Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MONTEVIDEO213
2008-04-18 16:41:00
SECRET
Embassy Montevideo
Cable title:
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PHYSICAL SECURITY DEFICIENCIES AND FAST-TRACKING PROPOSED SECURITY UPGRADE
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHMN #0213 1091641 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 181641Z APR 08 FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8118
S E C R E T MONTEVIDEO 000213
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR WHA/BSC, DS/PSD/PCB, OBO/PD, DS/IP/WHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018
TAGS: ASEC ABLD PTER UY
SUBJECT: AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PHYSICAL SECURITY DEFICIENCIES AND FAST-TRACKING PROPOSED SECURITY UPGRADE
Classified By: RSO for reasons 1.4(g)
S E C R E T MONTEVIDEO 000213
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR WHA/BSC, DS/PSD/PCB, OBO/PD, DS/IP/WHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018
TAGS: ASEC ABLD PTER UY
SUBJECT: AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PHYSICAL SECURITY DEFICIENCIES AND FAST-TRACKING PROPOSED SECURITY UPGRADE
Classified By: RSO for reasons 1.4(g)
1. (U) This is an action cable. Please see paragraph 6.
2. (S) Embassy Montevideo is extremely concerned about the continued slippage in the start date for the embassy security upgrade projects first proposed and approved in 1999 and now delayed until 2013. The Ambassador is unable to meet his mandate of adequately protecting the lives of our employees and guests until the physical security deficiencies highlighted below are addressed. The physical security situation remains unsatisfactory in the post-9/11 environment.
3. (S) First and foremost the chancery has insufficient setback and huge glass windows in most offices. Any explosion would undoubtedly result in casualties. The security upgrade project proposes replacing the windows with ballistic glass mullions. We view this as the most important part of the project and should be given priority over the other upgrades if possible.
4. (S) Secondly, because of the building configuration, all visa applicants/consular visitors pass through our central lobby, which faces/has access to our open atrium main stairwell. Only one FSN guard stands between consular visitors and our main stairwell. All employees, including Americans, use this same entrance and must mingle/enter the building with consular visitors/applicants. This flaw must also be addressed sooner rather than later.
5. (S) In addition to these major deficiencies the RSO, after staging several Jeddah-scenario drills, has identified a significant vulnerability. XXXXXXXXXXXX As a part of the upgrade, or as a stand-alone project, we would like to ameliorate this threat with the construction of an interior vehicular Sally Port gate. We would need OBO to survey/approve/fund our proposal.
6. (S) Action Request: Embassy Montevideo requests that DS and OBO put priority on initiating and completing these vital security upgrades in the short term.
Baxter
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR WHA/BSC, DS/PSD/PCB, OBO/PD, DS/IP/WHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018
TAGS: ASEC ABLD PTER UY
SUBJECT: AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PHYSICAL SECURITY DEFICIENCIES AND FAST-TRACKING PROPOSED SECURITY UPGRADE
Classified By: RSO for reasons 1.4(g)
1. (U) This is an action cable. Please see paragraph 6.
2. (S) Embassy Montevideo is extremely concerned about the continued slippage in the start date for the embassy security upgrade projects first proposed and approved in 1999 and now delayed until 2013. The Ambassador is unable to meet his mandate of adequately protecting the lives of our employees and guests until the physical security deficiencies highlighted below are addressed. The physical security situation remains unsatisfactory in the post-9/11 environment.
3. (S) First and foremost the chancery has insufficient setback and huge glass windows in most offices. Any explosion would undoubtedly result in casualties. The security upgrade project proposes replacing the windows with ballistic glass mullions. We view this as the most important part of the project and should be given priority over the other upgrades if possible.
4. (S) Secondly, because of the building configuration, all visa applicants/consular visitors pass through our central lobby, which faces/has access to our open atrium main stairwell. Only one FSN guard stands between consular visitors and our main stairwell. All employees, including Americans, use this same entrance and must mingle/enter the building with consular visitors/applicants. This flaw must also be addressed sooner rather than later.
5. (S) In addition to these major deficiencies the RSO, after staging several Jeddah-scenario drills, has identified a significant vulnerability. XXXXXXXXXXXX As a part of the upgrade, or as a stand-alone project, we would like to ameliorate this threat with the construction of an interior vehicular Sally Port gate. We would need OBO to survey/approve/fund our proposal.
6. (S) Action Request: Embassy Montevideo requests that DS and OBO put priority on initiating and completing these vital security upgrades in the short term.
Baxter