THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY FIVE YEARS AFTER OAKWOOD:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 001885 SIPDIS STATE FOR S/CT, EAP/MTS, DS/IP/ATA, DS/SP/EAP, DS/IT/ATA E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2018 TAGS: ASEC PTER RP SUBJECT: THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY FIVE YEARS AFTER OAKWOOD: REFORM CONTINUES, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN REF: A. MANILA 1384: JCS CHAIRMAN MEETS PHILIPPINE COUNTERPART ¶B. MANILA 0167: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH DEFENSE SECRETARY TEODORO Classified By: Kristie A. Kenney; for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Five years after a small group of Philippine military personnel seized an apartment complex in Manila, demanding an end to the corruption and neglect they believed was crippling the armed forces, the Philippine military has made significant progress in its efforts to retrain, reequip, and reform its forces. Recently, Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Yano publicly stated that while isolated cases of corruption still exist in the military, improvements have been made in logistical and operational fields. However, other critics continue to complain that recent reforms are merely administrative in nature and do not address underlying problems, such as the politicization of senior military officers and the lack of a defined direction regarding the future of the armed forces. Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro has repeatedly underscored his personal commitment to the Philippine Defense Reform Program, declaring it ONE of his top priorities and insisting that it is a process for which the Philippine government must continue to shoulder responsibility. Over the past four years, the Philippine government has spent USD 414 million funding military retraining and equipment purchases, with U.S. contributions totaling USD 41 million during that same period. Sustained U.S. support and engagement is paying big dividends: we are seeing long-term financial and apolitical commitment by the Philippine government, which is key to sustaining progress in military reform. END SUMMARY. -------------- OAKWOOD MUTINY: LIGHTING A SPARK -------------- ¶2. (C) On July 27, 2003, more than 300 Philippine military officers and troops seized the upscale Oakwood Apartment complex in downtown Manila, demanding the resignations of President Gloria Arroyo, then Secretary of Defense Angelo Reyes, and senior military officers for betraying the country by allowing corruption and neglect to stifle modernization of the Philippine military. Although the mutiny ended without incident when the soldiers surrendered to authorities 18 hours later, as a result of the grievances aired by the rebellious soldiers, President Arroyo created an independent fact-finding commission to investigate the charges. The commission validated several of the rebellious soldiers' claims regarding problems in recruitment, retirement benefits, military medical services, and other issues. While the vast majority of the Philippine public, along with members of the country's armed forces, were adamantly opposed to the mutineers' actions, the concerns raised by the failed mutiny became issues which the government was forced to confront. -------------- PHILIPPINE DEFENSE REFORM -------------- ¶3. (C) The seeds of Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) were first planted in 1999, when U.S. and Philippine defense officials initiated policy discussions on reform within the Philippine military. Subsequently, both countries participated in Joint Defense Assessments of the Philippine Armed Forces in 2001 and 2003. During the second assessment in 2003, the Oakwood mutiny occurred, further highlighting soldiers' and officers' dissatisfaction with inequities and corruption in the military. Consequently, as PDR took shape, its goals and objectives incorporated recommendations from the defense assessments as well as the Arroyo fact-finding commission convened in the wake of the Oakwood mutiny. The PDR Program was developed to initiate short-term improvements and long-term goals of the Philippine military. Conceived as a multi-year initiative, PDR focuses on key areas of the armed forces, including personnel issues, logistics, procurement, administration, and retraining and re-equipping of 84 battalions. Over the past four years the Philippine government has spent USD 414 million funding military operations and equipment purchases, with the United States MANILA 00001885 002 OF 003 contributing USD 41 million during that same time period. ¶4. (C) In late 2007, soon after being appointed by President Arroyo, dynamic and politically influential Secretary of Defense Gilberto Teodoro underscored his personal commitment to the PDR Program, declaring it ONE of his top priorities and making himself the PDR program chairman. Secretary Teodoro insists that it is a process for which the Philippine government must shoulder responsibility (ref B). For example, he sought to de-link the sale of military property assets from funding for the Philippine military, stressing that modernization funds should not be contingent on the sale or lease of military-titled property. Secretary Teodoro wants to strengthen Philippine military capabilities, through training and equipment, and believes the size of the Philippine military may need to increase. Declaring PDR a finite process with a proper endstate, Secretary Teodoro stressed, "We cannot have a state of perpetual reform. We will set our goals . . . as to where it should end and where the function of the PDR should be undertaken by the major services themselves." To facilitate this process, Secretary Teodoro set up an interagency group to participate in defense reform. ¶5. (C) While putting his personal stamp on defense reform and emphasizing to military leaders that the formal PDR program must obtain certain key goals in the near term, Secretary Teodoro has not ignored the need to obtain buy-in from the Philippine Congress to institutionalize the reforms the military is implementing. Teodoro has told Philippine legislators that modernization of the Philippine military may be expensive at the outset, but it is a necessity that cannot be avoided, whether the Philippines focuses on internal threats or external strategic partnerships. A former congressman, whose wife is currently in the House of Representatives, Teodoro not only understands the importance of the legislative process in securing stable funding for the military, but also the difficulty in convincing skeptical politicians to commit scarce funds to an organization with a history of corruption. -------------- -------------- MILITARY MAKES PROGRESS AGAINST ENDEMIC CORRUPTION -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Parallel to the focus on modernizing the military through enhanced training and new equipment, there has been a strong effort on the part of the military to root out corruption. During recent meetings with senior U.S. officials, Philippines Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Alexander Yano has admitted that isolated instances of corruption still exist within the Philippine military, but he cites recent court-martial proceedings against officers charged with corruption as evidence the Philippine military will not condone institutionalized malfeasance (ref A). In June, the Philippine Army announced they had convened court-martial proceedings against a two-star general for unlawful recruiting procedures. Critics point out that the lack of lawyers in the Philippine military -- 80 lawyers for more than 2,500 pending cases -- stymies prosecution of fraud and corruption cases in the armed forces. Military sources respond that with a higher budget and more personnel, they could tackle corruption more effectively. In 2007 for example, there were more than 1,500 complaints filed in the military regarding accusations of fraud, embezzlement, and corruption. Only 253 were recommended for filing due to lack of evidence, but out of those filed, there was a 57 percent conviction rate. -------------- - TRYING TO GET IT RIGHT, DESPITE THE CHALLENGES -------------- - ¶7. (C) Trying to balance conducting military operations against terrorist groups well-entrenched in the clan societies of the southern Philippines with upholding the rule of law, the military has begun an effort to clean up their past image as an organization which abused human rights (ref A). Over the past few years, senior military leadership have made concerted efforts not only to improve the Philippine military's record on human rights, but also to address the legacy of politicization of senior military officers that MANILA 00001885 003 OF 003 began during the Ferdinand Marcos regime. Since taking office in May, General Yano has emphasized that military promotions will be based on meritocracy, a criteria which has been demonstrated by the promotion of officers based on professional merit, not political ties. In public statements, as well as in private meetings with U.S. officials, senior Philippine military leaders have acknowledged the importance of being "above" the political fray and that respect for human rights does much to enhance the military's standing not only with the Manila political establishment, but also with the Muslim populace in Mindanao. -------------- CONTINUED USG ENGAGEMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Since 1951 with the signing of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States has maintained a continued engagement with its Philippine military counterparts. Bilateral annual military exercises such as Balikatan, our growing number of ship visits to various Philippine ports, and our continued subject matter expert exchanges do much to strengthen our relationship with the Philippines. Part of that engagement is an emphasis on the Philippine military's embrace of soft power, including civil-military and humanitarian assistance operations. The Philippine armed forces have shown a strong interest in such operations over the last two years, increasingly using civil-military projects as a viable and highly-effective method in maintaining and securing a peaceful environment in areas of southern Mindanao prone to terrorist recruitment by groups such as Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Challenges remain in the Philippine military's drive to reform itself after years of corruption and neglect. However, the Arroyo Administration, especially given Secretary Teodoro's personal commitment to the PDR program, appears to be willing to make some substantive efforts in facilitating the military's modernization efforts. Any such attempt is dependent upon a Philippine Congress that may be skeptical about increasing funds for the armed forces. Nonetheless, in the budget deliberations for 2008 held last fall, the Philippine military budget was approved with little debate and no reduction of the amount requested. It remains to be seen whether this outcome was a one-time phenomenon or a signal that Congress realized that the Philippine armed forces have been underfunded for almost two decades and that the internal and external stability of the nation depends in large part on a healthy, modern military committed to democratic principles. KENNEY