PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR DISCUSSES PEACE PROCESS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 002072 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MTS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018 TAGS: PGOV EAID PINR PREL PHUM KISL RP SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR DISCUSSES PEACE PROCESS WITH AMBASSADOR Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Jon Lindborg for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a wide-ranging discussion with the Ambassador September 3,Presidential Peace Advisor Hermogenes Esperon made it clear that the Philippine government is still searching for an appropriate way forward in peace process negotiations with Muslim insurgents in Mindanao. A key milestone will be the Supreme Court decision on the stalled memorandum of agreement on territory, which is expected by the end of September. The Ambassador's talk with Esperon was useful in helping to sift through the plethora of voices and policy prescriptions being issued by government officials from a variety of government agencies. Esperon took pains to emphasize that the peace process remains alive, but the exact nature of the future talks had yet to be determined. He explained that President Arroyo had dissolved the peace panel for talks with Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and would set up two new panels for the talks, one that would focus on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of insurgent forces, while the other would address political and economic issues. In spite of harsh criticism from all sectors of society for the MILF attacks in central Mindanao and assertions that the MILF was no longer a viable negotiating party, Esperon suggested that the government is continuing discussions with some MILF members and while disarming the MILF was essential, it was not a precondition and would move simultaneously as peace talks move forward. END SUMMARY. SHIFT IS COMING, BUT EXACT DIRECTION UNCLEAR -------------- ¶2. (C) During a private meeting at the Ambassador's residence September 3, Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process Hermogenes Esperon explained that while the Philippine government had dissolved the peace panel for talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),it would pursue a new peace process policy with the MILF whereby "negotiation with armed groups will be in the context of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration" (DDR). Esperon, who will remain as presidential advisor for the peace process, stressed that defanging the MILF as a military organization was not a precondition for further negotiations but would proceed simultaneously with a resumption of peace talks. At �A;such time, the government would likely create two peace panels for MILF talks: one would focus on disarmament; the other would address political and economic issues. NEW STRATEGY BORN OUT OF MILF "ATROCITIES" -------------- ¶3. (C) Esperon explained that the new strategy had been born out of MILF "atrocities" in central Mindanao, specifically the killing of 28 innocent civilians in Cotabato and the taking of hostages in Lanao del Norte. Esperon emphasized that negotiations with the MILF would resume only when the situation in Mindanao became conducive to talks; that is, when the MILF handed over the rogue commanders responsible for the recent violence, or when the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) captured them. He reiterated President Arroyo's statement to Ambassador that the rogue commanders were an obstacle to peace and would need to be removed for the peace process to move forward. Esperon concluded that the government's new policy represented a shift in strategy from centering on dialogues with rebels to "authentic dialogue" with communities and stakeholders. PEACE PROCESS IN HOLDING PATTERN -------------- ¶4. (C) Esperon said the peace talks were essentially in a holding pattern for the month of September, as the Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of the stalled Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on territory was expected by September 30. Admitting that the government was concerned about the "political" inclinations in the Supreme Court and the implications of the ruling for the Arroyo administration, he observed that the Supreme Court ruling nonetheless would guide the Philippine government on what was feasible in terms of negotiations. Esperon noted that the AFP was making progress in its operations against MILF rogue elements in Central Mindanao and expected to wrap up operations in September. He observed that given that Ramadan was taking MANILA 00002072 002 OF 003 place in September, the AFP expected less fighting, with a possible spike in insurgent activity in early October, once Ramadan concluded. TALKS BY LATE SEPTEMBER? -------------- ¶5. (C) Esperon expressed hope that the success of AFP operations against MILF rogue elements, coupled with a not-too-damaging Supreme Court ruling on the MOA, would permit peace talks to resume by late September. At that time, the government would reconstitute a peace panel and resume negotiations, without either approving or disapproving of the memorandum of agreement. Esperon expressed his belief that the MILF Central Committee was not directing the rogue commanders and that, in a loyalty-based clan society, turning them in to the government would cost the Central Committee its leadership positions. Thus, according to Esperon, the AFP would have to capture the rebel commanders, something he admitted could prove hard to do. However, he added that if the AFP made enough headway, these rogue MILF commanders would at least lose their ability to attack again. Esperon conceded that the success of current AFP actions was proving popular, pleasing both President Arroyo and some of the hawks in the Cabinet. Still, Esperon thought the MILF would seek peace negotiations as they had no other options to pursue. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador stressed to Esperon the importance of limiting the conflict, and keeping it from spreading to other areas of Mindanao, while also respecting the human rights of civilians and combatants alike. She impressed upon Esperon the need for a manageable ceasefire to allow development to continue and encourage the government and the MILF to behave responsibly and return to peace talks. The absence of dialogue served no good purpose. MNLF HELPFUL BUT NO NEGOTIATIONS -------------- ¶7. (C) Turning to widely publicized reports that the Philippine government was considering negotiations with the other major Muslim group in Mindanao, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF),with which the government reached an agreement in 1996, Esperon discounted the implication that the government would now shift its focus to the MNLF. Nonetheless, he admitted that MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari was seemingly inclined to be helpful and, while acknowledging that Cotabato City Mayor and MNLF leader Muslimin Sema had played a sensible and helpful role during this difficult time, he noted that it would be difficult to find room for both Misuari and Sema in the MNLF. He concluded that the ongoing review with the MNLF on how to implement fully the 1996 peace deal would not be complicated. IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE -------------- --- ¶8. (C) Esperon said President Arroyo was especially concerned about the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the fighting in central Mindanao and the government was working to make sure relief got through. The Ambassador expressed concern that aid projects important to stability and prosperity in Mindanao could not go forward for the time being due to the security situation. Esperon responded that he thought things would improve by the end of September but agreed that now was definitely not the time to have assistance workers operating there. He requested that the international community make clear that foreign assistance would continue, even if peace process was not in best shape. He also expressed concern that AFP operations could spark human rights complaints and agreed with Ambassador that MILF fighters who surrendered needed to be treated well and accorded all rights under the law. BROADENING THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING TEAM -------------- ¶9. (C) Esperon said the government was considering broadening the International Monitoring Team (IMT) to include countries beyond Malaysia, as they had done during negotiations with the Moro National Liberation Front. Esperon indicated he was headed for Kuala Lumpur later in the week to meet with Malaysian facilitator Datuk Othman. As an aside, Esperon complained that Othman had not been particularly helpful in MANILA 00002072 003 OF 003 moving the process forward. LINDBORG