RECOMMENDATION FOR CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000609 SIPDIS FROM AMBASSADOR AGUIRRE FOR PM AA/S MULL, EUR A/S FRIED, AND H A/S BERGNER, OSD FOR DASD FATA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2018 TAGS: MASS PREL SP SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION FOR CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF TOMAHAWK SALE TO SPAIN Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDUARDO AGUIRRE, JR. REASONS 1.4(B),(D). ¶1. (C) First, many thanks to PM, EUR, H, and our colleagues at DOD, especially DSCA, for their steadfast support over many months on the sale of the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) to Spain. This has been a long process, and we are grateful for the personal and focused attention it has received from senior personnel. While we appreciate the strong support, we believe the Administration needs to take the next and final step of moving forward expeditiously to meet its commitment to Spain. Specifically, we strongly recommend the Department push ahead and formally notify Congress of the sale. ¶2. (C) We understand representatives from the Departments of State and Defense again briefed Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff May 22. Unfortunately, it appears we are back to square one. Some staff members remain unconvinced -- despite repeated assurances -- regarding Spain and the integrity of the Missile Technology Control Regime. ¶3. (C) We recognize there may be other equities involved here. We can only speak to the bilateral issues, and there we fear that failure to do all we can to consummate this sale could have serious negative consequences. The Spanish Navy is staunchly pro-American. Spanish officers still talk warmly of the Eisenhower Administration's decision to enter a defense relationship with Spain and what that meant to their navy. Spanish officers who have served in operations with the U.S., either in NATO or bilaterally, are proud of that association and quick to brag about it. Despite the growth in European defense industries, including in Spain, and the pressure to buy at home, the Spanish Navy has a distinct preference for U.S. equipment. They believe it is the best, and they see it as the key to being able to operate with the world's premier navy. That is in part why Spain acquired the AEGIS system for its newest class of frigates and why they want TLAM. Make no mistake about it: all the Spanish military services are well disposed to the U.S. and committed to NATO, but it is the Spanish Navy with which we achieve the greatest resonance. Despite changes in the political climate, that military-to-military relationship remains a cornerstone of our interests in Spain. We should not take that relationship for granted. In fact, TLAM is a long-term strategic investment for Spain with the U.S. and a way for both countries to strengthen military ties for decades to come. We would not go so far as to suggest that our military relationship depends on this sale, but failure to make every effort to deliver after five years and after the then Secretary of Defense let it be known he supported the sale will be received very negatively in Spain. They are a completely trustworthy partner when it comes to proliferation concerns and will deeply resent any implication to the contrary. Were they denied the chance to purchase TLAM, it would only be natural for the Spanish Navy to question their own procurement philosophies and reconsider their strong interest in projects such as the Joint Strike Fighter. Longer term, this only feeds the perception here that the U.S. is not a reliable partner and does not value or fully trust Spain as an ally. The Spanish would never suggest a connection, and we do not assert a direct link, but failure on TLAM cannot help our cause on issues such as maintaining our access to the bases at Rota and Moron (due for renegotiation in 2011); increasing port access for our warships (the U.S. Navy is interested in gaining access to the Canary Islands); cooperation with AFRICOM, possibly including hosting some of its elements; an increased effort in Afghanistan; or a host of other issues. We need to take care of our friends, and the Spanish Navy is our friend. ¶4. (C) We have been careful to explain to the Spanish the sale cannot go forward if our Senate objects. Spanish officials and military officers have a strong commitment to democracy and understand and respect the separation of powers and the Senate's prerogatives. However, as a matter of principle they will be expecting the U.S. Administration to push this commitment to the limit. On May 29 the head of the Spanish Navy, Admiral Sebastian Zaragoza, told the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission that he had fought hard for TLAM and invested a great deal of personal credibility in this over the years. Zaragoza said that, in part due to budget allocation issues, he preferred a definitive "no" from the Senate to continued uncertainty. Our assessment is that if the Administration notifies the sale and the Senate blocks it, the Spanish Navy will be deeply disappointed, but at least they will know the Administration did everything possible to get the sale through. If we do not take that final step, this is going to be a bitter experience for them and one that may plant lingering doubts about our seriousness when it comes to our military relations with Spain. Aguirre