OCTOBER 12 AMCONSULATE MONTERREY EAC MEETING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MONTERREY 000459 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC KCRM PINS SNAR MX SUBJECT: OCTOBER 12 AMCONSULATE MONTERREY EAC MEETING REF: CONSULATE MONTERREY DS SPOT REPORTS MONTERREY 00000459 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) The evening of October 12 post's Emergency Action Committee (EAC) met to review secure posture and preparations in light of the gunshot/grenade attack on the Consulate building midnight October 11. While unknown assailants fired 6 to 10 shots at the building and threw a grenade (which did not explode),no one was injured. The grenade, which was discovered early the morning of October 12 in a subsequent daylight search of the grounds, did not detonate because the assailants did not remove the pin arming device. In the October 12 EAC, DHS ICE Assistant Attache reported that he had detected persons unknown conducting surveillance of him that very morning as he departed the residence of the DHS ICE Representative. Greater Security Measures -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Meeting participants included CG, Acting RSO, DEA, DHS-ICE, ATF, OPAD, Legatt, IMO, PAO, and GSO. Acting RSO related the steps already in train to bolster security at the Consulate, including redoubled police presence on the part of Nuevo Leon state, Monterrey city, and San Pedro city law enforcement. (While the Consulate is not in San Pedro, that is the municipality where Consulate direct-hires reside.) The City of San Pedro is also increasing police patrols near the residences of Consulate direct hires. CG reported that the Governor of the State of Nuevo Leon had telephoned to offer any assistance that the Consulate might need in terms of security and investigation follow-up. FBI and ATF briefed on evidence collection efforts to date, including examination and analysis of recovered shell casings and bullet fragments and impoundment of a suspect vehicle. ATF stated that an AFI (Mexican federal law enforcement) canine bomb detection team would arrive from Mexico City to verify that there were no more explosive devices in the Consulate compound. (This search was done later that evening and again repeated early the morning of October 13; results were negative.) Employee and Public Outreach -------------- ¶3. (SBU) CG described telephone outreach efforts already undertaken to inform Consulate employees of the incident, many of whom had traveled out of town for the holiday weekend. A Country Team meeting was set for the morning of October 14, the first morning back at work, and Section/Agency supervisors agreed to meet with their employees early October 14 to brief them on events over the weekend. A town hall meeting will take place later in the week. Post released a press statement that night -- which was given prominent play in the October 13 Monterrey morning newspapers -- and a warden message was sent out October 13. Next Steps in Terms of Physical and Personal Security -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) RSO personnel noted that given the assailant's approach to the premises, avoiding our video cameras, it appeared that they had conducted prior surveillance of their target. EAC recommended increased activity on the part of our Surveillance Detection team. EAC also undertook to come up with a package of physical security measures which could mitigate the impact of this type of attack in the future. Most immediate items include wire mesh for the highway-side facade of the building to ensure that any future thrown grenade did not get trapped by the latticework, new mylar for windows, and spikes for the sub-standard fence. Post will request immediate funding for these items from DS (approximately US$5,000 to US$8,000), with a request for another US$15,000 for additional measures in short order. In addition, ATF stated that it would seek to advance the ATF Explosive Threat Vulnerability Assessment of the Consulate programmed for November 2008 to an earlier date. Construction of an anti-scale fence had already been scheduled for FY 09. Given its location approximately 5 meters from a busy superhighway, however, Consulate building's main deficiency remains its glaring lack of setback. The October 14 visit of MONTERREY 00000459 002.2 OF 002 Embassy Mexico RSO will prove helpful in integrating these various strands into an effective package. ¶5. (SBU) Overall, EAC members agreed upon the need to reinforce strong personal security practices on the part of Consulate direct-hires and LES. Acting RSO reminded supervisors to stress the importance of varying routes and departure/arrival times, planning ahead, and being security-conscious. (Kidnappings for ransom have risen substantially during recent months). EAC also discussed the need to review trip-wires in terms of the Consulate's overall presence. Possible Motives of the Assailants -------------- ¶6. (SBU) As no group or person had taken responsibility for the incident, EAC discussed possible motives behind the attack. EAC consensus was that it was in response to either USG, and/or specifically Consulate-initiated, anti-drug law enforcement efforts, and that the late-night timing and the manner of the attack (i.e., the failure to remain the pin from the grenade) was intended to send a message. Post's law enforcement reps met with local contacts October 14 to begin sifting through this and other possible theories. CG and law enforcement team plan to keep in close touch with federal (Monterrey-based),state, and local counterparts to emphasize the need for progress in the investigation of this incident. A meeting with the Nuevo Leon state Attorney General is set for the afternoon of October 14. ¶7. (U) Post will continue to monitor developments closely. WILLILAMSON