FOLLOW-UP WITH GOS ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000203 SIPDIS SIPDIS EUR FOR A/S FRIED, PDAS VOLKER, DAS DICARLO EUR/WE FOR ALLEGRONE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2018 TAGS: PREL UNMIK UN YI KV SP SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP WITH GOS ON KOSOVO REF: A. STATE 16319 ¶B. MADRID 186 MADRID 00000203 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Since FM Moratinos' comment (repeated by President Zapatero) that Kosovo's declaration of independence was "illegal," the Ambassador and DCM have had numerous conversations with senior GOS officials including Deputy FM Bernardino Leon, National Security Advisor Carles Casajuana, MFA Political Director Rafael Dezcallar, and Chief of Defense Felix Sans Roldan. While Leon stuck to his guns on the issue of legality, he, Casajuana, and Dezcallar made clear that they wanted to keep our disagreement private, as befits two allies who are both keenly interested in maintaining stability in the Balkans. Helpfully, the GOS was quick to condemn the February 21 violence in Belgrade. Our interlocutors have been at pains to make clear that regardless of their views on Kosovo's declaration of independence, Spain intends to continue its participation in KFOR and in EU efforts to help Kosovo. They hope to lower the public profile of this issue, although that will be a challenge with an election on March 9 and two presidential debates between now and then. Ironically, although Zapatero's socialist party (PSOE) and Mariano Rajoy's Popular Party (PP) agree on very little, both view Kosovo's declaration of independence negatively (former President Aznar published an op-ed February 22 making the case against independence). END SUMMARY. //DEPUTY FM LEON// ¶2. (C) Spanish Deputy Foreign Minister Bernardino Leon summoned Ambassador Aguirre to a meeting with Leon, Political Director Rafael Dezcallar, and Director General for North America Pepe Pons February 21 to discuss recent U.S./Spanish disagreements on Kosovo. The Ambassador expressed strong disagreement with the description of Kosovo's independence as illegal (ref B) and noted that several other major European nations agreed with our assessment that the UDI did not violate UNSCR 1244. He reiterated the case for Kosovo's independence and emphasized that it set no precedent for other separatist or territorial disputes. After years of exhaustive but ultimately unsuccessful efforts to reach a negotiated settlement, independence was the only way to ensure continued stability in the Balkans. ¶3. (C) Ignoring the long history of failed negotiations with Serbia and the impossibility of achieving a UNSCR in the face of Russian intransigence, Leon argued that a separatist movement cannot declare itself independent without either a negotiated agreement with the parent state or the explicit authorization of a UNSC Resolution. The GOS considers these two means as the only internationally acceptable methods for a separatist state to gain its independence. Absent either one, the separation is not "legal." Leon said this position was doctrinal among both the ruling PSOE and the opposition PP, and that both major Spanish parties are fundamentally concerned about the principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Leon acknowledged that many nations have a valid reason for recognizing Kosovo's independence - the belief that the risk for instability in Kosovo and the region is too great to ignore and there is no other option. Nevertheless, Leon argued that this argument of necessity did not convey legality. If it did, the door would be opened for any separatist group to seek independence by securing the approbation and recognition of a finite number of foreign states. Such a mistaken belief was already becoming fodder for Basque and Catalan separatists and was certain to help separatist parties gain some parliamentary seats in the Spanish elections, causing problems for whoever wins. ¶4. (C) Continuing the conversation in the wake of the violence in Belgrade the night of February 21, the Ambassador called Leon February 22, telling him that while the U.S. found the arguments about legality untenable, this was a disagreement that should be conducted in private. To facilitate this, he strongly urged that Spanish officials avoid gratuitous comments about legality and focus instead on the need to work together for stability in the Balkans. The Ambassador suggested the GOS condemn the attack against the U.S. Embassy and other embassies in Belgrade. Leon quickly agreed that both governments had an interest in taking a step MADRID 00000203 002.2 OF 003 back and lowering the tension. He said that he would recommend that the Spanish government issue a condemnation of what happened in Belgrade (see text of statement below). //CASAJUANA, DEZCALLAR, CHOD SANZ// ¶5. (C) Following the Ambassador's conversations with Leon, Deputy Chief of Mission Llorens spoke February 22 with Presidential National Security Advisor Carles Casajuana. Casajuana emphasized that the GOS strongly condemned the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade. The DCM mentioned that Ambassador had asked Leon to issue a statement; Casajuana agreed the GOS should do so and promised to follow-up. Turning to the broader issue, Casajuana noted the many conversations between GOS and USG officials here and in Washington on the subject of Kosovo in recent months. He said Spain had been clear about the domestic sensitivities regarding a UDI but perhaps Spain, in an effort to make clear its willingness to work with the U.S. and preserve EU unity, had sent confusing signals and left the impression that Kosovo was merely an issue in the context of the Spanish elections. In fact, he said, Kosovo independence was problematic for more fundamental reasons having to do with Spain's own regional tensions. This would be true with or without an election pending. The imminent election made this a highly political issue and simply reduced the government's room for maneuver. Waiting until after the election would not necessarily have changed the government's position, but having independence declared before the election did force the government to adopt a more dogmatic public stance. ¶6. (C) Nevertheless, Casajuana insisted Spain wanted to be constructive. He noted Spain's commitment to KFOR and to the EU effort in Kosovo. He said there was not even any discussion within the GOS of backing away from either, despite the fact that this put the GOS in an awkward spot: on the one hand they were forced to say publicly that they did not support Kosovo's UDI but on the other hand they were continuing to support Kosovo. The DCM told Casajuana the GOS should refrain from gratuitous public remarks about things such as "illegality." As recent events in Belgrade showed, the situation in the region was delicate, and it was to no one's advantage to say anything that might contribute to tension. He said the U.S. did not want to make this a U.S.-Spain issue, and that would be more easily achieved if the public remarks were more restrained. Casajuana said he understood but noted he could not guarantee that nothing more would be said publicly. (NOTE: The presidential candidates have televised debates scheduled for February 25 and March 3. END NOTE.) ¶7. (C) The DCM also spoke with MFA Political Director Rafael Dezcallar February 22 (following the conversation with Casajuana). Dezcallar called to express outrage over the violence in Belgrade, which he described as "barbaric, savage, and distressingly reminiscent of the horrible events in the Balkans in the 1990s." Dezcallar said Spain may disagree with the U.S. on the underlying issue, but nevertheless the U.S. was an ally, and the GOS was committed to work with the U.S. and the EU to maintain peace and stability in the Balkans. He said a GOS statement condemning the violence would be forthcoming. The DCM advised that A/S Fried had been briefed on the Ambassador's conversations over the last 24 hours with Leon. It was obvious that the U.S. and Spain strongly disagreed on the question of recognizing Kosovo, but that for its part the U.S. wanted this to remain a private disagreement among allies. Nothing was served by turning this into a bilateral issue. The DCM urged that the GOS avoid any further gratuitous public statements. He noted in particular that Spanish questioning of the legality of Kosovo's declaration was unhelpful. ¶8. (C) In a February 22 conversation with the DCM, Chief of Defense General Felix Sanz Roldan echoed what Casajuana had said about Spain's commitment to KFOR, saying Spain had no intention of pulling out, and in fact he was preparing the normal six month troop rotation. He said all the signals he had gotten from the government were "business as usual." Sanz added that he suspected Spain would eventually recognize Kosovo but only after the elections and after enough other countries had done so that the government could do so without exciting too much negative comment in Spain. MADRID 00000203 003 OF 003 //MFA CONDEMNS BELGRADE VIOLENCE// ¶9. (U) The MFA issued a statement February 22 roundly condemning the acts of violence in Belgrade against various embassies and those who perpetrated them, who were described as "extremists who should not have any place in a modern Serbia." The statement manifested support for the Serbian Government and its President noting they had rejected the acts of violence. The statement said the GOS called on EU countries to join forces do everything necessary to put into effect the conclusions reached by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the EU February 18 in which was recorded the commitment of the EU to stability in the Balkans and its availability to play a leading role in strengthening that stability. //AZNAR: THE KOSOVO MISTAKE// ¶10. (U) Former Spanish President Jose Maria Aznar wrote a February 22 op-ed entitled "The Kosovo Mistake" in conservative daily La Razon. Aznar wrote, "It has to be said: recognizing Kosovo is a mistake that will have grave consequences... NATO did not go to war in 1999 to ensure the independence of Kosovo... NATO embarked upon its intervention to preserve tolerance and consolidate multi-ethnic states... Anyone who believes the opposite is mistaken, and anyone who says the opposite, if they were familiar with the deliberations that took place at the time, is lying... The Americans, for their part, seem to be tired of having to take care of and manage this region and would prefer to think that by giving free rein to the Kosovars the pressure will let up... Recognizing independence means accepting in the international sphere a principal of self-determination of peoples and alteration of borders in Europe without a consensus. Not only has our experience with these issues been catastrophic in the past, but this violates the principles that the EU, for example, has defended for over five years. Furthermore, it establishes a very bad precedent for the future... The theory that by accepting the unilateral declaration of independence we would be establishing a better basis for the future is more than questionable. For the time being, this whole issue has turned into a major mistake, and it is our own fault." (NOTE: Full text sent separately to EUR/WE Spain desk). //COMMENT// ¶11. (C) We believe the GOS is trying to back away from public confrontation with the U.S. on this issue. Certainly the violence in Belgrade and their genuine concern over it has something to do with this. The GOS hoped (unrealistically) that independence would come after March 9. While it is not clear (perhaps not even to them) what they would have done then, they at least would have been able to consider their moves more calmly. Instead, they had to react on the campaign trail in the midst of a hotly contested general election. In any case, they now seem anxious to lower the volume. That would be a good thing. With the PP taking a hard line against Kosovo's declaration of independence, and some Basque and Catalans welcoming what they see as a precedent, anything the Zapatero government says publicly on this issue will be negative from our point of view. Casajuana is correct about the cognitive dissonance evident in the government criticizing independence while continuing to work with KFOR and the EU in Kosovo. The less this is highlighted here, the better. Also, if this does become perceived as a U.S. vs. Spain question, it will make us an election issue (which we have so far largely avoided) and will probably play to Zapatero's benefit with the voters. While we expect the GOS will try to tone things down, we should not be surprised if Kosovo comes up again here (perhaps in the February 25 or March 3 debates). If it does, Zapatero and Rajoy are likely to say something negative about independence. END COMMENT. AGUIRRE