Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MADRID274
2008-03-07 11:21:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:  

SPANISH ELECTIONS: NECK AND NECK IN THE

Tags:  PGOV SP 
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VZCZCXRO8308
RR RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
DE RUEHMD #0274/01 0671121
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071121Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4426
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 3346
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000274 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV SP
SUBJECT: SPANISH ELECTIONS: NECK AND NECK IN THE
HOMESTRETCH

REF: MADRID 213 AND PREVIOUS

MADRID 00000274 001.2 OF 003


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000274 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS FOR EUR/WE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV SP SUBJECT: SPANISH ELECTIONS: NECK AND NECK IN THE HOMESTRETCH REF: MADRID 213 AND PREVIOUS MADRID 00000274 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Two days away from the March 9 Spanish general election, the polls continue to suggest a close race with Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero's Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) perhaps enjoying a slight lead over Mariano Rajoy's Popular Party (PP). The only thing analysts seem to agree on is that high voter turnout favors Zapatero while low turnout benefits Rajoy. No one expects the victor to take an absolute majority in congress, so March 9 is likely to mark the beginning of some serious deal-making with the smaller parties. End summary. Zapatero and Rajoy - Final Debate -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Zapatero and Rajoy held their second and final debate March 3. 12 million Spaniards tuned in to watch a heated discussion in which neither candidate said much that was new and both devoted considerable time to events long past. Rajoy again made the case that ordinary Spaniards were suffering in a worsening economy. Zapatero accused Rajoy of having only recently discovered the economic issue, leading to a seemingly endless argument about whether Rajoy had or had not questioned Zapatero about the economy early in the legislature that just ended. In a discussion of foreign policy, neither candidate had much to say about the future. Instead, Zapatero raised the Iraq war and Rajoy repeatedly accused him of supporting a UN resolution urging troop contributions to Iraq after pulling out Spanish troops. On terrorism, Zapatero repeated his accusation that the PP has played politics, pledging he would support any opposition government's policy against ETA. Rajoy's rejoinder was that if Zapatero's policy with ETA was to fight rather than negotiate, he would support him. ¶3. (SBU) At times Zapatero appeared genuinely angry, repeatedly interrupting Rajoy. Perhaps this was a deliberate attempt to stir up PSOE voters, but combined with Rajoy's incessant attacks regarding the economy, immigration, and public security it contributed to an overall negative atmosphere. Snap polls after the debate (we cannot vouch for their trustworthiness) suggested Zapatero won the debate. The press split along partisan lines. Our guess, as with the first debate, is that no one's mind was changed by this debate and undecided voters
did not get much help. Polls and Turnout -------------- ¶4. (U) As polls have consistently shown over many months, the final pre-election polls show the PSOE with an edge. For example, a Metroscopia poll published March 2 in left-wing daily El Pais showed the PSOE with 42.9 percent of the vote and 165-169 congressional seats. The PP showed up with 38.8 percent and 148-154 seats (an absolute majority would be 176 seats; in 2004 the PSOE won 164 seats and the PP 148.). The poll showed the Catalan Convergence and Union Party (CIU) with nine seats, the Basque National Party (PNV) with seven seats, the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) with five to six seats, the United Left (IU) with four seats, and other, even smaller parties, with a total of six to seven seats. The poll showed turnout at 74-75 percent (it was 75.66 percent in 2004). The poll was based on 8,750 telephone interviews conducted February 8-27 (the first Zapatero-Rajoy debate was February 25). The margin of error was plus or minus 1.1 percent. ¶5. (U) A Sigma Dos poll published March 3 in the conservative daily El Mundo showed the PSOE with 43.4 percent of the vote and 157-171 congressional seats. The PP showed up with 39.3 percent and 148-161 seats. The poll showed the CIU with 9-11 seats, PNV with 7 seats, ERC with five or six seats, the IU with four seats, and the smaller parties with a total of three to eight seats. The poll showed turnout at 76-78 percent. The poll was based on 11,000 telephone interviews conducted between February 20 and March 1. The margin of error was plus or minus 1.2 percent. ¶6. (U) March 3 was the last day polls could be published in Spain, but a Barcelona left-leaning daily evaded the prohibition by releasing a poll in their March 5 Andorra edition. The poll was conducted by the Group of Social and Public Opinion Studies (Gabinet d'Estudis Socials i Opinio Publica or GESOP) and showed the PSOE with 41.5 percent to the PP's 39.0 percent. A datum likely to alarm (and perhaps motivate) the PSOE was the prediction of only 68 percent voter turnout. The poll was based on 600 telephone MADRID 00000274 002.2 OF 003 interviews conducted March 4. The margin of error was plus or minus 4 percent. ¶7. (SBU) We also have unpublished poll conducted by ASEP (Juan Diez Nicolas, a member of Spain's pre-PP conservative party but well-regarded for the technical rigor of his polling). Diez does not predict an outcome (he once told us that given Spain's provincial voting scheme, one would need roughly 30,000 interviews to make worthwhile predictions, and since he eschews telephone interviews as inherently unreliable, the cost would be prohibitively high). Nevertheless, he mentions a 1.6 percent PSOE advantage and argues that the outcome will be close (no more than three point if the PSOE wins or no more than two points if the PP wins -- the PSOE won by 4.9 percent in 2004). He predicted turnout at 68-72 percent, noting that at 72 percent or above, a PSOE victory became more likely, while the reverse was true at 68 percent or less. The poll was based on 1,201 face-to-face home interviews conducted February 11-17. The margin of error is unknown. The poll can be found at www.jdsurvey.net. ¶8. (U) As we have noted previously, the conventional wisdom here is that low turnout favors the PP. In 2004, the Iraq war and the Madrid train bombings three days before the elections sent 75.66 percent of voters to the polls, and the PSOE won a surprise victory. The percentages of voter turnout (and victors) in other general elections: 79.97 in 1982 (PSOE absolute majority); 70.49 in 1986 (PSOE absolute majority); 69.93 in 1989 (PSOE); 76.44 in 1993 (PSOE); 77.38 in 1996 (PP, the anomalous result was attributed to PSOE corruption scandals); and 68.71 in 2000 (PP absolute majority). Absentee Voters and Recounts -------------- ¶9. (U) The polls will close here at 8:00 pm and the first results should start coming out shortly thereafter. By midnight, and perhaps as early as 10:00 pm local, we should know who won. However, if the margins are razor thin, the absentee (including overseas) vote could become a factor. There are approximately 1.2 million voters overseas. The largest numbers are in Argentina, France, and Venezuela. Like absentee voters in Spain, they could request an absentee ballot (the deadline for doing so was February 28). Overseas voters also had the option of going to a Spanish embassy or consulate to vote (March 2 was the deadline). The deadline for posting absentee ballots was March 6 (or March 8 for overseas voters who chose to mail their ballots). Absentee ballots are counted in the province in which the voter is listed in the census. In 2004 the absentee vote favored the PP by nearly 20 percent (but it predated the terrorist attacks in Madrid three days before the election). Requests for absentee ballots have been heavy this year (770,000) compared to 2004 (559,730). This might suggest higher voter turnout across the board, but remember that the 2004 absentee ballot requests were made before the train bombings raised voter interest. As a footnote, we know of at least one controversy in recent years regarding overseas voting. The PP alleges that in 2005 it failed to capture Galicia because Venezuela's Hugo Chavez held up a Spanish diplomatic pouch containing -- according to the PP -- a large number of PP ballots. ¶10. (U) If the results in a given race a very close, there might be a call for a recount. However, the Spanish system of voting is uniform and simple. Voters choose the ballot of the party for which they wish to vote and seal it in an envelope. They then identify themselves to the poll workers and are allowed to place the envelope in a ballot box. When the polls close, the four poll workers (selected randomly from the census - similar to jury duty in the U.S.) open the envelopes and count the ballots. If an envelope contains more than one ballot or if the voter has made any marks on the ballot, that vote is void. After counting and certifying the results (under the watchful eyes of any party observers present),the election materials are taken by courier to the electoral commission offices, where the results are entered in a computer. ¶11. (U) Regardless of any glitches with absentee ballots or recounts, the election results are supposed to be finalized and the official count published as early as March 12 but no later than March 15. Then follows the roughly month-long process of forming a government described in reftels. Comment MADRID 00000274 003.2 OF 003 -------------- ¶12. (SBU) We expect a close race. We have no reason to doubt the conventional wisdom about turnout. A party needs 176 congressional seats to have an absolute majority and no one here is predicting either party will achieve that. With fewer seats, the winner will have to court the small parties, which gives the advantage to the PSOE. There are two other potential twists to keep in mind. One, if the winner comes out with more seats than votes (which has never happened),he will be in an embarrassing position, although both candidates have recently backed away from saying they would not try to form a government in that circumstance. Two, because of the difficulty the PP could have in forming a coalition (see reftels),it could win but find itself unable to form a government (which has also never happened). We do not predict either outcome, but the possibilities are there. AGUIRRE

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