russia's continued adherence to a ban on military equipment and services, and pledged Russia's continued respect for Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Saying there were no plans at present for permanent offices, the MFA pointed to an earlier GOG-approved arrangement allowing an MFA official to be seconded to the peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia. In explaining the expanded economic relationship, the MFA pointed to the Albania-Pristina "model," but argued there were multiple international precedents for engagement. While the GOR has granted agrement to the new Georgian Ambassador, there are no high-level contacts planned, with the GOR dismissing Saakashvili's autonomy proposal as a stunt and depicting GOG mischaracterization of its proposal for judicial cooperation as willful spiking of the relationship. End summary. Changed Course: Instructions rather than a Decree -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) In an April 16 statement (informal translation sent to EUR/RUS),the MFA detailed Putin's new instructions to the GOR designed to support the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including the Russian citizens residing there, by working with Abkhazian and South Ossetian authorities to promote economic, social, cultural and educational ties. The instructions are in accordance with international law, said the statement. In contrast to April 15 press reports that new representative offices would be established and manned by MFA diplomats, the instructions authorized regional offices of Russian government agencies -- Krasnodar region for Abkhazia and North Ossetia/Alaniya for South Ossetia -- to provide consular services to the residents of the two republics. ¶3. (U) The MFA statement claimed that Russia's decision was driven by concern for the interests of the republics' population. With the prolongation of the conflict, the residents continue to be in a state of poverty, deprived of "universal" rights to a dignified life and stable development. The statement blamed Tbilisi's refusal to use existing mechanisms to establish normal economic relations and solve social problems the two republics face, while reinforcing Georgia's offensive military forces, including in the Upper Kodori Gorge, in violation of a UN security resolution. The statement argued that under these circumstances, Saakashvili's new peace plan could not be taken seriously. The MFA statement stressed that the Russian decision was in line with UNSCR 1808 adopted on April 15, which encouraged measures for economic recovery in Abkhazia and betterment of life conditions in the conflict zones. No Military Component -------------- ¶4. (C) In the wake of the April 16 announcement, MFA CIS Fourth Director Andrey Kelin told us that the most notable characteristic of Russia's new move was the absence of any military component. Reiterating Deputy Foreign Minister Denisov's April 15 comments to the Ambassador (reftel),Kelin said the GOR stood "100 percent" by its international commitments and responsibilities not to supply weapons to the conflict zones; Russian sanctions on military services and equipment remained. The GOR decision to lift CIS sanctions, he argued, had been driven by economic considerations, with the resulting lack of military transparency not adequately factored into the GOR decisionmaking process. No Permanent Office -------------- ¶5. (C) Dismissing earlier press reports about establishing new offices as false, Kelin said that a three-man team headed by an MFA official seconded to the peacekeeping forces had been working in Abkhazia for eight years with the GOG's agreement. At this point in time, the GOR has no plan to open offices along the Taiwan model. When pushed, Kelin said that officials working in the regional offices may have to travel in and out of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but there will be no "permanent" offices on the ground. In response to whether the GOR had consulted with the GOG on the new plan, Kelin replied, "we thought you would do that for us." Kelin said that the GOR originally planned to process passports out of Sochi but with the 3000 passport renewals pending, some involving elderly applicants who could not endure the long bus ride, two regional offices on the Russian side of the borders were chosen to handle the load. Greatly Expanded Economic Engagement -------------- ¶6. (C) Kelin insisted that Putin's instructions were not a step toward recognition but toward economic development of the disadvantaged and impoverished regions; given strong Duma and public pressure for Russian action, the steps constituted the "minimum required" in the domestic political context. He reiterated Russian respect for the redlines of Georgian territorial integrity and sovereignty but said that in the absence of GOG economic engagement with Abkhazia (e.g., refusal to cooperate in the restoration of the train service, rebuffing of Turkish proposals to establish sea and air links to Abkhazia),the GOR was taking the only possible course to improve the conditions of a "piece of land in misery." Kelin was clear that the GOR would be engaged in significant economic activity in Abkhazia, and noted that Russia had looked at multiple models of engagement -- ranging from Taiwan, to Albania-Pristina, where the Kosovars had reached over 80 agreements with its neighbor. He dismissed objections to a comparison of economic cooperation allowed under UNSCR 1244, and also rejected arguments that Russia's unilateral approach undermined the Friends' diplomacy. Russia would not allow Georgian obstructionism to prevent the economic rehabilitation of the region, without which there could be no reconciliation. Autonomy Proposal Dismissed -------------- ¶7. (C) Kelin dismissed Saakashvili's autonomy plan, "or what we have heard of it," as a propaganda stunt. Kelin said it was hard to take seriously a plan that had not been presented to the Abkhaz, but briefed first to the U.S. and NATO. Kelin maintained that Georgia had yet to brief Russia on its proposals (although we heard from the Georgian Embassy that a copy was delivered). Kelin reiterated that in the complete atmosphere of distrust and in the absence of confidence building measures, Saakashvili's proposal could not be treated seriously. When asked whether Russia was encouraging Abkhazia to engage on the proposal, Kelin retorted "how can they engage on something they have not seen." The Abkhaz remained focused on developing "interstate" relations, not autonomy within Georgia, and absent a significant change on the ground -- such as confidence built through economic development -- that would not change. Waiting for Georgia's Move -------------- ¶8. (C) In response to the argument that cumulative Russian actions in Abkhazia had undercut Russian gestures to improve its bilateral relations with Georgia, Kelin criticized Georgia for "not doing its part." Arguing that improved bilateral relations were a "two-way street," Kelin said the GOG had ignored the goodwill gestures of the resumption of air, maritime and postal links, and instead had replied with public hysteria, citing the Russian Justice Ministry letter of cooperation as a case in point. While Russia had granted agrement to the new Georgian Ambassador, there were no high-level contacts planned. Kelin took the opportunity to criticize the Georgian Foreign Minister for failing to come to Moscow. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Since multiple mid-level officials confirmed the press reports of the establishment of liaison offices, Putin's instructions constitute a change, but not one significant enough to allay concerns over growing Russian influence in Abkhazia. In an April 16 meeting, the Ambassador encouraged his French and German counterparts to reinforce U.S. concerns over Russia's moves towards Abkhazia. A coordinated approach will be the most effective way to try to constrain Russian actions. BURNS