Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MINSK102
2008-02-13 09:05:00
SECRET
Embassy Minsk
Cable title:
CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT: BELARUS
how-toVZCZCXYZ0002 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHSK #0102 0440905 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 130905Z FEB 08 FM AMEMBASSY MINSK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6901 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1827 RUEHBS/USMISSION USEU 0278 RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
S E C R E T MINSK 000102
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
S/CT FOR S. GAIL ROBERTSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2028
TAGS: ASEC ECON PTER PREL BO
SUBJECT: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT: BELARUS
REF: A. STATE 6461
B. 07 MINSK 743
Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d,,e,f,g).
Summary
-------
S E C R E T MINSK 000102
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
S/CT FOR S. GAIL ROBERTSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2028
TAGS: ASEC ECON PTER PREL BO
SUBJECT: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT: BELARUS
REF: A. STATE 6461
B. 07 MINSK 743
Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d,,e,f,g).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Post believes three objects in Belarus meet the
definition of critical infrastructure (ref A): the Druzhba
oil pipeline, the gas pipelines, and the Sosniy nuclear
research facility. The USG actively engages Belarus to
improve security at Sosniy. End summary.
Druzhba Oil Pipeline
--------------
2. (SBU) The Druzhba pipeline transports approximately 1.35
million barrels of oil per day to Europe. Under normal
conditions the main recipients of oil shipped through
Druzhba, Poland and Germany, store at least a two-month
supply of oil reserves. However, alternate spare pipeline
capacity could not fully meet European demand in the event
the Druzhba pipeline did not function.
Yamal-Europe Gas Pipeline
--------------
3. (SBU) Russia supplies 44 billion cubic meters of gas to
the EU via the Russian owned Yamal-Europe gas pipeline and
the Beltransgaz pipeline. Excess capacity through Ukraine
could allow some supplies to be rerouted in the event of a
disruption in Belarus, but significant economic damage to
Europe would still occur in the event of a long-term
disruption.
Sosniy Nuclear Research Facility
--------------
4. (S) Belarus' Joint Institute of Power and Nuclear
Research, Sosniy, houses significant amounts of fissile
material for research purposes and exhibits security lapses
reminiscent of most Russian facilities a decade ago (ref B).
U.S. Department of Energy teams have visited Sosniy regularly
to plan an upgrade to the Material Protection, Control and
Accounting System, and recent visits have explored the
possibility of cooperation on creating the proper regulatory
environment to better secure nuclear materials.
STEWART
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
S/CT FOR S. GAIL ROBERTSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2028
TAGS: ASEC ECON PTER PREL BO
SUBJECT: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT: BELARUS
REF: A. STATE 6461
B. 07 MINSK 743
Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d,,e,f,g).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Post believes three objects in Belarus meet the
definition of critical infrastructure (ref A): the Druzhba
oil pipeline, the gas pipelines, and the Sosniy nuclear
research facility. The USG actively engages Belarus to
improve security at Sosniy. End summary.
Druzhba Oil Pipeline
--------------
2. (SBU) The Druzhba pipeline transports approximately 1.35
million barrels of oil per day to Europe. Under normal
conditions the main recipients of oil shipped through
Druzhba, Poland and Germany, store at least a two-month
supply of oil reserves. However, alternate spare pipeline
capacity could not fully meet European demand in the event
the Druzhba pipeline did not function.
Yamal-Europe Gas Pipeline
--------------
3. (SBU) Russia supplies 44 billion cubic meters of gas to
the EU via the Russian owned Yamal-Europe gas pipeline and
the Beltransgaz pipeline. Excess capacity through Ukraine
could allow some supplies to be rerouted in the event of a
disruption in Belarus, but significant economic damage to
Europe would still occur in the event of a long-term
disruption.
Sosniy Nuclear Research Facility
--------------
4. (S) Belarus' Joint Institute of Power and Nuclear
Research, Sosniy, houses significant amounts of fissile
material for research purposes and exhibits security lapses
reminiscent of most Russian facilities a decade ago (ref B).
U.S. Department of Energy teams have visited Sosniy regularly
to plan an upgrade to the Material Protection, Control and
Accounting System, and recent visits have explored the
possibility of cooperation on creating the proper regulatory
environment to better secure nuclear materials.
STEWART