NEW MILITARY HUMAN RIGHTS DIRECTORATE STILL A WORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 002337 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2028 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MX SUBJECT: NEW MILITARY HUMAN RIGHTS DIRECTORATE STILL A WORK IN PROGRESS REF: MEXICO CITY 2112 MEXICO 00002337 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: POLITICAL Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay. Reason: ¶1. (C) Summary: The Mexican military's reluctance to fully engage the public, media, or even other elements of the Mexican government on human rights seriously undermines its image here and abroad. In January 2008, SEDENA created a Directorate General for Human Rights, to improve the institution's handling of human rights cases. The new office exemplifies a changing attitude among the military high command about human rights, but has not yet established itself as a key broker between the institution and civil society. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Mexico's military has long been a hermetic institution, a characteristic that stems largely from Mexico's post-revolutionary period in the late 1920's. After a protracted period of POLITICAL violence which drew in and fragmented the military, military bosses and civilian politicians made a pact that got the institutions out of politics in exchange for a degree of institutional autonomy that was remarkable even by regional standards. In addition to freedom from both POLITICAL and bureaucratic interference in its internal affairs, the Mexican military since the 1930s has enjoyed an enviable amount of budget autonomy. It also possesses a code of military justice granting it broad jurisdiction over soldiers accused of "offenses against military discipline" as well as offenses "under common or federal law." ¶3. (U) Antipathy toward the Mexican military among the Mexican left and human rights community dates to the so-called "Dirty War" of the 1970s, in which the military was accused of widespread rights violations during its battle against an armed insurgency in southern Mexican states. Military operations against Zapatista rebels in the mid-1990s also occasioned charges that the institution tolerated rights violations and refused to cooperate with civilian authorities and civil society in investigating allegations against soldiers. ¶4. (U) The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture issued a report on Mexico in 1998 that found that "military personnel appear to be immune from civilian justice and generally protected by military justice," and recommended that serious crimes committed by military personnel against civilians be subject to civilian prosecution. The current debate over the military's intensive involvement in counter narcotics operations, has given new life to this contention. ¶5. (U) SEDENA's creation of a General Directorate for Human Rights in January of this year is designed to help open up the institution. The Directorate is charged with investigating human rights complaints from Mexican governmental human rights entities (the state and national commissions, as well as law enforcement institutions) and international organizations, such as UNHRC, promoting compliance with international humanitarian law, and promoting an institutional culture within the military that promotes respect for human rights. Contacts in presidency and SRE say the office is also supposed to work to improve the interface between the military and civil society. ¶6. (C) Within the institution, the Directorate has made headway. Members of the Embassy's Defense AttachQ office have had several meetings with Directorate staff and leadership and report that they has been cordial and forthcoming in discussing the office's functions. The DATT reports that conversations with senior military officials, as well as visits to military units demonstrate that the command's emphasis on human rights training and performance is making its way down through the ranks and that the establishment of the Human Rights Directorate has had a healthy influence among soldiers. (DATT also reports some pushback by older senior officers who think the emphasis is misdirected in the middle of a drug war.) ¶7. (C) It has also made some gains also in broadening SEDENA's engagement with institutions outside the military. CNDH staff we have spoken with say they have established a good working relationship with the Directorate. Indeed, the recent release of eight new CNDH recommendations, citing military abuses, was the result of close coordination between that organization and the directorate. A military intelligence source within the Estado Mayor told us the release was carefully orchestrated innoculate the military against backlash when new allegations became public. MEXICO 00002337 002 OF 003 ¶8. (SBU) On the other hand, CNDH's pugnacious leader, Jose Luis Soberanes, continues to complain publicly that efforts to investigate accusations against soldiers continue to be hampered by the military's refusal to grant access for interviews. (The military defends its refusal on the grounds it seeks to protect the integrity of its own investigations.) Moreover, virtually all attempts by NGOs to set up meetings with the Directorate or seek information on specific cases have been rebuffed. It is a widespread (but unconfirmed) assumption that the head of the UN Human Rights Office in Mexico ended his tenure in February of this year in response to complaints by military officials that he was too aggressive in his criticism of the military's involvement in counter narcotics operations. Military Code, Prevailing Attitudes Prevent Information-sharing ¶9. (SBU) Military officials cite their code of military justice, which prohibits individuals (besides the accused) and organizations from releasing any information about an ongoing case. This includes the names of soldiers accused of criminal offenses. While invoked to protect the rights of the accused, the code restricts media, NGOs and even family members access to, and public use of, details about the investigation or prosecution, or even the whether soldiers charged with crimes are being detained. Rights organizations are suspicious that the military uses this restriction to justify its disinclination to bring criminal cases against soldiers to conclusion. (Comment: When it suits SEDENA to do so, it is perfectly willing to release the names of soldiers accused of rights violations. Last year, it named the soldiers and officers allegedly involved in a checkpoint shooting in the state of Sinaloa; two weeks ago, it provided CNDH with the names of the soldiers implicated in the eight cases that organization cited in its new list of recommendations. End Comment.) ¶10. (C) Of course, SEDENA retains its own suspicions of civil society. A conservative PAN Senator on the Defense Commission who maintains close ties to the military told the Political Counselor that many senior officers, including the Director General of the new office, are suspicious of independent rights organizations, and believe some are being funded by the cartels to discredit the military. Suspicions that CNDH itself has been infiltrated by the cartels have often been voiced by senior military officials. The Director General told the Embassy's Defense AttachQ that his office has yet to decide which groups are reputable and merit engaging. ¶11. (C) Comment: While the cartels certainly have an interest in undermining public support for the military's prominent role in President Calderon's counter narcotics strategy, we are skeptical that national rights organizations have been bought by Mexican drug lords. There is more evidence that the Cartels pay individuals to put forth false claims of abuse by soldiers, use contacts in local media and government to discredit the military and engage in their own direct campaigns, using a variety of tools. The majority of the organizations the Embassy deals with -- those which say they have knocked on the Directorate's door with poor results -- have proven themselves in our experience to be credible and independent, if not particularly balanced in their perspectives. ¶12. (C) As for the publicly funded CNDH, while its curmudgeonly president has often used his position to grind a political ax, he and his organization are frequently accused by non-governmental organizations of being, if anything, too close to the government. ¶13. (C) There is clearly a wide gulf that needs to be bridged between the military and civil society. But suspicion of civil society organizations is not limited to the military. Many GOM contacts express disdain for non-governmental organizations, particularly human rights groups. The more than 70 year dominance by the Institutional Revolutionary Party over most organizational aspects of Mexico's POLITICAL landscape left little space for independent groups. Non-governmental organizations, human rights groups included, are only slowly getting their legs here, developing their capabilities and generating respect among government entities. As civil society develops, the barriers that isolate the military will undoubtedly break down. End Comment. MEXICO 00002337 003.2 OF 003 Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / WILLIAMS