KIDNAPPINGS AND ORGANIZED CRIME CHALLENGE CIVIL SOCIETY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MONTERREY 000414 SIPDIS DS FOR IP /ITA AND IP/WHA E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/2/2018 TAGS: KCRM PINS SNAR ASEC PGOV PHUM MX SUBJECT: KIDNAPPINGS AND ORGANIZED CRIME CHALLENGE CIVIL SOCIETY REF: MONTERREY 390 MONTERREY 00000414 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Bruce Williamson, Consul General, Monterrey, Foreign Service. REASON: 1.4 (c),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Over the past few weeks, Conoffs have reached out to various players within Nuevo Leon civil society to gauge the effect that the increase in kidnappings since the beginning of the year has had on local institutions. In our conversations with military and police officials, mayors, the press, academics, security consultants, and business leaders, we have found a unanimous sense of gloom, most marked among those government officials charged with the responsibility for correcting the situation. For instance, Monterrey Tec leaders note that applications to that university are down 20 percent, a fact which university officials attribute to the increasing violence. In this tense environment, the public is looking at all solutions (even bad ones) -- although given the drug cartel's penetration of state and local police none is likely to prove effective in the short-term. As a result, a number of wealthy families are considering how they might legally relocate to the U.S. End Summary. The Military -------------- ¶2. (C) The Mexican army remains the tip of the spear in terms of the Calderon administration's attack upon the drug cartels. On August 15, Consul General, visiting Embassy ATF Attache, and Consulate ALAT met with General Javier Real de Magallanes, head of Mexico's Fourth military region (which consists of Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, Tamaulipas, and San Luis Potosi). Normally aloof and taciturn, on this occasion he was expressive and direct, reflecting openly upon the challenges he faces in combating narco-trafficking. The military, he said, had been hampered by the procedural delays involved in obtaining search warrants and the inability of the state and local police to provide any useful support for such efforts. Indeed, he commented, confidential information shared with those entities generally made its way to the traffickers, thus frustrating search and seizure actions. A 47-year Army veteran, he joined up in 1961, Real worried that the campaign against the cartels would inevitably lead the public to view the military as corrupt as well. (In his remarks, Real pointedly refrained from attributing any responsibility to the military to deal with kidnapping as this, he felt, was a state police function.) ¶3. (C) In contrast to previous meetings in which he appeared to prefer a go-it-alone approach, this time General Real welcomed cooperation with ATF and FBI (less so, DEA) and Consulate law enforcement officials are following up with him. Nevertheless, he indicated that in his view the situation would get worse before it got better. The drug traffickers had expanded their product range, he stated, and now engaged in the smuggling of weapons, people, human organs, and pirated goods. In local flea markets, the price of pirate CDs had doubled over the past year, he observed, as the trafficking cartels had become more efficient in taxing the vendors of such goods. With his retirement imminent next year, Real said that he wished to do what he could, while leaving it to his successors to continue the fight in the medium and long-term. Security Consultants -------------- ¶4. (C) Post spoke with two separate corporate security experts, one in a more public environment and the other in a private setting. In the first encounter, the local Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) Director noted that while many were worried about the increase in kidnappings over recent months, no one had any accurate figures. While corporate security directors pooling their information had come up with 158 events from January to August (68 kidnappings for ransom, 66 "levantones" of persons with organized crime connections, and 24 disappearances),official state figures showed only 54 such events. Yet clearly the number was higher, he said, as after a show of hands nearly one-third of the audience (8 of 25) revealed that they knew of a co-worker, colleague, or friend whose family had been victim of a kidnapping. Indeed, the public's fear had created a new industry: virtual kidnappings, in which a victim receives a phone call demanding that he pay money or else as there is an SUV filled with armed men outside the person's house -- and a quick check reveals that there actually is. The victim usually pays. ¶5. (C) The second expert we spoke with was more pessimistic. His view was that the various state and local police were infiltrated and that, as a result, local leaders were unable to mount a serious effort against both the traffickers and the kidnapping rings. He cited a recent case involving a father and a son who were themselves kidnapped within state police headquarters while reporting an incident involving organized crime. Although this episode had been covered by the local MONTERREY 00000414 002.2 OF 004 press, our contact noted that when several police indeed tried to react to the intruders their unit leader received a call from persons unknown on his mobile radio (on state police frequencies) directing him to stand down. In yet another case, police arrived at the scene of an organized crime related-shooting only to find the victim still alive and eager to file a complaint. However, in transporting the victim back to the police station officers had not traveled four blocks when gunmen intercepted their vehicles and took the complainant away. None of this could have taken place, our interlocutor noted, unless the gunmen had strong ties to the police. However well-intentioned, police leaders can do little as they themselves are under threat. High-level state and local law enforcement officials report that they regularly receive phone calls from cartel front-men clearly informing them of the red-lines they must not cross. Earlier this month, the chief of the state police discovered surveillance being done by the traffickers on his posh San Pedro home. Several kidnap victims who had been ransomed later reported that their captors had access to state law enforcement data bases and the state's GPS squad car tracking system. This problem could become even more acute once Nuevo Leon's new law enforcement C-4 center becomes operational next year as it could provide both the police (and organized crime) with improved monitoring capabilities. Business and Academic Community -------------- ¶6. (C) Industry leaders and civil society are up in arms about the ever-increasing lack of security and making their concerns known. The latest sign of the decay was the first-time ever appearance in Monterrey August 26-27 overnight of public banners posted by the Gulf cartel decrying law enforcement complicity with its Sinaloa cartel rivals. While previously, President Calderon had received high marks from local opinion-makers, now he is coming under mounting criticism. Some say that he has too many other priorities (energy reform, education, etc.); others say that, unlike Colombia's President Uribe, he has not personally experienced the agony of having close family members kidnapped and executed. Searching for a way to address the situation, the wealthy municipality of San Pedro has distributed personal security tips to its residents and the city's citizen advisory committee is urging victims to report kidnappings and extortion. The latter may be a hard sell given the possibility that the victims could well be subject to retaliation given the suspected involvement of the police with organized crime. ¶7. (C) While numerous business lobby groups (CANACO, COPARMEX, CAINTRA, etc.) have gone to the Governor demanding immediate action, slowly the realization is dawning that little can be done in the short-term as the public security apparatus has been compromised. Investment in armored cars, bodyguards, security training, and polygraphers is booming as those who can afford it begin to take protective measures. Those less well-healed, unfortunately, are not able to avail themselves of such resources and are heading north. Inquiries regarding long-term investor visas to the U.S. are rising and there are anecdotal reports that Monterrey residents are increasingly purchasing homes in Texas. Indicative of the public mood, post officers have heard our business contacts wonder whether Monterrey's large corporations will bypass the government and take direct action against the kidnapping rings. (One industrialist openly called for a return of the "Brigadas Blancas" vigilante squads of the late 1970s.) Another sought to confirm "news" that in Tijuana business owners had hired Israeli consultants to take out the kidnapping rings. ¶8. (C) One businessman told us that in retrospect, the days when Monterrey was a peaceful haven in tumultuous Mexico may have only been a transitory phase, and that now the region is facing the same situation as much of the rest of the country. Monterrey Tec leaders note that applications to that university are down 20 percent, a fact which university officials attribute to the increasing violence. Local industry leaders realize that Mexico is just beginning its struggle against organized crime and the drug cartels and frankly worry whether the government will given the immense resources available to the cartels. Local Government -------------- ¶9. (C) Perhaps those most under pressure are local government leaders. Mayors from all over Monterrey metropolitan area have expressed their frustration to us. While they face increased demands from their constituents, their hands are often tied by: 1) the inability of either the federal government to mount an effective response against narco-trafficking or the state government against kidnapping, and 2) cartel intimidation of their law enforcement and judicial apparatus. The Mayor of MONTERREY 00000414 003.2 OF 004 wealthy San Pedro told us that corrupt judges were hindering his ability to close down several night clubs and casinos which were suspected of being narco-fronts or hangouts for organized crime. He recounted stories of receiving threatening phone calls for his efforts, which, when investigated, turned out to have originated from Mexican prisons. In contrast, the Mayor of working-class Apodaca and the Secretary of Public Security in nearby Santa Catarina have made it clear that given the inability of anyone to protect them, the best they could do was merely to try to keep out of organized crime's way. The former floated the idea of a collective commitment on the part of society to refrain from paying ransom to kidnappers (very likely a non-starter) while the latter pointed out that during the wave of executions in early 2007 a number of his officers were targeted and that the current corps of policemen had not forgotten this. ¶10. (C) Following on President Calderon's recent anti-crime package, on August 27 Nuevo Leon state government and local mayors agreed to raise minimum police salaries, effective 2009, to approximately US$1,000 per month (roughly a five to fifteen percent raise). Even with this pay hike, officers remain poorly compensated for the risks that they face. Indeed, this pay initiative could be coming much too late as once officers forge links to organized crime, it is nearly impossible to sever these links and still remain safe. Two local legislators told Poloff that narcotics traffickers have either intimidated or gained control of municipal governments in the small towns north of Monterrey (Cienega de Flores, Salinas Victoria, Juarez, China, Sabinas Hidalgo, etc.) lying along the trafficking routes to the United States. They worry that drug money could easily flow into Nuevo Leon political campaigns, just as they say it has in the neighboring state of Tamaulipas. 11 (C) The problem is even more acute in smaller municipalities in rural areas. On August 15, CG and EconOffs met with the Mayor of Juchipila, Zacatecas, a small town in the southern most part of Zacatecas, near the border with the state of Jalisco. It appears to lie along a strategic transit route that is most likely used to transport narcotics from Guadalajara to the North. Three other small towns near Juchipila are also along this transit route; Apozol, Juchipla, and Jalpa. The Mayor reported that he and the three mayors of the nearby towns are becoming increasingly concerned over the growing presence of drug traffickers in their communities. He believes that Southern Zacatecas is becoming a battle ground for the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels, which are seeking to recruit new members and territory. Although there have not yet been executions in Juchipila or the other towns, the Mayor said that levantones (express kidnappings for a specific purpose) have greatly increased. He believes cartel members are kidnapping members of the rival cartel in order to force them into joining theirs. He said that there are now armed men in the town that openly walk around with their weapons, and who are quick to threaten anyone who gets in their way. Local police are not doing anything about these or other narco-related crimes because they are either corrupt or too afraid to take action. In fact, earlier in the year, several Juchipila police quit, leaving an already small force even more short-handed. He noted that despite the growing influence of drug traffickers in the area, no military operations have taken place there. Given the lack of jobs and activities in the town, he believes that youths are even more susceptible to falling prey to drugs and drug dealing. ¶12. (C) The Mayor reported that he and the other mayors have requested assistance from the state government, specifically the state's Secretary General Carlos Pinto Nunez, but that their pleas have been ignored. Neither the state nor local authorities, he concluded, are equipped to deal with the growing power of the cartels operating in the state. By chance, on August 29 post officers met Pinto, giving us a chance to hear his side of the story. Pinto, a two-time former Attorney General for the State of Zacatecas, said that, in his view, the state police had not been infiltrated by the cartels, but that they had no capacity to react to cartel violence. While 1,500 of Zacatecas' 2600 state and local police had received training recently, he said, they neither possessed the weaponry, equipment, intel capacity nor the infrastructure to challenge organized crime. He feared that the situation would only worsen as the state's security forces were clearly outmatched. The Press -------------- ¶13. (C) The press has come under similar assault. Reftel reports upon the dilemma faced by Monterrey's prestigious daily "El Norte" and its publishers as they confront specific threats from the traffickers. We are still trying to determine whether a relative of El Norte's founder was the victim in a recent MONTERREY 00000414 004.2 OF 004 kidnapping near several Consulate residences, and, if so, whether the crime was connected to the previous threats. Comment. -------------- ¶14. (C) The next step for Nuevo Leon is not at all clear. Everyone agrees that the rule of law needs to be strengthened but no one knows how to do this in the short-term. In addition, while the public has fixated on the wave of kidnappings as the principal threat to security, the kidnappers only operate with impunity because the narco-traffickers have so weakened the law enforcement and judicial apparatus. With respect to the health of civil society, with gubernatorial and congressional elections upcoming in August 2009, the situation is only likely to get worse before it gets better. The challenge will be to prevent narco-money from infiltrating into the coffers of the various candidates, thereby making those officials that are eventually elected beholden to organized crime masters. WILLIAMSON