REGIME DEMAND FOR STAFF REDUCTION: FRENCH DEMARCHE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000203 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018 TAGS: PREL PHUM ODIP AMGT BO SUBJECT: REGIME DEMAND FOR STAFF REDUCTION: FRENCH DEMARCHE FOREIGN MINISTER ON EU BEHALF REF: A. MINSK 199 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. USEU 411 Classified By: Charge Jonathan Moore for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) Charge met March 21 with French Ambassador Mireille Musso, currently representing the Slovenian EU Presidency in Minsk, to discuss her March 19 demarche to Foreign Minister Sergey Martynov on the continued demand of the Belarusian regime (ref A) for the U.S. Embassy to significantly reduce its diplomatic staff as well as EU plans to observe public protests to mark the 90th anniversary of the Belarusian People's Republic March 25. ¶2. (C) Musso gave a brief account of her March 19 demarche with Martynov, to whom she delivered points on behalf of the EU (ref B). She said the Martynov complained about U.S. moves against Belarus, noting that the GOB interpreted the March 6 guidance of the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control as a "major expansion" of sanctions. Musso added that Martynov showed no enthusiasm for the current pressure on the U.S. Embassy, but had no regret about it either. She told Charge that she pressed Martynov for the release of political prisoner Aleksandr Kozulin, but that the Minister's only response was to note that Kozulin was causing problems in jail and -- as his release had to be "in accordance with Belarusian law" -- Kozulin should "behave himself." Oddly, Musso -- who knows better -- seemed to have been swayed somewhat by that argument. (Comment: The regime has of course cynically manipulated its legal system at every turn in both creating and releasing political prisoners, a point she acknowledged when raised by Charge. End comment.) ¶3. (C) Musso said that Martynov did not offer a timetable for Kozulin's release. She told Charge that the EU would renew existing visa sanctions against the Belarusian regime in April, but asserted that the delay in the opening of the EU Commission Delegation in Minsk (ref B) was only for "technical reasons." Martynov apparently asked her to help get U.S. sanctions pressure lifted. Charge noted to Musso that only with Kozulin's release would there be any possibility of progress, and that lifting sanctions would depend on the regime making further reforms. ¶4. (C) Charge raised the upcoming public protest scheduled for March 25, intended by civil society and some members of the democratic opposition to mark the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Belarusian People's Republic. Musso noted that she would not be available to observe the long-anticipated protest, as she is hosting a "Francophonie" event that evening, and that her deputy would be away on holiday; she added that many other EU heads of mission (HoM) would be away then as well. However, she does anticipate that there will be an EU presence, and invited Charge to attend the weekly EU HoM meeting earlier March 25 to coordinate with European colleagues at that time. Comment -------------- ¶5. (C) At least on the ground, the EU is not giving us much to work with. The statement that the postponement of the opening of the EU Commission Delegation is not for policy reasons -- which appears to contradict ref B -- and the absence of the leading EU Ambassador from the March 25 protest are not signs of solid support for the U.S. position, either by error or design. We welcome any effort to buck up EU spirit on Belarus in Brussels or individual capitals, but the current GOB effort to divide the U.S. and the EU may be succeeding here. MOOR