PEACE PROCESS BATTERED BUT NOT BURIED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 002365 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MTS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2018 TAGS: PGOV EAID PINR PREL PHUM KISL RP SUBJECT: PEACE PROCESS BATTERED BUT NOT BURIED REF: MANILA 2338 (HIGH COURT RULES AGAINST MILF PEACE DEAL) Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Despite a Supreme Court decision October 14 striking down a centerpiece territorial deal between the Philippine government and Muslim insurgents, leaders of both sides continue to insist that they remain committed to finding a negotiated settlement to the Muslim insurgency. Beyond that shared conviction, however, the way forward remains murky, with the government asserting talks will not begin anew until rogue Muslim insurgent commanders are neutralized, Mindanao's security situation has been stabilized and a still-vague consultation process has been carried out with concerned parties. For its part, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front announced it would not launch an uprising in reaction to the Supreme Court decision but has signaled to a variety of diplomatic sources that it is looking to international mediation to solve the impasse -- a move that Philippine officials are wary of. Meanwhile, fighting in Mindanao has remained at a relatively low intensity and fears that the Supreme Court decision, at the end of Ramadan, would spark a resurgence in fighting have thus far not materialized. Still, the fighting to date has resulted in tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons, creating a significant humanitarian problem, which the government, supported by U.S. and EU assistance, seeks to mitigate. The Ambassador, DCM, and Embassy officials continue to emphasize in frequent contacts with dozens of key players the need to end the fighting, and eventually return to negotiations, not just for the sake of an enduring peace, but to alleviate immediately the current suffering of internally displaced persons. END SUMMARY. SHARP SETBACK FOR PEACE PROCESS ... -------------- ¶2. (C) The strongly worded majority opinion in the Supreme Court's 8-7 ruling against the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain was categorical in its rejection of this key element in the government's comprehensive plan to create a self-governing Muslim political entity out of the current Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. The Court was unsparing in its criticism of the government and its peace negotiators, castigating them for contravening basic elements of the constitution, assigning illegal rights to the proposed entity, and failing to carry out adequate consultations with national and local political leaders. While the government had publicly insisted for weeks that it would not take any further action to implement the agreement, the high court's ruling was still a setback, both for the sharp tone of the rejection as well as the detailed nature of its objections. This could make it more difficult for the government to resurrect and repackage key elements of the deal in a later settlement, such as important proposals for sharing revenues from natural resources that were to fund development and operating costs for the new Muslim political entity. ... BUT NO SIGNIFICANT MILF COUNTERPUNCH -------------- ¶3. (C) While the Supreme Court's original August 4 temporary restraining order against the agreement sparked savage attacks against villages in North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte by three unrestrained Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) commanders, the latest ruling did not lead to any significant upsurge in fighting. The armed forces continued to report sporadic clashes and said it had prepared contingency plans to counter any MILF retaliatory attacks, but as of October 20, those fears had not materialized. Since October 1, there had been just 15 small-scale armed encounters between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and MILF forces in Mindanao. This compares with 128 for the year to date, most of which occurred between August 4 and September 1. ¶4. (C) Despite the relative calm, the AFP is using the opportunity presented by the earlier MILF attacks to continue offensive maneuvers intended to harass the three rogue MILF base commands that carried out the earlier attacks and further degrade their military capabilities, already much battered by August's ill-advised pitched battles with the MANILA 00002365 002 OF 003 armed forces. President Arroyo has stated repeatedly that her goal is to capture or neutralize the rogue commanders as a prelude to resuming peace discussions. The rugged terrain and guerrilla tactics employed by the MILF make that a tall order, but senior Philippine military officials have made it clear they are to extend the search for the commanders, using the opportunity to wear down what are some of the MILF's most effective fighting forces and further weaken the insurgents' appetite for conflict. The armed forces' efforts have broad support from politicians and a public outraged over the brutality of the MILF attacks, and Philippine legislators have pledged additional funds for the defense budget to cover the costs engendered by the fighting. HUMAN COST CONTINUES -------------- ¶5. (U) The lack of significant military conflict has done little to mitigate the suffering of those already displaced by the August attacks and unusual monsoon flooding in North Cotabato. Philippine authorities say they have served some 500,000 displaced persons, with tens or even hundreds of thousands currently living outside their homes. Assessment trips to North Cotabato province by international aid agencies and U.S. government personnel, including Mission's USAID members and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance officials, have confirmed food, health, and sanitation problems faced by the displaced villagers, though the exact number of affected persons is difficult to quantify because of inexact counting methods. It is important to note, however, that while the humanitarian crisis is severe, it is not widespread, as it afflicts just 4 percent of the population of Mindanao and 5 percent of its land mass. USG AND INTERNATIONAL AID -------------- ¶6. (U) Based on these assessments, the USG has provided almost $400,000 in non-food emergency relief aid (hygiene kits, plastic mats, mosquito nets, and blankets),water, sanitation, basic health and emotional recovery/psychosocial assistance. The USG will also provide through the United Nations World Food Programme food aid valued at approximately USD $2 million. The EU has announced Euro 4 million in emergency grant aid for the current crisis and an additional Euro 3 million for development assistance in the region. USG ACTIONS -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador, DCM, and many Mission members are using contacts developed over several years to convey to all key players the need to end the fighting now, focus on humanitarian assistance and development, and eventually return to negotiations. In recent comments to Foreign Secretary Romulo, Defense Secretary Teodoro, Peace Advisor Esperon, Executive Secretary Ermita, AFP leadership, and others, the Ambassador and DCM have acknowledged the positive efforts of the Philippine armed forces in restoring relative calm and stability in Central Mindanao. We have underscored the human and financial cost of continued fighting and voiced concern that the AFP may not have a concrete end in sight for their offensive and might push the MILF into a backlash. We are also stressing to key Muslim leaders from Mindanao that the MILF must remove its errant commanders from the battlefield as a first step toward resuming peace negotiations. ¶8. (C) In a sign that there may be nascent progress on the consultations, Foreign Secretary Romulo said he hoped an upcoming report from Catholic and Muslim leaders would start the discussion process moving forward. Various NGOs have stated their support for immediately ending hostilities in Mindanao and resuming the peace process, including the Bishop Ulama Conference, Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy, and the Mindanao Peoples Council. Even some local leaders who had been critical of the peace process seem more receptive. Zamboanga City Representative Isabelle Climaco said the high court's decision should become the "government's guide" in resuming talks with the rebel group. NOT ALL HELP WELCOME -------------- ¶9. (C) However, Philippine officials have been less welcoming MANILA 00002365 003 OF 003 of efforts on the part of some in the diplomatic and NGO community with less of a track record and who tend to overreach. The current stasis in the talks has prompted numerous outreach efforts by international peace organizations and diplomatic missions to the MILF. The MILF has said the rejected agreement has soured its faith in the Philippine government as a negotiating partner, and has called for the talks to be "internationalized," which it has publicly characterized as possible involvement by the Organization of Islamic Conference or the UN. Privately, the MILF leadership has floated ideas of international mediation with various EU-Asian diplomats. At the same time, several international experts on the peace processes and on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) have held discussions with MILF political leaders on lessons learned from other peace processes like Northern Ireland and Aceh. The MILF has sounded out these specialists as well on potential international intermediaries. ¶10. (C) According to diplomatic contacts, senior Philippine officials have expressed wary concern about these developments. European diplomats were called to a meeting October 15, during which senior Cabinet officials expressed gratitude for development assistance to Mindanao while at the same time making it clear that the Philippine government will ask if and when it seeks diplomatic intervention from the EU. We also know that the Arroyo administration is not pleased with Malaysia's performance in mediating the MILF peace talks -- senior Philippine officials routinely criticize the Malaysian facilitator for not being evenhanded. The government is concerned about having too many actors delving into a complex process that is politically charged, while not wishing to alienate Malaysia precipitously and perhaps endanger the ceasefire monitoring effort that Malaysia also heads. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) What is important now is to wind up the fighting, get people back in their homes and focus on development. Some sensitive negotiations are needed to get to that point, especially on what to do with the errant MILF commanders. We are closely engaged with key government, civil society, and MILF-connected officials to help all reset their goals to end the fighting. While early in the fighting the AFP had great success against these MILF commands, the costs of continuing to pursue these commanders, in terms of displaced people and alienated populations, now outweigh any military benefit. At the same time, the MILF needs to hear a consistent message from the international community that they must first figure out how to remove their errant commanders from the battlefield before the international community can help a return to peace talks. Unfortunately, many eager diplomats and peace experts are fueling hopes that the MILF will be rescued by an international savior. We are relying on close contacts built over several years to convey to the MILF the need to take serious actions. Key domestic NGOs are sending similar messages. We will continue to focus all players in the government, MILF, other political leaders in Mindanao and Manila, and civil society, on the need to return to a ceasefire, focus on development and eventually resume negotiations. KENNEY