ROUGH ROAD AHEAD FOR MEXICO'S PRD DESPITE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 003594 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX SUBJECT: ROUGH ROAD AHEAD FOR MEXICO'S PRD DESPITE CONSOLIDATION OF MODERATE'S POSITION REF: MEXICO 3171 Classified By: Polcouns Charles Barclay. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Jesus Ortega, newly confirmed president of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD),this week heralded the beginning of a new period of greater stability for his party. However, his assumption to the presidency has done nothing to quiet the bitter factional tensions among Mexico's left. While the threat by the United Left to formally leave the party in the short term has been exaggerated, PRD's partners since the 2006 elections, the Convergencia Party and far left Workers Party, broke off their alliance with the PRD and are thought to be wooing disaffected PRD members. Most political observers believe it is too late for hard-line PRD standard bearer Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) to form a new party before the 2009 elections. Several party insiders told us that he will seek to strengthen support from within the PRD, and attempt to garner hardline PRD candidates to stand in next summer's legislative elections, in order to build a base from which to launch a 2012 presidential bid. He is also reaching out to the smaller leftist parties. END SUMMARY. Triumph for the New Left Has Not Defused Internal Conflict -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The Mexican Federal Electoral Tribunal November 12 ruling that Jesus "El Chucho" Ortega won last spring's disputed internal party elections for the party presidency only occasioned more internal wrangling in its immediate aftermath. Losing candidate (and AMLO proxy) Alejandro Encinas reportedly asked Ortega not to accept the tribunal's decision and proposed reaching a political accord to govern the party, but Ortega rejected the offer. Encinas then considered accepting the number two position of General Secretary, but decided against it, stating that it would validate the tribunal's decision. Instead, Hortencia Aragon, also from the United Left Faction (ULF),took the job, but hardliners are not happy with her appointment as she is supported by the PRD Governor of Zacatecas, who is viewed as too close to the New Left Faction (NLF). ¶3. (C) Nevertheless, Encinas apparently has decided not to leave the PRD but rather to form a new movement within the party and provide expanded political support for AMLO. Sources close to AMLO told Emboffs that the failed 2006 presidential candidate himself had counseled Encinas to strike a middle path, believing it better served his interest to have an influential supporter on the inside to help him undermine Ortega's faction than it was to take the uncertain path of a formal split. PRD insider MaryCarmen Soria told Poloff that the ULF's threat to leave the PRD was exaggerated and designed to exact concessions from the Ortega camp. Most agree, however, that the rift has only deepened and poses serious risks to PRD's long-term health. According to Encinas supporter Raul de la Paz, while tribalism has been a fact of life since PRD's inception, this is the first time in the party's history that the president of the party and party standard bearer come from opposing factions, which makes the divide in the party deeper than ever. Smaller Parties Hope to Capitalize -------------- ¶4. (C) The ULF's near-term strategy of remaining under the PRD umbrella has not prevented the departure of hard liners, although we see no signs of a mass exodus so far. Former PRD spokesman Fernandez Norona and some PRD founding members have resigned from the party. Press reports say an estimated 10,000 rank and file PRD members from a Mexico City borough signed up two weeks ago with smaller, left-of-center Convergencia. The day after Ortega's confirmation by the electoral tribunal, that party, and the far left Workers Party (PT),broke relations with the PRD (and later announced they would run candidates together for the 2009 legislative elections). Most observers say the move was designed to attract defectors from the PRD. Convergencia's parliamentary coordinator Alejandro Chanona asserted to Poloff that the move was long contemplated and timed to give time to form and register the new alliance and recruit candidates for 2009 (while expressing a fair amount of bitterness toward moderate MEXICO 00003594 002 OF 002 PRD leaders, who he said were arrogant and dismissive of the smaller parties). He denied that Convergencia was actively wooing disaffected PRD members but said his party recognized their value-added and would not turn them away. (He also confirmed that a PRD Mexico City borough president had walked with a large group of city employees to present themselves to Convergencia's headquarters.) AMLO's Strategy -------------- ¶5. (C) For his part, AMLO would be hard-pressed to formally leave the PRD and form his own party given time constraints posed by the new electoral law of 2007. That will not stop him from working closely with the smaller leftist parties to pursue his agenda, however. In the past two years, AMLO has used a coalition of hardline PRD, Convergencia and PT legislators to attempt to block legislation, such as fiscal, electoral and energy reform not to his liking. He has extensive contacts with members of both Convergencia and PT and will likely support their candidates in constituencies where his hard line PRD supporters are not standing for legislative seats. Alejandro Chanona told Poloff that Convergencia would use AMLO to campaign for its candidates (and those of the PT) in areas where PRD is weak. ¶6. (C) At the same time, according to de la Paz, AMLO's main near-term objective is to fight aggressively to secure slots for his PRD supporters as 2009 legislative candidates (putting more energy into this fight than he has to secure PRD party leadership positions). De la Paz believes that AMLO needs the allegiance of 100 deputies in Congress in order to continue to influence Mexico's political agenda and maintain his profile over the next several years. With this legislative base after 2009, he also can legitimately threaten to cripple PRD by breaking off if the party's leadership did support his candidacy for the 2012 elections. ¶7. (C) While most observers discount a formal split, Director of AMLO's Social Movements Ricardo Ruiz opined that if the ULF does not get an equitable share of deputy candidates early next year for the 2009 Congressional elections, the party would break up, or could dissolve gradually as candidates migrate to smaller parties such as Convergencia. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Genuine differences over agendas and posture remain among PRD's tribes. Although he doesn't much care, AMLO's medium-term goal -- to fashion a political base that will hold through the 2012 elections -- is probably the single most important factor that will further divide and weaken the party. Beyond patching together a coalition of hard-line PRD members and the smaller leftist parties, AMLO needs to craft an agenda that captures the support of a broader segment of Mexico's voting public if he is to remain viable over the next four years. Spearheading opposition to energy reform provided him with a life support system for many months, keeping his profile high, galvanizing his core supporters and even shifting the terms of the energy debate. At the same time, though, it further undermined him among mainstream voters. He'll need another set of issues to energize (let alone expand) his base in the months ahead. END COMMENT. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / BASSETT