SPAIN/AL-KASSAR: EXTRADITION ON TRACK, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000007 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT COORDINATOR DAILEY AND EUR/WE NSC FOR JUAN ZARATE DEA FOR MICHAEL BRAUN AND THOMAS HARRIGAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2018 TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV SP SUBJECT: SPAIN/AL-KASSAR: EXTRADITION ON TRACK, BUT GOVERNMENT WILL WAIT FOR APPEALS PROCESS TO END REF: A. MADRID 2251 ¶B. MADRID 2041 MADRID 00000007 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Eduardo Aguirre, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The extradition process of Syrian arms dealer Monzer al-Kassar continues to move forward and we are increasingly confident that he will end up in U.S. custody. Foreign Minister Moratinos and Interior Minister Rubalcaba have both told the Ambassador in recent days that the judicial process has been settled in favor of the U.S., and they agree Al-Kassar is a bad man who should be extradited. However, they also cautioned that Al-Kassar will have a final opportunity to appeal his case to the Constitutional Court, and the GOS therefore will wait for the appeals process to wrap up before carrying out the extradition. They want to do everything "by the book" to ensure that their handling of this high-profile case holds up to public scrutiny. Although there remains the possibility that the Constitutional Court could find for Al-Kassar and deny the extradition, top GOS officials have told us that they believe Al-Kassar's appeals case is extremely weak. Our contacts in the Spanish legal community believe Al-Kassar will make his formal appeal during the middle of January, and the Constitutional Court will then have 30 days to render its decision. If the Constitutional Court rules against Al-Kassar, the Spanish Council of Ministers will then give its final approval for the extradition. Many elements of the USG interagency and our Mission team have worked closely with Spanish authorities for several months to convince them of the need for Al-Kassar to stand trial in the United States, and we will continue to do all we can to make his extradition a reality. We will probably be in a holding pattern for a few more weeks while the judicial appeals process plays out. END SUMMARY //A LONG CRIMINAL HISTORY// ¶2. (C) Monzer al-Kassar is a reputed international arms dealer and accused terrorist with a long alleged criminal history. He is alleged to have sold arms in 1985 to the hijackers of the Achille Lauro cruise ship and then flown the group's leader, Abu Abbas, to safety on one of his private planes. In 1992, Al-Kassar made arms sales in the millions of dollars to Croatia, Bosnia, and Somalia, violating United Nations arms embargoes to all three countries. Later that year, the Spanish government arrested him for his alleged earlier involvement in the Achille Lauro hijacking and charged him with document falsification and possession of illegal weapons and vehicles. He spent more than a year in jail before being released on bail. The charges were eventually dismissed in 1995 after several prosecution witnesses changed their stories before the trial began. One prosecution witness fell to his death from a fifth-story window in what the coroner called an "alcoholic coma," and another witness's children were kidnapped by Colombian drug traffickers shortly before he was to testify. Current Spanish Justice Minister Mariano Bermejo and investigative magistrate Baltasar Garzon were both involved in prosecuting that trial and have told the Ambassador in the past that they regret not being able to win a conviction. In the summer of 2006, the Iraqi government placed Al-Kassar on their most wanted list and called him "one of the main sources of financial and logistics support" for the Iraqi insurgency. In June 2007, the Spanish government again arrested Al-Kassar, this time on behalf of the USG, which charged him with conspiring to kill Americans, supplying terrorists, obtaining anti-aircraft missiles and money laundering. ¶3. (C) Many elements of the USG interagency (primarily the DEA, US Attorneys in NYC, and the Embassy Madrid Country Team) were involved in the operation and investigation that ultimately led to Al-Kassar's arrest at Madrid's Barajas Airport on June 7. A number of Spanish government officials were aware of the USG investigation, and Al-Kassar's arrest was a victory for U.S.-Spanish law enforcement cooperation. MADRID 00000007 002.2 OF 003 In the immediate aftermath of the arrest, the Ambassador and DCM thanked GOS officials for their work and both Interior Minister Rubalcaba and his deputy Antonio Camacho assured us that Al-Kassar's extradition was a priority for the Spanish. They cautioned however that Al-Kassar would need to go through a lengthy and involved judicial process before his extradition could become a reality. All knew that Al-Kassar was a dangerous and ruthless man with good attorneys, and we expected him to fight the extradition every step of the way. In addition, he has served in the past as an informant of Spanish intelligence and law enforcement and maintains contacts in those services. ¶4. (C) Al-Kassar contended that his arrest had been the product of "entrapment" by DEA officers who posed as brokering agents for the Colombian terrorist group FARC. As "induced" crimes are not admissible in Spain, Al-Kassar argued that all charges should be dropped, or that if he was deemed to have committed any crimes, then he should be tried only in Spain. DEA Madrid and our Embassy legal advisor worked closely with the investigative magistrate and the office of the National Court Chief Prosecutor throughout the entire judicial process, and fully answered all requests for additional information. Assistant U.S. Attorneys visited Madrid to work with Spanish prosecutors to ensure they completely understood our case for extradition and to prepare them for probable defense arguments. Ambassador Aguirre also held several meetings with high-level Spanish officials, including the Vice President and Minister of Justice, to outline the charges against Al-Kassar and to explain our request for his extradition. The Spanish officials all said they were familiar with the case and knew very well what kind of individual he was. They also cautioned that we needed to wait for the Spanish judicial system to run its course. //THE EXTRADITION HEARING AND REVIEW PROCESS// ¶5. (C) The extradition hearing took place on October 4 before a three-judge panel and with Embassy officers in attendance. The hearing lasted over four hours and featured passionate arguments from both the prosecution and defense. The defense predictably attacked DEA and accused them of entrapment. The prosecution replied that Al-Kassar had been caught not in a "provoked" offense, but rather in a "detected" one, and laid out the Syrian's long alleged criminal history. On October 26, the Fourth Section of the Criminal Division of the Spanish National Court made public its 2-1 vote to accept Al-Kassar's extradition to the U.S. (REFTELS) Judge Teresa Palacios, who presided over the extradition hearing, voted against remanding Al-Kassar to U.S. custody, while her two deputy Magistrates voted in favor of the prosecution. Shortly after the verdict was announced, Ambassador Aguirre released a statement thanking the National Court for "striking a blow against international terrorism," and said that the verdict highlighted yet again that Spain and the United States remain united in the fight against terrorism. ¶6. (C) Al-Kassar then appealed his case to a 12-member panel headed by Judge Javier Gomez-Bermudez, who was the chief judge of the March 11, 2004, Madrid train bombings trial. On December 13, this panel upheld and approved Al-Kassar's extradition, with only Gomez-Bermudez voting against. The decision stated that Al-Kassar could be sent to the U.S., provided that he not be sentenced to death by a U.S. court, and provided that he not be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Following the appeals ruling, Embassy Madrid's legal advisor and the DEA Madrid Country Attache met with National Court Chief Prosecutor Javier Zaragoza to examine any hurdles that may remain in the way of the extradition. Zaragoza said that two steps remained, receiving official approval from the Council of Ministers, and Al-Kassar's final appeal to the Spanish Constitutional Court on the grounds that his human rights had been violated. Due to the holidays, Zaragoza said these two events would likely take place in mid-January. Our contacts in the Spanish National Court told us on January 2 that they MADRID 00000007 003.2 OF 003 will receive the panel's formal written decision on January 15, and at that time Al-Kassar will be able to make his appeal to the Constitutional Court. That Court will then have 30 days to render its decision. //GOS WANTS TO DO EVERYTHING BY THE BOOK// ¶7. (C) At a December 28 dinner hosted by the Ambassador, Interior Minister Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba said that the Spanish government supported the extradition of Al-Kassar, who he described as a "bad man" who needed to face justice. He noted however that a few steps still needed to be completed, and described again the role the Constitutional Court and Council of Ministers would play. Rubalcaba also noted that his Ministry had come under intense pressure from the Syrian government not to extradite Al-Kassar (placed mostly on the office of his deputy Camacho),but added that the Syrian actions only stiffened Spanish resolve to see Al-Kassar in U.S. custody. These comments echoed what Deputy Justice Minister Julio Perez-Hernandez had told the DCM a few days earlier, that the GOS would proceed deliberately and do everything by the book, and would wait until the completion of Al-Kassar's appeals process before physically transferring him to the U.S. He said the Spanish government did not want to be seen "putting Al-Kassar on an American aircraft at three o'clock in the morning," and therefore wanted to make sure that everything was carried out in an open and transparent manner. Perez-Hernandez expressed confidence that Al-Kassar would ultimately be extradited to the U.S. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador also discussed this case with Foreign Minister Moratinos on December 27. Moratinos said he was confident that the Council of Ministers would ultimately approve the extradition, but bureaucratic reasons impeded the case from appearing on the agenda of the final Council meeting of 2007. Moratinos also said a December 24 story in right-leaning El Mundo (alleging Syrian threats against Spain if they carried out the extradition and claiming that Moratinos had once given his word to Syrian authorities that Al-Kassar would not be extradited) was a complete fabrication, and suggested that Al-Kassar had paid off the journalist. Moratinos noted that he spoke to the Syrians probably more than any other European official, and that while Syrian authorities had raised the extradition with his chief of staff, the level and tenor was not as high as alleged in the news article. He then said that bilateral relations with Syria would certainly survive this case. //COMMENT - THE ROAD AHEAD// ¶9. (C) Spanish government officials at all levels are aware of the importance for the USG to see Al-Kassar face trial before a U.S. court and have assured us that it is a priority for them as well. Over the past several months, we have enjoyed excellent cooperation from GOS authorities on this case, and the Ambassador, DCM and members of the Country Team have had ready access to relevant Spanish officials and have been able to discuss all issues freely. Although the Spanish have made the political decision to respect the judicial rulings granting the extradition, the Spanish judiciary is fiercely independent, and there remains the possibility that the Constitutional Court could find for Al-Kassar and deny the extradition. However, top GOS officials have told us that they believe Al-Kassar's appeals case is extremely weak. For our part, the Ambassador and members of the Country Team will continue to work on a priority basis to ensure that Al-Kassar is extradited and brought to justice in the United States, but we should be patient for a few more weeks to allow the judicial appeals process to play out. AGUIRRE