PRESIDENCY MINISTER ON ZIMBABWE: "WE'RE DEFENDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MAPUTO 000666

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ZI MZ
SUBJECT: PRESIDENCY MINISTER ON ZIMBABWE: "WE'RE DEFENDING
NATIONAL INTERESTS, NOT MUGABE"

REF: MAPUTO 603

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Todd Chapman for reasons 1.5 (b) and (
d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: After being told that the GRM's stance on
Zimbabwe harms the government,s international reputation and
that a stronger effort--beyond quiet diplomacy--is
imperative, Minister of the Presidency Antonio Sumabana
claimed that the GRM views Mugabe as a dangerous madman who
could inflict significant damage on Mozambique, including
sabotaging the energy generation infrastructure of Cahora
Bassa Dam or Mozambican railroads. He said that the GRM's
'fragility' made it difficult to speak out, but that
President Guebuza had actually done so in addition to
behind-the-scenes efforts. The GRM sees their stance--which
we might consider as 'head-in-the-sand'--as prudent conflict
avoidance with both Zimbabwe and with South Africa, and
task-shifting to SADC. Even so, increasing civil sector
criticism suggests that the GRM could be swayed with
additional, high-level USG intervention. END SUMMARY.

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GRM Told That Silence Hurts Int'l Reputation
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2. (C) Following a joint demarche with nine other Embassies
on President Guebuza to discuss Zimbabwe on June 27 (reftel),
I requested a one-on-one meeting with Minister of the
Presidency Antonio Sumbana the following week to have a more
frank discussion on the subject. I told Sumbana that while
the group appreciated the opportunity to meet with the
President, the general consensus was that it was a
disappointing result as Guebuza simply repeated the official
stand-behind-SADC response. The Minister was especially
concerned when told that Mozambique's 'quiet diplomacy' on
Zimbabwe was hurting the GRM's reputation in Washington and
in many other capitals.

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"Mugabe is a Madman Who Can Harm Mozambique"
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3. (C) Sumbana reacted defensively but with greater candor
than in previous discussions on Zimbabwe. He noted his own
recent visit to Harare (where he formerly served as
Ambassador) to meet with Mozambique's Ambassador, who
concluded that Mugabe had suffered from some kind of mental
breakdown resulting in erratic behavior. "Mugabe is a madman
who can cause Mozambique a lot of trouble" was a constant
theme throughout our conversation. Sumbana recounted how
ZANU's soldiers had bases in Mozambique when fighting against
Rhodesia and that many in the Zimbabwean military knew
Mozambique well. "If Mugabe sent someone to blow up the
electricity generators at Cahora Bassa dam or our railroads,
it would cause Mozambique great economic hardship. We want
Mugabe gone, of course we do, but we cannot afford to have
Mugabe attack Mozambique. We have to think more about our
national interest," he concluded.

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"GRM's Fragility Makes Public Comment Difficult...
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4. (C) After I elaborated on the political costs to
Mozambique of remaining silent and not publicly condemning
the political violence, Sumbana retorted that Mozambique was
not getting credit for the actions they had taken, including
refusing entry of the Chinese ship with Zimbabwe-bound arms
into a Mozambican port. I (again) commended the GRM's
decision to reject the Chinese vessel, but said that we were
looking for continuing measures by the GRM to encourage
positive change in Zimbabwe, and reiterated that silent
diplomacy isn't enough. "But we are an extremely fragile
country, even more so now with the food crisis and the rising
fuel prices," said the Minister. He reiterated the argument
that Western governments chose to chastise misbehaving
leaders publicly, whereas the African way was to do so
privately. Reminded of the positions taken by Botswana,
Zambia, and Tanzania, Sumbana replied it was much easier for
more stable countries like Botswana and Tanzania to make such
statements, but Mozambique as a fragile state could not
endure any potential retaliation from Mugabe.

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...but We Have Spoken Out In the Right Forum"

MAPUTO 00000666 002 OF 002


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5. (C) I suggested to Sumbana that he consider briefing a
smaller group of countries, with a view of being more
transparent about President Guebuza's actions behind the
scenes. He liked the suggestion but said he would have to
clear it with the President. The next day, Sumbana agreed to
the meeting and asked that I host it at my residence. I
invited the British, French (representing the EU),Canadian
and Swedish Ambassadors for lunch with Sumbana and
Presidential Counselor Carlos Pessane on July 10. The
Minister shared much of the same information about
Mozambique's fear of reprisals, but added that the President
did communicate often with Mbeki and believed they were
making progress towards a negotiated political settlement in
Zimbabwe. Defending his President, Pessane stated that
Guebuza was very direct with Mugabe during their recent
meeting at Sharm al Sheik on his need to negotiate with the
MDC. Pessane reminded us that Guebuza did hold a press
conference in Egypt July 2nd lamenting the political violence
in Zimbabwe and underscoring the importance of political
negotiations. They believed this statement demonstrated GRM
intent and responded to our earlier expressed concerns about
Mozambican reticence. The British, French, Canadian, and
Swedish Ambassadors all presented their perspectives on how
Mozambique was being viewed in their capitals with the common
thread being a general disappointment with the GRM's failure
to take a more visibly apparent role in arguing for the
preservation of democratic principles in Zimbabwe.

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COMMENT/PROPOSED ACTION
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6. (C) The GRM claims that they want Mugabe gone and are
working behind the scenes to support SADC's efforts to
promote a negotiated solution--and have pointed to several
concrete steps they have taken to that end. At the same
time, the Mozambicans frequently mention having already
suffered much as a result of the Zimbabwean crisis and appear
to have concluded they have too much to lose by criticizing
Mugabe openly. Although Zimbabwe forces might be unlikely to
have the capability to muster any sort of sabotage action in
the short term--thus weakening Minister Sumbana's
claim--perhaps more important is the GRM's hesitancy of being
seen by Mbeki as parting ways with SAG efforts. The GRM
appears to feel that the overall bilateral relationship with
South Africa is too important to take an independent
position. Hence, the GRM strategy, such that there is one,
seems to be to hope the Zimbabwe problem will simply go away.
While we would call that a head-in-the-sand strategy, they
would characterize it as prudent conflict avoidance and task
shifting to SADC. Nonetheless, Mozambique's independent
media are increasingly critical of the GRM's stance, civil
society groups are hosting events challenging the absence of
more visible GRM action, and public sentiment about Zimbabwe
is increasingly negative. In this environment, I believe
that a high-level call from Washington to Foreign Minister
Oldemiro Baloi would be useful to help underscore U.S. and
international concern about the continuing political violence
and impasse in Zimbabwe. As a relatively new Minister,
however, he does not yet have the sway to convince the
President to change course and adopt a more activist position
which might be at variance with South Africa. Sumbana is the
one who must be turned. Another useful Washington action
would be to call in Mozambican Ambassador to the U.S. Armando
Panguene. While not viewed as one of Africa's most agile
Ambassadors in Washington, he does have a direct channel back
to President Guebuza and to Sumbana, therefore it is worth
calling him in for a frank discussion.
Chapman