FOREIGN MINISTER ON LARIJANI VISIT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000734 SIPDIS BAGHDAD FOR AMBASSADOR ERELI E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2038 TAGS: PREL MOPS IR BA SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ON LARIJANI VISIT REF: A. MANAMA 702 ¶B. MANAMA 528 Classified By: Classified by CDA Christopher Henzel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: Bahrain's Foreign Minister saw Larijani's visit as part of Iran's double game of pressure and engagement with Gulf states. Larijani said Iran was concerned about allegedly new American military activity. End summary. ¶2. (S) CDA, accompanied by poloff, called on Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmad Al Khalifa October 22. Shaikh Khalid said the visit of the speaker of Iran's parliament, Ali Larijani, was in response to a long-standing invitation from the speaker of Bahrain's chamber of deputies. (Discussion on Iraq and human rights reported septels.) Larijani was in Bahrain from October 21-23 and met with King Hamad, the Crown Prince, the Prime Minister, the FM, and members of parliament and the business community. ¶3. (S) Shaikh Khalid said he had his own meeting with Larijani at the MFA that morning and then joined Larijani's meeting with the Crown Prince. According to Shaikh Khalid, he and the Crown Prince had urged Iran not to do anything that would harm the region's stability. Larijani had replied in both meetings that Iran wanted only peace and that the U.S. was the troublemaker. (Note: Larijani met King Hamad later that evening, and we do not yet have a readout.) "New" American Military Activity -------------- ¶4. (S) Shaikh Khalid said Larijani also told him and the Crown Prince that Iran was concerned about "new American cruise missiles" as well as an American submarine that had allegedly entered the Gulf recently. The Crown Prince replied that American forces had been "coming and going to Bahrain since 1949," that Bahrain's agreement with the U.S. was "private," and that U.S.-Bahraini ties "were not aimed at Iran." ¶5. (S) Shaikh Khalid told CDA Larijani is "a lot smarter than Ahmadinejad, but is just as much of a hard-liner." The FM expressed puzzlement at Larijani's belief that there was new American military activity in or near Bahrain. CDA undertook to update the FM if he learned of any unusual activity that might be a basis for Larijani's statement. ¶6. (S) Comment: Embassy Manama's Office of Military Cooperation is currently engaged in discussions with the Bahrainis about the possibility of acquiring or constructing additional space for U.S. weapons at the Bahrain Defense Forces' Munitions Storage Facility near Shaikh Isa Airbase. This would include cruise missiles and equipment for a Patriot battery being stationed here. However, we think it unlikely the Iranians would be aware of these discussions. American submarines visit Bahrain every few months. An SSGN called several months ago and an SSN in early October. Both would have been visible to workers and mariners at the commercial port. End comment. ¶7. (S) CDA asked the Foreign Minister why he thought Larijani had accepted the Bahraini invitation at this time. Shaikh Khalid responded that Iran was always playing a double game of engagement and threats with Gulf countries. The Gulf states would continue to rely on their relationship with the U.S. to deter Iran. Comment -------------- ¶8. (S) Larijani's visit and Shaikh Khalid's readout track with the pattern of Bahraini-Iranian relations in recent years (ref B). Negotiations between the Bahraini and Iranian oil ministers over a potential natural gas deal continue (ref A); Bahraini MinState for Foreign Affairs Baharna visited Tehran in July, while President Ahmadinejad visited Bahrain in November, 2007. The Bahrainis believe they must deal with their large neighbor across the Gulf, but view the strong U.S. military presence in Bahrain as the key to their national security. ********************************************* ******** Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/ ********************************************* ******** HENZEL