SPAIN/CUBA: TOUGH ROAD ALONG TWO TRACKS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 MADRID 000467 SIPDIS SIPDIS PLEASE PASS TO WHA A/S TOM SHANNON, DAS KIRSTEN MADISON, AND CTC CALEB MCCARRY HAVANA FOR PO MICHAEL PARMLY WHA/CCA FOR STERLING TILLEY EUR/ERA FOR NICOLE OTALLAH EUR/WE FOR ELAINE SAMSON NSC FOR TOBY BRADLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM CU SP EUN SUBJECT: SPAIN/CUBA: TOUGH ROAD ALONG TWO TRACKS TO DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION REF: A. PRAGUE 246 ¶B. MADRID 346 ¶C. MURRAY-OTALLAH E-MAILS Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Hugo Llorens, for reasons 1.5 (b ) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Cuba Transition Coordinator (CTC) Caleb McCarry met Spanish divergence from U.S. Cuba policy with considerable diplomacy; pressed Spain not to allow its growing policy of engagement with the GOC to leave behind the importance of supporting Cuban civil society and political prisoners; and stressed the need for real political change in Cuba. During his April 16-19 visit to Madrid, McCarry met with Spanish officials and parliamentarians as well as a conservative opposition thinktank, other NGOs, and representatives of the Cuban community to discuss USG views on recent adjustments and possible future developments in Cuba, in an effort to bolster Spanish and European support for Cuban civil society and human rights, try to develop partnerships working together on areas of convergence, and urge the Government of Spain to support maintaining the EU's Common Position when EU Foreign Ministers meet to review Cuba policy in June 2008. McCarry emphasized the USG's desire to see Raul Castro release all of the remaining political prisoners, and sought support in articulating this goal in more pronounced ways, including an upcoming event involving political prisoners including but not limited to Cubans. Our Spanish interlocutors were cautiously optimistic about the transition from Fidel to Raul Castro, and seemed inclined to view recent policy changes as openings to democracy -- or excuses to advocate eliminating the Restrictive Measures imposed by the EU in 2003 and suspended in 2005. Not surprisingly, most officials welcomed conversation on areas where USG and European policies toward Cuba are in agreement -- namely, on human rights, the plight of Cuba's political prisoners, and the need for engagement with the opposition -- but nonetheless favored continued and increased engagement with the Cuban Government. Opportunities for Mr. McCarry to meet with Cuban human rights activists and recently released political prisoners in Madrid balanced frank discussions with Spanish parliamentarians and policy makers. Cuban exile groups in Spain support the Transition Agenda announced April 10 by dissidents in Havana and plan to present it formally to the European Parliament in May in the lead up to the EU's June review of the Common Position. End Summary. //"El Abanico" -- The Spanish Fan of Hispano-Cuban Civil Society// ¶2. (SBU) Immediately upon his arrival April 16, Mr. McCarry met with the self-described "trio" at the head of the Spanish Federation of Cuban Associations (FECU),an umbrella organization founded in 2007 in an effort to unite various Cuban organizations behind shared goals for democratic change in Cuba. FECU President Elena Larrinaga, Secretary General Ernesto Gutierrez Tamargo, and Blanca Reyes, the European Representative of the "Damas de Blanco," warmly received McCarry and EUR/ERA's Nicole Otallah and regaled them with their efforts and those of other activists from across the broad spectrum or "fan" of Cuba human rights organizations in Spain. Beyond an abiding love for Cuba, they said, there were differences in preferred tactics. Gutierrez, a lawyer, called for an approach based in the rule of law, an overhaul of Cuba's legal system and new European legislation related to Cuba. Gutierrez explained he had declined to sign the manifesto of Dialogo Si (www.dialogosi.org),among a number of dissident documents in circulation, because it did not go far enough in demanding legal action. Mrs. Reyes expressed grave concern over the release and subsequent expulsion from Cuba of prisoners of conscience such as her husband, Raul Rivero. She worried that Cuba's internal opposition was endangered, and that the GOC's latest concessions were part of an effort to rid the island of dissident voices. All three of the activists spoke of the difficulty -- and the indispensability -- of reconciliation without violence or rancor. McCarry agreed reconciliation would not be easy, but insisted that dialogue was essential and assured Larrinaga, Reyes, and Gutierrez that the United States suffered with them. ¶3. (SBU) As of April 16, FECU was promoting the presentation MADRID 00000467 002 OF 007 to the EU of a document entitled "Cuba: A Path for the Future" which would operationalize an earlier "Accord for Democracy in Cuba" dated February 1998. In particular, the FECU officers briefed the USG team on activities planned for May to bring together dissidents from Cuba, representatives of the Cuban-American community, and Cuban exiles from across Europe to advocate for basic liberties on neutral ground: Switzerland. FECU members subsequently advised Mr. McCarry of their intention to sign the internal dissidents' minimum agenda (ref C). They support the call led by Martha Beatriz Roque for 1) liberation of all political prisoners, 2) immediate cessation of governmental repression of the political opposition, 3) an end to the "embargo" imposed by the Regime on the fundamental freedoms of the Cuban people, and 4) substitution of the totalitarian state with a democratic one. Gutierrez clarified to PolOff the FECU leadership's intention to travel with other Cuban exiles to Geneva on May 11 and on to Brussels, May 12-13. The dissident community plans to convoke the media for a highly publicized "family reunion" of exiles from outside of Cuba with dissidents permitted to travel from the island, and will formally present the Transition Agenda as a non-legal proposal without political debate May 13 to the Presidency of the EUROLAT in the European Parliament. //Ambassador's Perspective and Leadership// ¶4. (C) Ambassador Aguirre met the morning of April 17 with McCarry and Otallah and later hosted an off-the-record lunch at the Residence with select Spanish-Cuban notables and two journalists. During the office call, the Ambassador said he had told Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos, who is interested in meeting with Secretary Rice, that one way for Spain to get closer to the United States is to change course in Cuba. During these early days of President Zapatero's second administration, as personalities and policies continue to settle, we must continue to press the Spanish for three simple things relative to Cuba: free the prisoners, respect human rights, and open up the democratic process. The Ambassador wondered aloud whether dialogue with the Cuban Government was effective. But if the GOS must talk to the Castro regime, he hoped Spain would balance those efforts by "giving oxygen" to the Opposition. Ambassador Aguirre thanked CTC McCarry for the Department's continuous direction on Cuba policy priorities, and estimated we had a 10-month window of opportunity to "think outside the box." Mr. McCarry noted there was little disagreement between the United States and European Union member states on the nature of the problem in Cuba. He told the Ambassador he would be pressing the Spanish on prisoner releases, important for removing fear, and the importance of dialogue with all Cubans -- including the opposition. The EU's so-called "two-track policy" of political and economic engagement while insisting upon human rights reforms was acceptable in theory but had to include civil society and opposition groups. ¶5. (C) During a high-spirited lunch at the Residence, the Ambassador's guests debated specific strategies for engagement but agreed on the incremental and non-political nature of Raul Castro's elimination of certain prohibitions. Carlos Alberto Montaner, of the Union Liberal Cubana, suggested Raul calculated he had about five years to make his mark, based on familial life expectancy. Two journalists, a former International Visitor with conservative Daily ABC and his ideological opposite from left-of-center El Pais, argued from opposite ends of the table, leaving little conversational space for other participants, who included Cuban notables Leopoldo Fernandez Pujals, the Fundacion Hispano Cubana's Guillermo Gortazar, and Raul Rivero. Rivero, who has been in ill health since his arrival in Spain in 2006, made a special effort to attend the event in honor of Caleb McCarry. He shared the concerns expressed by his wife, Blanca, April 16 regarding the survival of Cuba's internal opposition, and he and others spoke disparagingly of the current Spanish Ambassador to Havana, Carlos "Charlie" Alonso Zaldivar. During a private conversation with McCarry, Rivero called the Spanish envoy the "head of the Committee to Defend the Revolution," echoing widespread concerns among dissident groups that he acted independently of even forward leaning Spanish policies. //GOS Expresses Flexibility . . . Toward Castro Regime// MADRID 00000467 003 OF 007 ¶6. (C) Mr. McCarry's interactions with Spanish Government officials were characterized by the thinly veiled suggestion that the U.S. ease up on Raul Castro and the alarmist suggestion that violence that could accompany too swift a change in Cuba. GOS officials agreed on the end goal of a democratic transition in Cuba, but seemed equally determined to advocate easing restrictions imposed by the EU after the Cuban regime's 2003 crackdown on dissidents, in light of what the Spanish perceived as democratic "openings." As National Security Advisor Carles Casajuana told CTC McCarry, referencing the elimination of some prohibitions and the authorization for Cubans to purchase cell phones, "Your work is almost done in Cuba!" The comment was made in jest, but reveals the spirit with which the Spanish are viewing the small changes announced in Havana, and the attitude they hope to promulgate within the EU in the lead up to May and June meetings. -------------- The Presidency -------------- ¶7. (C) In the Office of the Presidency at Moncloa on April 17, foreign policy advisor Maria Solanas Cardin admitted Cuba had a special place in Spanish emotional and political history. Cuba evinced such passion, she conceded, that sometimes it would be more convenient to take the passion out of the discussion. Cuba had been a part of Spain, its "last colony," and had become a political battleground. NSA Casajuana seemed distracted by other matters, including the appointment of Bernardino Leon as Secretary General of the Presidency, and made reference to handovers that are likely to include his own domain. Nonetheless, he seemed to share U.S. frustration over the opacity of the Cuban system. It seemed clear the transition had begun, he said, but it was difficult to know to what extent Fidel Castro had initiated the changes and why, or whether Raul Castro was acting more or less independently. The Spanish had no idea who within the GOC might lead the transition. The Cuban people, Casajuana agreed, are asking for change. Spain and the United States must support them, must assume that people within the GOC also want change, and must push for it. Up to that point, Casajuana, acknowledged, Spanish and U.S. views were similar. On the practical side, however, Spain did not want the democratic process to fail for being precipitous. Casajuana called to mind China's 1989 crackdown on student protesters in Tiananmen Square. What kind of transition do we want to encourage? We want to arrive at full democracy, that Cubans can direct their own future, with stability. And that, per Casajuana, "can be very dangerous." ¶8. (C) CTC McCarry insisted the "adjustments" announced by the Cuban Government were neither significant nor political and would not change the nature of the system or dismantle the GOC's control. These minor modifications, barely equal to economic privileges enjoyed in the former Czechoslovakia prior to 1989, along with small signs of Cubans' willingness to complain and to speak up for civil rights, were all the more reason to encourage Cuban civil society. Not only must the vital Opposition sector promote its own ideas, but youth and students could play and were playing a role. McCarry agreed there were probably elements within the Regime that wanted change. For there to be an effective dialogue, those elements must feel supported and must know they could think and act independently. ¶9. (C) Casajuana focused again on the dynamics within Raul's team and the make-up of the leadership "cupola" at the very top of the Cuban government. It was important, Spain thought, to get closer, to convince the leadership they would not be removed. He summarized the main difference between Spain and the United States on Cuba by calling to mind the same cultural ties of which Maria Solana had spoken, nearly defining the two-track policy. The people of Spain want Cuba to be a democracy, and they want Spain to have a close relationship with Cuba regardless. Mr. McCarry concluded the discussion by reminding Casajuana that the two-track policy had a human rights component, reiterating the steps the USG believed would lead to real change. Political prisoners should be allowed to return to their families, and the international community must engage with civil society. MADRID 00000467 004 OF 007 Personalities, he said, were not as important as an overall commitment to democracy. -------------- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs -------------- ¶10. (C) At the Foreign Ministry, McCarry attempted to engage counterparts on the importance of finding points of convergence and helping Cubans to create a dialogue. Director General for Iberoamerica Javier Sandomingo was perhaps preoccupied by the shuffling of leadership positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He alluded to his own transition within a few months to Lima, where he would serve as Spain's ambassador. He noted without remorse that the April 18 meeting would be his last brush with Mr. McCarry on Cuba policy. Asking McCarry how his work as "pro-Consul" was going, Sandomingo gave a peek at his own recent itinerary: Prague, Warsaw, and Berlin in addition to engagement with the Italians and French to revise the EU's Common Position on Cuba. Joined by Human Rights Director Fernando Fernandez-Arias and Sub-Director General for Cuba Jorge Romeu, Sandomingo articulated the optimistic Spanish view of recent changes and perceived relaxation of GOC control, saying repeatedly that these small steps had "potential." Cuba's signing of two international human rights covenants in February was a similarly good sign, and Spain's February 11 Cuba Human Rights Dialogue was a positive process aimed at broadening communication. To achieve the liberation of more prisoners, it would be important to reduce tensions ("diminuir la crispacion") so that the Cuban leadership did not feel too "stressed." Sandomingo noted that instead of confronting the Cuban Government, Spain and other Europeans should recognize that many of their aims had been achieved, including the liberation of some of the 75 prisoners. "We will need to do away with the 2003 measures," he stated, because to do so would be in the interests of the Cuban people. Besides, the Spanish added later at seeming odds with their contentions about positive changes, the past five years had "accomplished nothing." ¶11. (C) Sandomingo reiterated Moncloa's warning about the potential repercussions of a failed reconciliation process. Spain recognized the importance of opening space, making contacts, and encouraging dialogue. Sandomingo's clear priority, however, was reducing the Regime's own fear of change, so as to avoid a collapse of control that could end in either a military government or anarchy. Spain did not want to force the Government to take forceful steps. Prefacing his comments somewhat disingenuously by saying "we are not fooling ourselves that we know better than the Cuban people what they want," Sandomingo nonetheless seemed certain the Cuban people did not want a sudden and potentially dangerous change. During the February 11 dialogue, Fernandez-Arias noted Cuban interlocutors had been nervous and uncomfortable at the mention of dissidents. They had reacted strongly but eventually agreed to release Francisco Chaviano and a few others. MFA officials contended there had been a noticeable change of Cuban attitude in international fora, as evidenced by the signing now of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights -- both pacts they could have signed 30 years ago. The change was more evident in Geneva than in New York, where Cuba still felt threatened. Even as the Spanish insisted the time was right to ease up on Raul Castro, they were unable to respond when Caleb McCarry pressed the Spanish to define what the GOC had said it would concede in exchange for the lifting of the EU's Restrictive Measures. Defending Spain's engagement with the Regime, Sandomingo stated they saw "no utility" to increased cooperation with Cuban civil society without the agreement of the Cuban government. Mr. McCarry called his Spanish colleague on the idea of closer ties to the opposition "with the knowledge of" the Government, insisting that Spain could not give Cuba a "veto" over open democratic dialogue. Ms. Otallah urged the Spanish to think hard about legitimacy and the political signal that the lifting of Restrictive Measures would send to the Government of Cuba. ¶12. (C) All across Europe, participants agreed privately, there was support for a democratic transition in Cuba. MADRID 00000467 005 OF 007 McCarry and Otallah pressed for including the word "democracy" (up to now excised by the Spanish) in the joint declaration of the June 10 U.S.-EU Summit. As to whether the Summit could be a good opportunity to mention human rights, the Spanish agreed halfheartedly to make a note of the idea. Regarding possible events with political prisoners to put a face on the problems of Cuba's prisoners of conscience and those of other human rights violators, Jorge Romeu expressed Spain's clear preference for Geneva over New York as a venue. Wherever the event could be organized, McCarry reminded the Spanish that others in Cuba, even within the Cuban Government, hear what the United States and the Europeans are saying. -------------- Casa de America -------------- ¶13. (C) Mr.McCarry was invited to exchange views the evening of April 17 with a small group of representatives of institutions and foundations active in Latin America policy. At an off-the-record roundtable hosted by the public-private Casa de America, which receives funding from the Spanish MFA, the discussion touched on everything from the "China model" to anticipated changes in U.S. policy after the November 2008 elections. Attendees across sectors also asked about the role of countries such as Brazil, monetary remissions, the U.S. embargo, the likelihood of U.S. congressional travel to Cuba, the importance of Venezuelan petro-dollars, corruption, and the risks and benefits of foreign direct investment. Asked by a university student what role institutions of higher education might play in real democratic change, McCarry returned to one of the visit's main themes: helping the people of Cuba by getting closer to civil society. When McCarry spoke of planning and preparing for significant change in Cuba, a development agency official asked what the U.S. plan was for the day after. At that point, another Spanish attendee asked him pointedly, "Why do you ask as if it is up to the U.S.? Why is it not a shared task?" ¶14. (C) McCarry met separately April 18 with Casa de America Director Miguel Barroso, who is a close confidant of President Zapatero. Like Casajuana, Barroso ventured that with the disappearance from political life of Fidel Castro, it was all over "but for the paperwork." Still, Barroso opined Raul was unlikely to make "irreversible" changes as long as Fidel lived, despite the impossibility of the elder Castro's return. Barroso echoed other publicly voiced GOS views and commonly held Spanish perspectives on Cuba. He suggested the release of political prisoners on condition of exile freed Raul Castro of a "molestia" or nuisance, even if the dissidents did not present a threat, per se. McCarry was unwavering in his assertions that Cuba is listening and that democracy, sovereignty, and reconciliation are essential. When McCarry reiterated USG calls to release political prisoners and include them in an open dialogue, Barroso in effect told him the U.S. could not understand ("cuesta entender") and did not "get" Spain's special considerations. He referred to Spain's complicated relationship with Cuba as a "war without hate." Even though President Zapatero personally found the Cuban government "repugnant," it was vital to have contact with them. //No Surprises from Parliamentarians: Europe Knows Best?// ¶15. (C) Foreign policy experts from Spain's two predominant political parties joined Mr. McCarry for coffee at the Embassy earlier on April 18. Socialist deputy Fatima Aburto, past PSOE spokesperson for foreign affairs, took a hard-line view against U.S. Cuba policy and in favor of Zapatero's increased engagement with the Castro Regime. Guillermo Mariscal, a Partido Popular parliamentarian who had met with Cuba watchers in Washington and traveled to Havana, felt strongly that the internal opposition should be allowed to "pilot the transition." The PP shared the USG view that the latest "modifications" to GOC policies, including travel permits announced April 17, were positive for Cubans but would not lead to essential institutional changes. Mariscal noted that the tourism industry, including several Spanish interests, was refinancing the Castro Regime. While both Aburto and Mariscal agreed with McCarry on the importance of MADRID 00000467 006 OF 007 a democratic outcome and the need to free prisoners and open democratic space, and the futility of making the Cuba debate a forum for airing PSOE-PP differences, the similarities ended there. Aburto said the U.S. embargo prevents Cubans from seeing the rest of the world as it truly is, unemployment and all; as a result, Cubans believe the rest of the world is a "marvel" where "everything is easy." She spoke of Spain's emotional interests in Cuba and made conspicuous references to "European" viewpoints, suggesting indirectly that Spain should elaborate the EU's Common Position and knows better than the United States what is best for Cubans. Continuing the "last colony" thread, she said the Cuban opposition was not well organized and she stressed the importance of reaching a consensus in June even as she said the EU should "propose, not impose" policies. Above all, the PSOE representative called for a slow, "prudent transition." All agreed that the people of Cuba seemed to want change and should feel that they are the protagonists, but Aburto's final word was that the issue was "very European." //Partido Popular Offers to Help// ¶16. (C) At a working lunch hosted April 18 by the Foundation for Social Studies and Analysis (FAES),a conservative thinktank affiliated with the Partido Popular (PP),Mr. McCarry explored concrete ways to encourage and support the opposition's messages regarding democratic change in Cuba. PP and FAES secretary General for International Relations Jorge Moragas and his colleagues recognized the importance of finding and maintaining commitments to the explicit support of Cuba. Moragas offered to cooperate as needed with the Government of Spain. He noted one of the PP's demands, in exchange for supporting president Zapatero's foreign policy initiatives in the new Spanish Congress, had been the removal of the current Spanish Ambassador to Havana, noting Zaldivar was a member of the United Left (IU) party and echoing widespread concerns among dissident groups that the Ambassador acted independently of even forward leaning Spanish policies. At one point FAES Director for International Policy Rafael Bardaji dismissed U.S. efforts to partner with the GOS on Cuba, saying there was "no point" in dealing with Zapatero's government. The Deputy Chief of Mission shared Bardaji's overall criticism but was quick to insist the U.S. needed to stay engaged and attempt to influence Spain on Cuba. He stressed the importance of maintaining a dialogue and exchanging perspectives on what was happening on the island. Mr. McCarry mentioned May 21 activities planned for Cuba Solidarity Day, and FAES agreed to work with us. The DCM urged FAES to become active in lobbying the GOS to include language on democracy in Cuba in the U.S.-EU Summit Declaration. Ms. Otallah told them they could help by talking to open minds within the MFA about moving forward on the joint political prisoners event, which would highlight the plight of such prisoners worldwide, not just in Cuba. //Putting a Face on the Plight of Cuban Dissidents// ¶17. (C) To conclude the official portion of his visit, McCarry met the evening of April 18 with Jose Gabriel "Pepin" Ramon Castillo and Alejandro Gonzalez Raga, two of four political prisoners released the week of February 17 and allowed to seek medical treatment in Spain (ref B). Alejandro's wife Bertha, herself a Dama de Blanco, attended as well. They told McCarry the story of their release and travel to Spain, and described the political and administrative treatment they were receiving in Spain through the offices of the MFA and the Red Cross. Pepin has requested political asylum and, with the guidance of the Red Cross is seeking work in Spain as well as affordable housing and medical care. Both the dissidents expressed their appreciation to Secretary Rice and the U.S. Government for their solidarity with the people of Cuba, in particular President Bush's support for political prisoners. In the spirit of helping lower-profile fellow prisoners of conscience still incarcerated by the Regime, Ramon Castillo and Gonzalez Raga provided the names of some who were not receiving any economic assistance, and shared additional contact information by e-mail. ¶18. (C) COMMENT: The Cuba Transition Coordinator noted it MADRID 00000467 007 OF 007 was heartening, after a series of predictably less encouraging meetings, to be reminded of the importance of U.S. efforts to defend human rights in Cuba. His visit served likewise as a "shot in the arm" for the Cuban human rights activists and newly arrived dissidents with whom he met. Though Mr. McCarry expressly did no media or public outreach, his visit was followed closely by Spanish journalists who cover Cuba, and received some coverage April 19 in ABC. A hard-line leftist blog suggested his "secret" meetings were part of a "new imperialist offensive against the people of Cuba." Our Spanish interlocutors seemed less open to an exchange of views than in previous encounters, and sent strong signals that they value easing tensions with Raul Castro over creating space for democratic dialogue with all Cubans. Time will tell whether Cuban civil society and active exile groups can reverse the current Spanish-driven trend in the EU toward lifting restrictive measures -- and whether the will to turn the page in broader bilateral relations with the United States is strong enough to cause Spain to change its course in Cuba. AGUIRRE