VISAS DONKEY: REQUEST FOR CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000394 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INL/C/P, CA/VO/L/C, WHA/CEN, WHA/PPC DEPT ALSO FOR INR/B AND INR/IAA - EMERSON SOUTHCOM FOR FPA AND J9 NSC FOR ALVARADO AND FISK BOGOTA FOR POL, NAS AND RLA - FGROENE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018 TAGS: CVIS PREL PGOV KCOR KCRM EFIN NU SUBJECT: VISAS DONKEY: REQUEST FOR CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA INELIGIBILITY FINDING--JOSE MANUEL MARTINEZ SEVILLA REF: A. MANAGUA 130 ¶B. 07 MANAGUA 2562 ¶C. 07 MANAGUA 2001 ¶D. 06 MANAGUA 36 ¶E. 05 MANAGUA 2774 ¶F. 05 MANAGUA 2740 ¶G. 05 MANAGUA 2662 ¶H. 05 MANAGUA 2625 ¶I. 05 MANAGUA 2597 ¶J. 05 MANAGUA 2443 ¶K. 05 MANAGUA 223 ¶L. 05 MANAGUA 1760 ¶M. 04 STATE 45499 ¶N. 04 MANAGUA 1349 Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli for reasons 1.4 b & d. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: Embassy is seeking a security advisory opinion under section 212 (f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, proclamation 7750, suspending the entry into the United States and revoking the visa presently held by Jose Manuel Martinez Sevilla, born in Nicaragua on 19 November 1941. Martinez is currently the chief justice of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court (CSJ). National Assembly deputies loyal to FSLN leader Daniel Ortega and corrupt ex-President Arnoldo Aleman facilitated Martinez's election to a five-year term on the Supreme Court in 2003 as part of the "pact" between the two party bosses intended to undermine the Nicaraguan Constitution and ensure that all power in Nicaragua remains in their hands. Martinez has been a close associate of Arnoldo Aleman for decades and was elected the Supreme Court because of his loyalty to the ex-president. In 2005, as part of the Aleman-Ortega pact, which stipulates that the presidency of the CSJ rotate between PLC and FSLN magistrates on a yearly basis, Martinez became the court's chief justice. Even though his year expired in early 2006, he remains chief justice because of disputes between Aleman and Ortega on who should succeed him. ¶2. (C) Both as a CSJ magistrate since 2003 and as chief justice since 2005, Martinez has used his CSJ posts to serve as Aleman's proxy on the court and to enrich himself and the PLC by participating in the entrenched system of judicial corruption established by the Sandinistas (FSLN). Since his appointment to the CSJ, Martinez has loyally executed Aleman's orders on all important cases that have come before him, including siding with Ortega and Aleman on every single decision in the long-running political and institutional battle between the two party bosses and the previous Bolanos Administration. More recently between 2005 and 2006, Martinez was one of the two key CSJ actors in a complicated scam in which Martinez took bribes and manipulated the court system at multiple levels in an attempt to free a pair of Colombian drug traffickers, one of whom has a previous conviction for narcotics trafficking, and make illicit funds seized from them "disappear." These efforts led to the loss of the seized funds, freed one of the two Colombian traffickers, and led to a very light two-year sentence for the other one. ¶3. (C) Although the previous Attorney General's office (Procuraduria) called for a full investigation of this case involving the liberation of drug traffickers and their money and for an investigation of the part Martinez played in the plot, no substantive investigation has ever taken place. This is due to the fact that Martinez enjoys legal immunity from prosecution, as well as the protection of Arnoldo Aleman, corrupt National Prosecutor Julio Centeno Gomez, and of the PLC caucus in the National Assembly, which have blocked all efforts to launch an investigation of the CSJ magistrate. The ongoing political and financial corruption of which Martinez is an integral part has caused enormous damage to U.S. national interests including the stability of democratic institutions in Nicaragua, U.S. foreign assistance and development goals, as well as the activities of U.S. businesses here. ¶4. (C) Martinez remains a chief proxy for Arnoldo Aleman and his cronies, and one of Aleman's primary means both to secure illegal financing for the PLC and to undermine Nicaragua's Constitution and efforts of democratic forces to improve governance. He continues to damage all of these national interests, and to sustain the Aleman- Ortega stranglehold on the judiciary and the country as a whole. Moreover, Martinez's specific involvement in the Colombian case has played out publicly making obvious the fact that justice can be bought and sold in Nicaragua, and that those involved are untouchable so long as they enjoy political protection. Unfortunately, numerous judges at all levels are emulating Martinez's example, severely undermining the entire system of justice and impeding U.S. and Nicaraguan efforts to successfully prosecute international drug, arms and human trafficking. For all of these reasons, post recommends that the Department make a 212(f) finding against Jose Manuel Martinez Sevilla. The following provides information requested in reftel M, paragraph 16. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. MARTINEZ AND THE PLC TAKE PART IN THE FSLN SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL CORRUPTION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (U) As the Department's recent annual Human Rights Reports on Nicaragua have noted, almost all judges appointed to the country's Supreme Court owe their loyalty to either Aleman or Ortega, and their decisions on all sensitive cases are blatantly partisan and political. Each time openings are available on the Court, Aleman and Ortega negotiate package deals whereby they divide the judicial appointments evenly, always ignoring experienced and politically neutral candidates. Manuel Martinez was appointed to the CSJ in 2003 as part of such an Aleman-Ortega deal. Subsequently, he has performed a role for Aleman similar to that played by his FSLN counterpart, magistrate Rafael Solis, for Daniel Ortega Just as Solis does for Ortega, so Martinez votes as Aleman's proxy on politically sensitive issues. NOTE: The Department revoked Solis's visa under INA 212(f) in 2004 (reftel N). END NOTE. Martinez also uses his office to sow corruption throughout the judiciary via appointments of lower court judges and, in return for "fixing" judicial decisions, accepts bribes for his personal benefit and to fill Aleman-controlled party coffers. IMPUNITY R' US: MARTINEZ LIBERATES TRAFFICKERS AND LAUNDERS THEIR DRUG MONEY - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) In August and September 2005, Manuel Martinez participated in a complicated scheme (first reported in reftel G and described in greater detail in reftel D) to free two convicted Colombian drug traffickers and make their laundered money "disappear" in return for bribes for himself and other magistrates involved, as well as for the PLC and the FSLN. According to confidential embassy sources involved in the plot from beginning to end, the entire scheme was orchestrated by Lenin Cerna, the former director of state security during the 1980s Sandinista regime and current General Secretary of the FSLN. Cerna remains a shadowy figure in Nicaragua, involved in all manner of illicit FSLN activities. According to credible sources, Cerna orchestrated the plan to free the Colombians and their money in return for large payoffs to the FSLN, the PLC and the individual judges and lawyers involved in the scheme. Cerna's plan was implemented with the personal approval of FSLN leader Daniel Ortega, who reportedly negotiated agreements with international drug traffickers whereby traffickers would be allowed to operate unimpeded on the country's Atlantic coast if Ortega were elected president in ¶2006. Although the FSLN dominates the Nicaraguan judiciary and is the key player in such organized judicial corruption schemes, Aleman and his loyalists in the PLC, including Martinez, also actively participate in the corruption, taking their cut of the proceeds. ¶7. (C) This case began with the April 2004 arrest of Colombian citizens Jorge Eliecer Gonzales Hernandez (AKA Luis Angel Gonzalez Largo) and Leyla Bucardo Chavez in a Managua hotel with close to USD 800,000 cash in their possession. Since Nicaragua lacks a law governing the maintenance of seized assets, the seized money was deposited in a bank account belonging to the CSJ and directly controlled by Martinez and Solis. Hernandez and Bucardo were subsequently convicted of money laundering and other charges and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. There is no doubt that CSJ PLC magistrate Manuel Martinez and CSJ FSLN magistrate Roger Camilo Arguello (whose 212(f) case will be forthcoming), worked at the behest of Arnoldo Aleman, Bayardo Arce and Lenin Cerna, to personally orchestrate a scheme to erase the Colombians' convictions and liberate them and their illicit funds in return for bribes for themselves, the PLC, and the FSLN. ¶8. (C) This plot to free the Colombians and steal their money began in August 2005, when defense lawyers presented a spurious allegation that the trial was illegal because it had taken place in a jurisdiction different from the one in which the Colombians had been arrested. The appeal made the false claim that the duo had actually been arrested in the town of San Marcos, not Managua. This false allegation was supported by additional fabricated testimony from a police officer who had never testified and had no involvement in the case. Despite the fact that this technicality had never been raised during the original trial, it served as the legal pretext for the scheme that followed. Once the defense lawyers lodged their appeal, FSLN magistrate Roger Camilo Arguello began to manipulate the judicial system to ensure that the appeal was approved. First, Arguello used his position on the Supreme Court's constitutional chamber to appoint substitute Judge Julio Morales Aragon to rule on the spurious claim. Once Morales took up the appeal and "investigated" the case, he approved the appeal in record time (one day),overturned the convictions of Hernandez and Bucardo, and ordered that they and their money be released immediately. However, word of the developing scheme leaked to the media, and, before Hernandez or the money could be released, FSLN appeals court judge Enrique Chavarria overturned Morales' ruling, apparently to quiet the media outcry over what was happening. Subsequently CSJ Chief Justice Manuel Martinez publicly promised a full investigation. However, no such investigation took place, and Martinez and Arguello continued to proceed quietly with their efforts to free the Colombians, including a meeting to discuss how laundered drug money would be divided among the CSJ magistrates. ¶9. (C) With their first scheme to free the Colombians and their money having failed, Martinez and Arguello switched tactics. The Colombian's defense team appealed to the CSJ to have Chavarria's ruling overturned. Arguello drafted a sentence that would overturn Chavarria's decision and free the Colombians and their money. To obtain the signatures of the other constitutional chamber judges, Arguello and Martinez allegedly misled them as to the purpose of the draft sentence, while Arguello forged the signatures of others. At the same time as he was securing the CSJ verdict in favor of the Colombians, Arguello also engineered the extension of Judge Morales' temporary mandate as presiding judge over the case. ¶10. (C) Once Martinez and Arguello had the requisite signatures (both the authentic ones and the allegedly forged ones) on the ruling overturning the conviction of the two Colombians and releasing them and their money, Arguello took the document, which had not been properly authenticated according to established CSJ procedures, and made a photocopy, which he gave to one of the lawyers for the Colombians. The next day, the lawyers delivered the photocopy to Judge Morales, who immediately ordered the release of the Colombians and their money. Bucardo was released, but Hernandez remained incarcerated on other charges. At the same time, in his capacity as CSJ chief justice, Manuel Martinez signed a check from the CSJ account he controlled in the amount of USD 609,000, made out to the Colombians' lawyers, and ordered that the money be released from the CSJ account in the Nicaraguan Treasury. In August 2007, Supreme Court Vice President Rafael Solis confirmed to the Embassy that he and Martinez were the only two officials with access to this CSJ account. ¶11. (C) Henry Areas, the then-Treasury Director, was reluctant to release the funds, so Arguello and Martinez intervened again, ordering Areas to facilitate the release of the check to the Colombians' lawyers as quickly as possible. Areas complied, and the lawyers, using power-of-attorney documents, received the treasury check on September 26 and, based on instructions from Martinez, converted the funds to six separate cashiers' checks at a commercial bank that were redeemed the next day. At the bidding of Arguello and Martinez, Judge Morales personally went to the bank with the defense lawyers. Bank security cameras filmed Morales in the company of the lawyers when they took possession of the money. A confidential Embassy source subsequently reported (reftel D) that once the money was withdrawn from the bank, a large portion (USD 306,000) of it went to the FSLN via then-National Assembly deputy Bayardo Arce, while smaller amounts went to the various judges involved in the scheme, including CSJ magistrates Martinez, Arguello, Yadira Centeno, Rafael Solis, and Edgard Navas Navas. The source stated that Martinez and Centeno received the largest amounts of money given to individual magistrates (USD 100,000 each). ¶12. (C) Accounts of this case leaked to the media, including the central roles of Martinez and Arguello in liberating Bucardo and the disappearance of the money. To quiet the ensuing public and media uproar, Arguello left Nicaragua for nearly a month, while Martinez again promised a "full investigation" of the case. This investigation targeted several low-level judges and lawyers involved in the scheme, but eschewed any examination of the roles played by Martinez and Arguello. On December 13, 2005, Martinez announced a variety of administrative sanctions for several of the lesser actors involved in the disappearance of the money, but took no action against the two key actors in the entire affair: himself and his fellow CSJ magistrate Arguello. ¶13. (C) In October 2005, the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduria) charged Martinez and Arguello with embezzlement of government funds and judicial corruption; however, the two enjoyed immunity from prosecution that could only be lifted by the National Assembly, which was controlled by PLC and FSLN deputies loyal to the Aleman-Ortega pact. National Prosecutor Julio Centeno also leapt to Martinez's defense, declaring that his office (the Fiscalia),not the Procuraduria, held primary jurisdiction over any criminal investigation. The subsequent investigation by the Fiscalia, widely viewed as bogus, again focused on the "small fish" protecting Martinez and Arguello. In February 2006, the Fiscalia "archived" its investigation, declaring it had found no grounds to charge anyone in the liberation of drug trafficker Bucardo and in the "disappearance" of the USD 609,000 of drug money. Thus by virtue of protection under the Aleman -Ortega pact, both Martinez and Arguello have continued their CSJ "duties" unimpeded. Martinez has since publicly gloated about the immunity (and impunity) he enjoys, declaring to the media on November 22, 2005 that, "There is no procedure by which we (the magistrates of the CSJ) can be judged. People can say whatever they want, but no one can judge us. Not even the National Assembly has the power to judge us." OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE: MARTINEZ'S ROLE AS ARNOLDO ALEMAN'S PROXY ON THE SUPREME COURT - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶14. (C) Martinez and his fellow PLC magistrates on the CSJ helped former president and convicted felon, Arnoldo Aleman, escape justice, obstructing efforts by the Government of Panama to investigate Aleman's money laundering activities in that country and violating Nicaraguan law and international treaty obligations in the process. In January 2005, the office of the Panamanian Anti-Corruption Prosecutor announced that its intention to press charges against Aleman and other conspirators for money laundering in that country. Panamanian law requires that suspects be formally notified at each stage of such cases, so Panamanian authorities asked Nicaragua's then-Attorney General, Alberto Novoa, to serve papers notifying Aleman and the others of a preliminary hearing against them. ¶15. (C) Immediately, the then-National Prosecutor (Fiscal General) Julio Centeno Gomez alleged that Novoa's actions were illegal and insisted that only the Fiscalia had the legal capacity to deliver such documents, despite both the existence of a Central American mutual assistance treaty specifically granting this authority to the Procuraduria, and the fact that the Procuraduria had already performed executed some 40 other similar cases without a word of protest from Centeno Gomez, a close friend of Aleman's whose visa was revoked under 212f in 2005 (reftel L). When the Novoa and the Procuraduria appealed to the courts, Martinez and his fellow CSJ magistrates sided with the Prosecutor Centeno. As the Panamanian investigation proceeded, Martinez and Centeno continued to use their positions to obstruct efforts by Panamanian authorities to carry out their legal notification obligations and derail Panamanian prosecution of Aleman. ¶16. (C) Also beginning in 2005, Manuel Martinez and all but one of the other CSJ magistrates abandoned any pretense of judicial independence and took blatantly partisan positions on every legal issue that surfaced in the institutional conflict between the Bolanos administration and its FSLN and PLC opponents in the National Assembly. (Reftel J) Between 2005 and 2006, with Martinez at the helm, the CSJ ruled month after month in favor of the Aleman-Ortega pact-controlled National Assembly in dozens of constitutional disputes that arose out of Assembly "reforms" intended to strip powers (and even Bolanos himself) from the presidency and transfer them to itself. The Bolanos government regarded these "reforms" as unconstitutional and refused to recognize them -- a position bolstered by a ruling from the Central American Court of Justice that declared the changes unconstitutional and a violation of the separation of powers mandated by Nicaragua's Constitution. At one point, the government instructed the police to carry out orders that contravened the desires of the National Assembly. In retaliation, Martinez and other CSJ magistrates called for the creation of a body of "judicial police" that would bypass the executive, and report directly to the Court. Then, after international pressure forced Aleman and Ortega into a political "cease-fire" with Bolanos, Martinez led the CSJ in reversing itself and suspended further legal actions against Bolanos. IMPUNITY CONTINUES: MARTINEZ IS INCORRIGEABLE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶17. (C) Martinez and his fellow magistrates continue to subvert Nicaragua's Constitution and its rule of law by using the CSJ, and the courts more generally, as an instrument to pressure and threaten opponents of the Aleman-Ortega pact. In August 2007 Martinez and the CSJ refused to hear the case of Alejandro Bolanos-Davis, a National Assembly member from the Conservative Party, who had been stripped of his Assembly seat on the basis of U.S.-Nicaraguan citizenship, but really for attacking Lenin Cerna, the FSLN and judicial corruption (reftel C). Martinez's refusal to hear a case referred to the CSJ by the National Assembly itself was surprising given his eagerness, only a year earlier, to hear and rule in favor of nearly every case he received from the Assembly. This pattern of subversion and corruption has continued. In December 2007 and January 2008 Martinez facilitated two CSJ decisions that emasculated the efforts of opposition National Assembly members to require (now) President Ortega to comply with Nicaraguan law as he sought to formally incorporate his Citizen Power Councils (CPCs) into the Executive Branch. (Refs B and A) SERIOUS ADVERSE EFFECT ON U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶18. (C) CSJ Chief Justice Manuel Martinez has used his judicial position to serve the political interests of Arnoldo Aleman and his allies to undermine the Nicaragua's constitutional order and governance; he has helped to free drug traffickers, and has taken bribes and used his office to protect convicted felon Aleman and other corrupt officials. All these corrupt acts have had serious adverse effects on those U.S. interests specified in the Presidential Proclamation as well as U.S. foreign policy priorities highlighted in the Embassy's Mission Program Plan (MPP). The Embassy has encouraged Nicaragua to prosecute officials for corruption and has provided substantial financial and technical support in corruption cases. The Embassy has also provided a numerous resources and training to the Nicaraguan police and military to increase their capabilities to intercept and arrest international drug traffickers. This training and support has been increasingly successful, with Nicaraguan law enforcement capturing increasing numbers of drug shipments, drug traffickers, and laundered drug money each year. ¶19. (C) The Department's 2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) highlighted judicial corruption as one of the single greatest factors undermining anti-drug trafficking efforts in the country. Unfortunately, the corruption of Manuel Martinez, other Supreme Court magistrates, and of lower court judges under his sway, has not only enabled many of the drug traffickers to go free, but also to recover the drug money and other drug properties seized by police, undermining the hard work of the police, military and the USG in seeking to prosecute traffickers and carry out the rule of law. Although Manuel Martinez is just one part of the CSJ's corruption problem, his corrupt actions, and his total impunity, both of which he has thrown in the face of the public, have reinforced widespread popular attitudes that justice can be bought and sold in Nicaragua. As the CSJ's chief justice, Martinez is the most public face of judicial corruption in Nicaragua. Lower court judges are increasingly emulating Martinez and his CSJ counterparts and freeing drug traffickers and their money in return for bribes ¶20. (C) Stability of Democratic Institutions: The Embassy's top priority is strengthening and consolidating democracy through the development of transparent, accountable and professional governmental institutions, including the judiciary. Our MPP states that "... abuse of power, corruption and politicization of many state institutions, especially the judiciary, have impeded the consolidation of democracy and economic growth." Martinez sits at the apex of this criminal justice system and his corrosive corrupting influence has undermined democracy creating serious political instability. Martinez's participation in unrelenting "pact"-driven attacks against the Constitution and Nicaragua's democratic institutions have helped to put supporters of democracy perpetually on the defensive. His stalwart defense of convicted felon Aleman has obstructed both Nicaraguan and Panamanian efforts to prosecute the ex-president to the full extent of his crimes. ¶21. (C) Martinez's corruption, which amounts in itself to money laundering, and his trafficking of influence have been particularly devastating to the credibility of Nicaragua's institutions, as overwhelming evidence of his corrupt acts has been front page news for months at a time -- without Martinez having suffered any legal consequence whatsoever. His case has demonstrated to the entire country that corrupt officials can commit any act, and be caught at it, without suffering any legal consequences as long as they enjoy the support of Ortega or Aleman. The result is total impunity for corrupt individuals and bolsters the widespread attitude that even a democratically-elected government is incapable of providing for the public good. The resulting cynicism has undermined confidence in democracy, government institutions and the administration of justice. ¶22. (C) Foreign Assistance Goals: One of the top three USG foreign assistance goals in Nicaragua is strengthening democracy. The chief goals of USAID assistance in this area are battling corruption and effecting judicial reform. Aleman and Martinez's actions have directly damaged progress in both of these areas. In December 2003, post froze our judicial assistance program in response to endemic judicial corruption, highlighted by what appeared to be an imminent fraudulent "not guilty" verdict for Arnoldo Aleman, due to backroom dealing between Ortega and the corrupt ex-president. Thanks to corrupt officials such as Martinez, Aleman possesses the means to protect allies from the consequences of their corrupt acts and the power to sanction and silence opponents. This power has enabled him to retain total control of the PLC caucus in the National Assembly, and he uses this power to negotiate the very future of the country with Ortega. ¶23. (C) Due to their control of Nicaragua's entire court system from CSJ magistrates like Martinez on down, Aleman and Ortega have the ability to use nominally legal means to harass, intimidate and arrest opponents. In a vicious circle that guarantees their political power, Ortega and Aleman use co-dependent cronies such as Martinez on the Supreme Court and other state institutions to ensure their control of the National Assembly, which, in turn, ensures their control of all the other institutions of the state that are under the Assembly's supervision, including the judiciary, the Comptroller General's Office (Contraloria),and the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE),among others. For as long as Martinez and people like him remain on the Supreme Court, it will be an integral part of Nicaragua's corruption problem, rather than what it should be, a key institution aiding the government in its anti-corruption fight. ¶24. (C) International Activity of U.S. Businesses: Corrupt Nicaraguan institutions hamper U.S. investment in Nicaragua and discourage U.S. exporters from establishing agent/distributor relationships. U.S. investors and business-people are reluctant to risk their resources in Nicaragua, knowing they could easily be subjected to the vagaries of a corrupt judiciary or the whims of politicians should they become involved in any commercial dispute, real or trumped up. By shamelessly serving only the interests of Arnoldo Aleman and the PLC, sowing corruption throughout the judiciary, by taking bribes to enable drug traffickers to escape with their proceeds, Martinez has undermined Nicaragua's constitution, facilitated perpetual political instability and ensured that U.S. and international businesses continue to regard Nicaragua as a risky investment prospect. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR FINDING - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶25. (C) On February 13, Martinez met with the CG to discuss his immigration status. He said he requested the meeting because, in 2005, he had experienced problems at U.S. ports of entry on various occasions. During his last transit through the U.S. on November 5, 2005, the DHS officer asked Martinez to waive his diplomatic immunities before allowing him to clear immigration. While DHS officers did not explain why he was consistently sent into secondary, he concluded that he had been included on the list of "desvisados" (those whose visas had been revoked by the Embassy). Martinez said he had seen his name on this list, as well as all the other members of the Supreme Court, at one point in the local newspapers. He noted that other magistrates of the Supreme Court had experienced similar problems at ports of entry and that they had come to the Embassy to clarify their immigration status. He was aware of which magistrates had subsequently had their visas restored and which had their revocations confirmed. ¶26. (C) CG inquired about Martinez's residency status. He stated that he had lived in the U.S. from 1979 until 1994 and was grateful for the political asylum that he had been granted. He said that his sister, his seven children, eight grandchildren and ex-wife were all American citizens, but that he had not pursued U.S. citizenship because he did not want to jeopardize his political fortunes in Nicaragua. Nonetheless, he professed great admiration for the U.S. and said that he wished to continue visiting his Amcit relatives there. ¶27. (C) CG explained U.S. immigration law and noted that when Martinez returned permanently to