RUSSIANS EXPLAIN VIEWS ON UNSCR 1540 COMMITTEE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001052 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR U.S. 1540 COORDINATOR TOM WUCHTE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018 TAGS: PREL AORC KPAO PTER UNSC UK FR RS SUBJECT: RUSSIANS EXPLAIN VIEWS ON UNSCR 1540 COMMITTEE MANDATE RENEWAL REF: STATE 39114 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Together with UK and French colleagues, we delivered reftel demarche April 16 to Aleksandr Deyneko, Senior Counselor in the MFA Department of Disarmament and Security Issues, responsible for UNSCR 1540 issues. Deyneko stressed that, as a co-sponsor of UNSCR 1540, Russia was very interested in the prolongation of the 1540 Committee and saw it as a major practical tool for implementation of the resolution. He emphasized several times that Russia did not have any problems with the suggestions in the P3 text, but had a number of questions and concerns that needed to be addressed first (see para 5). When pressed, he said Russia was willing to be "flexible" on the length of the mandate renewal, but "wanted reciprocity and real dialogue, not demarche-style diplomacy." End Summary. ¶2. (C) With UK and French Embassy poloffs, we jointly made the points in the reftel non-paper and stressed the need for a more substantive resolution to strengthen the Committee, with a mandate longer than two years. Deyneko acknowledged the importance of the work of the Committee, and noted that Russia had been the first to propose a renewal of its mandate in November 2007 and had submitted a draft text to the U.S. which had not generated any objections. Russia had suggested that we exchange views on the future of the 1540 Committee before agreeing on a renewal text, but had received no response. Russia had seen the extension as a tactical issue, designed to make the transition to a new mandate as smooth as possible, and was surprised that its "proposal for a purely technical mandate renewal would cause such a reaction; now we're facing complaints that we're undermining P5 consensus." ¶3. (C) Deyneko stressed that Russia and the P3 did not differ on policy; only on tactics. He added that Russia did not have a problem with the fact that the Resolution puts a lot of obligations on UN Member States. He said that his comments were not intended to reflect that Russia was against a more comprehensive resolution, but underscored that they also did not mean that Russia would be able to agree to one now, as Russia had a lot of questions that needed to be answered. He noted that Russia did not support making the 1540 Committee subordinate to other bodies (e.g. 1267 Committee). ¶4. (C) Stressing that the issue should be worked "in capitals," as well as in New York, Deyneko commented that he did not know which text to work from, since he had separate drafts with U.S., UK, and French comments. We pointed out that we had submitted a consolidated text in mid-March, but they had not included any of it in the version they sent to other UNSC members, and reiterated our surprise and disappointment that Russia had not sought to get a P5-agreed text before circulating a draft to the rest of the Council. ¶5. (C) Deyneko mentioned the following main questions and concerns (NOTE: the para numbers are from the April 1 draft with US/UK/French mark-up of the Russian text): -- Russia does not see the value of putting the new proposals and ideas into the Resolution; it would be better to roll-over the mandate and let the Committee review the issues; -- On the Preamble, Russia does not understand why "experts" should be highlighted. Responsibilities should be given to the Committee as a body. -- Russia does not understand Preambular paragraph that says "Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, regional, subregional and international levels...." What does this mean, intended to do? Not against it, but don't understand it. -- Reference to FATF (in both Preambular and Op paras): Important subject, but FATF activities are just one of a whole range of similar organizations and activities; why single FATF out to include in the text of the Resolution? -- Russia believes it's important to lay out priorities - implementation of 1540 is important, but reporting is also still important, especially since one-quarter of UN Members are lagging behind in their reports; -- Op. 3: Action Plans: Idea okay, but Russia still waiting for answers to its questions. How will the Committee get countries which haven't been able to submit their reports in the last four years, even with assistance, to submit action plans within a year? How realistic is this? -- French proposal to combine Op paras. 4 and 6: Okay, but would like to see a text; -- Op. 5: Why need reference to Annex 1? -- Op. 7: Why need request for point of contact in the Resolution? If 46 or 48 (he said U.S. and Russia don't seem to agree on the number of non-compliant states) countries aren't reporting, how do we get them to do so? -- Op. 8: Mandate length. Said Russia was "flexible," but wanted to be part of consultations. Also, Russia did not understand need for a reference to "experts working under the policy guidance of the 1540 Committee;" -- Op. 9: What do we mean by "comprehensive review"? This is a new idea; not discussed before, or reflected in the report. What type of review? Would it be similar to the comprehensive reviews in the Non-Proliferation Treaty context, or something else? What are the modalities and goals of such a review? How many participants and who will choose them, etc.? -- Op. 10 (a): Russia does not understand what is meant by "implementation strategies." While the idea is good, the devil is in the details. Before getting UNSC endorsement, we should make sure we all understand the meaning the same way. -- Op. 10 (c): Outreach events. What are the "specific aspects of resolution 1540" referenced in the para? Who decides? What types of events are we talking about? -- Op. 10 (e): What is meant by "stakeholder involvement"? Who are the "stakeholders"? -- Russia believes that language on enhancing cooperation between 1540 and UNSCR 1267 is important, but there are many other elements of export control practices that are equally important. Why aren't they included? ¶6. (C) We asked why Russia had not raised these issues before and urged him to have the mission in New York do so at the April 16 meeting. We pressed the importance of agreeing on the concept of having a resolution that strengthened the Committee and that extended its mandate for five years, and letting the Committee itself work out many of the issues he had raised. He agreed on the need not to tie the Committee's hands by specifying too many details, but still stressed that Russia needed answers to its questions. ¶7. (C) Deyneko also commented on the 1540 Committee Report, saying Russia thought the first version prepared by the experts had been bad, and Russia's comments did not reflect all of their concerns. For instance, the Report contained a lot of imprecise language such as "Many States view...." Such language gave rise to questions like: How many States? Who were they? Russia would prefer to work on a shorter, clearer draft report. ¶8. (C) Comment. Russia's intransigence on this issue, where we really do not have differing views on the end result, reflects a growing tendency by the GOR to make the point that Russia expects to be consulted prior to P-3 decisions being taken on matters of concern to it. BURNS