MINDANAO PEACE PROCESS: SEEKING A WAY FORWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 002178 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MTS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018 TAGS: PGOV EAID PINR PREL PHUM KISL RP SUBJECT: MINDANAO PEACE PROCESS: SEEKING A WAY FORWARD REF: A. MANILA 02171 (DEFENSE SECRETARY DISCUSSES MINDANAO WITH AMBASSADOR) ¶B. MANILA 02072 (PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR DISCUSSES PEACE PROCESS Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Philippine government continues to grapple for an appropriate way to address the ailing peace process, even as it awaits the Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of the stalled Memorandum of Agreement on territory with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). While the government fully expects to resume peace talks once the Supreme Court issues a decision and the security situation is stabilized, exactly what form that process will take is fluid. Meanwhile, after several weeks of intensive fighting in central Mindanao, the military still is engaged in the hunt for the two MILF commanders who unleashed attacks on civilians and government forces in Mindanao, following the breakdown of peace talks in August. The Philippine Armed Forces has had success in containing the fighting, which is generally limited to Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao provinces in central Mindanao. President Arroyo had made the conflict in Mindanao a top priority and traveled there September 18 to meet with military commanders to assess firsthand the government's handling of internally displaced persons. In meetings with senior officials, including President Arroyo and key members of the Cabinet, the Ambassador has stressed our strong belief that the resumption of peace negotiations remains the only hope for achieving long-term stability and prosperity in the southern Philippines. President Arroyo is resolute in pursuing the peace process, but the political opposition appears just as determined to fight her efforts. The Supreme Court decision could dictate whether there are enough salvageable elements in the agreement to bring the parties back to the negotiating table soon. END SUMMARY. RESUMING PEACE TALKS -------------- ¶2. (C) The Philippine government continues to grapple for an appropriate way to address the ailing peace process, even as it awaits the Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of the stalled Memorandum of Agreement on territory with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). While President Arroyo clearly announced that the Administration would not sign the Agreement in any form, irrespective of the Supreme Court decision, some government officials indicated that the ruling, expected in late September, would help guide the form and substance of future negotiations. Government officials have also unambiguously stated that the peace process cannot move forward until the security situation on the ground in the conflict-affected areas of Mindanao has been stabilized and "rogue" MILF commanders have been captured, two areas in which the government has made progress. UNRESOLVED FACTORS -------------- ¶3. (C) While the government fully expects to resume peace talks once the Supreme Court issues a decision and the security situation is stabilized, exactly what form that process will take is undetermined. Although the government announced that it would appoint two peace panels -- one to address disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, the other to focus on political and economic concerns -- after the dissolution of the peace panel, it has not yet done so, nor have possible candidates to integrate the panels been mentioned. It is similarly unclear whether Malaysia will continue to play a role as facilitator, as there appears to be a considerable level of dissatisfaction within the Philippine government with their role. Officials have also made clear that disarming and demobilizing Muslim insurgents is not a precondition for returning to the negotiating table, but would be undertaken concurrently with the negotiations. PUNO OUTLINES STRATEGY -------------- ¶4. (C) During a private breakfast meeting September 18 with the Ambassador, Department of Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno said that resumption of negotiations would have to wait until the three rogue MILF leaders who were the instigators of violence have been apprehended, MANILA 00002178 002 OF 003 although he opined that decisive action to contain them by the MILF leadership might also be acceptable. While Puno acknowledged that further progress with the MILF might not be possible during President Arroyo's term, he said that Arroyo still held out hope for a return to negotiations. Secretary Puno stressed that much depended on the Supreme Court's ruling on the Memorandum of Agreement, and that if the Court found that the agreement was unconstitutional, that could result in yet another move to impeach President Arroyo, which would put the peace process on hold indefinitely. SEARCHING FOR ROGUE COMMANDERS -------------- ¶5. (C) After several weeks of intensive fighting, the Philippine military still is engaged in the hunt for the two MILF commanders -- Commanders Bravo and Kato -- who unleashed a series of attacks on civilians and government forces in Mindanao following the breakdown of peace talks in August. Although initially more widespread, the fighting is generally now limited to Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao provinces in central Mindanao. Initial battles between large numbers of MILF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) forces have given way to smaller, guerrilla-style engagements after the MILF suffered heavy casualties from AFP bombing and artillery. The MILF is using its knowledge of the terrain and support from locals to keep the AFP at bay, preferring to employ ambushes when they have the advantage. In recent days, such engagements have resulted in AFP casualties as Philippine troops press further into MILF territory in Mindanao. While the MILF commanders are still on the run, there have been reports that Commander Kato was injured during the fighting and that Commander Bravo is closing ranks and dismissing bodyguards out of fear of betrayal. Meanwhile, on Jolo, the local MILF commander has signed an agreement with the Philippine AFP commander, pledging to maintain the ceasefire and stability on the island. We have not seen MILF forces moving from the Sulu Archipelago to Mindanao in support of the rogue MILF commanders. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS A TOP PRIORITY -------------- ¶6. (C) The Philippine government has told us that they expect fighting to continue on a limited scale for the near term. President Arroyo had made the conflict in Mindanao a top priority and traveled there September 18 to meet with military commanders to assess firsthand the government's handling of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The Philippine National Disaster Coordinating Council estimates approximately 105,000 families (500,000 people) have been displaced in Mindanao from January through early September. The majority of the IDPs are located in Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato, and Maguindanao. Approximately one-third of those were displaced in the fighting that has occurred in the last month. Although government shelters are overcrowded, many families have begun to return to their homes or are staying with relatives. The total assistance being provided by all government and NGO partners (including the UN) is about USD 13 million. USAID is supplying an additional USD 100,000 in assistance to Save the Children, an international NGO. The Philippine government believes that in order to protect the civilian population from both Christian vigilante forces and rogue MILF insurgents, a more robust police presence -- coupled with stronger cooperation between law enforcement and the military -- will be necessary in Mindanao. FORCES STRETCHED THIN -------------- ¶7. (C) Although the AFP had performed very well to date in moving their forces and managing the conflict -- including minimizing civilian involvement -- in the aftermath of losing one of their C-130 aircraft on August 25, the Philippine government is concerned about the military's ability to sustain operations from a resupply standpoint. The loss of the aircraft and the focus on Mindanao had temporarily stretched the ability of the AFP to respond to other demands. Should the Philippines suffer another large natural disaster in the next few months, the government has emphasized that it might have to call on the USG for assistance. MISSION DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS -------------- MANILA 00002178 003 OF 003 ¶8. (C) In meetings with senior government officials, including President Arroyo, Foreign Secretary Romulo, Defense Secretary Teodoro, Interior Secretary Puno, and other key members of the Cabinet, the Ambassador and senior Mission officials have stressed our strong belief that the resumption of peace negotiations remains the only hope for achieving long-term stability and prosperity in the southern Philippines. Noting the cost in human life and displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, the Ambassador has repeatedly underscored the need to limit hostilities and not permit the conflict to spread to other areas of Mindanao. Similarly, the Ambassador has highlighted the importance of respecting the human rights of civilians and captured combatants alike. Philippine officials have uniformly stressed their intention to limit the conflict and seek a way back to the negotiating table. Since the conflict began last month, the Ambassador has also been in regular contact with other members of the diplomatic community, including the Australian, British, and Japanese ambassadors to ensure that the international community stays engaged. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) While President Arroyo appears determined to pursue the peace process, she faces continued challenges, both from Muslim insurgents and from her vociferous political opponents. The political opposition appears determined to fight her efforts, not necessarily because they oppose peace, but because they perceive a political vulnerability they can exploit. Some Senators and other key members of the opposition appear intent on denying her the legacy of peace she has announced she seeks, and instead see the potential for yet another run at impeachment. The MILF faces a similar dilemma. While the MILF leadership clearly wants a peace agreement, they are hard pressed to turn over the "rogue" commanders who instigated the current violence, as such action could be seen by some as tantamount to treason in this clan-based society. In addition, the MILF leadership cannot easily abandon the stalled agreement, as it represents the fruit of several years of negotiations. Beginning the process from scratch would be an admission of failure that could cost the MILF leadership their positions. The wild card here is the Supreme Court decision, which could well find that while the agreement is unconstitutional in its present form, there are enough salvageable elements to bring the parties back to the negotiating table. KENNEY