AMBASSADOR NULAND PRESSES SPANISH ON NATO/ISAF

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000142 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM JACK HILLMEYER USNATO FOR REBECCA ROSS, PETER CHISHOLM, JOHN COCKRELL OSD FOR TODD SQUIRE KABUL FOR BRENT HARTLEY KABUL PLEASE PASS CSTC-A FOR CAPT ROBERT OVERBEEK E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018 TAGS: NATO MARR PREL PGOV SP SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR NULAND PRESSES SPANISH ON NATO/ISAF COMMITMENTS REF: A. MADRID 23 ¶B. 2007 MADRID 1884 ¶C. 2007 MADRID 1910 ¶D. 2007 MADRID 2297 ¶E. OSTICK-ROSS E-MAILS JANUARY 19-25 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4(b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Victoria Nuland's January 16-17 visit to Madrid coincided with the announcement by the Secretary of Defense that the U.S. would deploy additional troops to Afghanistan, followed by misconstrued statements about the reliability of troop-contributing countries there. Against this backdrop, Ambassador Nuland and Spanish counterpart Ambassador Benavides presented a united and forward-looking message while pressing Spain to do even more. The program included significant media outreach, a public roundtable, a scenesetting dinner with the highest levels of the Spanish armed forces, and two productive sessions at the Ministries of Defense and of Foreign Affairs. Public diplomacy coups included one-on-one interviews with two print journalists, a televised interview that was subsequently aired in parts during newscasts, and a discussion on background with a third journalist and Spanish Ambassador Benavides (ref E). With the GOS, Ambassador Nuland was unequivocal in calling for swift recognition of Kosovo and increased commitments to Afghanistan in the lead up to the April 1-2 NATO Summit in Bucharest. During cordial and substantive meetings, she and her interlocutors nonetheless agreed to disagree on approaches while sharing the same overall goals. Spanish officials attempted to defer decisions until after March 9 general elections, and Ambassador Nuland argued against waiting for the electoral outcome to do the right thing in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. End summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador Aguirre hosted a dinner January 16 to welcome Ambassador Nuland. Spanish officials in attendance were Chief of Defense Staff General Felix Sanz; Spanish NATO Ambassador Pablo Benavides; Spanish service chiefs Admiral Sebastian Zaragoza, General Francisco Garcia de la Vega (air force),and General Carlos Villar (army); and MOD Director General for Defense Policy Major General Benito Raggio. Ambassador Nuland used the opportunity to stress the importance for NATO and its partners of an increased effort in Afghanistan. Sanz made clear this was a decision that rested with his civilian political bosses, but he noted that the Spanish military had been interested in sending a headquarters element and mentioned that they might be able to send a small number of additional helicopters. He noted that the military's switch from Puma to Chinook helicopters had already increased the capacity Spain could offer. He also noted that Spanish fixed wing aircraft were playing an important role. Sanz also expounded on Spain's robust commitment to the NATO rapid response force. All of the Spanish guests made clear their affinity for the U.S. military, with Zaragoza and Garcia de la Vega noting the seminal event in the modernization of the Spanish Navy and Air Force was not joining NATO but the defense agreement with the U.S. signed during the Eisenhower Administration. -------------- --- Brainstorming Before Bucharest with MOD's Cuesta -------------- --- ¶3. (C) Ambassadors Nuland and Benavides, accompanied by Deputy Chief of Mission, Army Attache, and Emboffs, met first January 17 with MOD's Secretary General for Policy Luis Cuesta. Cuesta and his staff advanced their morning schedule to accommodate the 90-minute meeting, which was the most substantive on the program. Ambassador Nuland began by acknowledging Spanish hesitancy to make commitments ahead of the March 9 elections. She cautioned Cuesta, however, that it was important to brainstorm now in order to be able to act expeditiously in the short weeks following Spanish elections and leading up to the NATO Summit in Bucharest April 1-2. Spanish Vice Admiral Enrique Perez-Ramirez, Deputy Director of Defense Policy, presented an overview of current issues in Spanish defense policy through a NATO lens including ISAF operations, force generation, and missile defense. He noted Spain had 2,822 troops deployed worldwide, including more than 600 in Kosovo. The Spanish expected to maintain this contribution, deemed UNSCR 1244 did not support a new mission, and stated that unity among Allies was of paramount importance. Under ISAF in Afghanistan, Admiral Perez-Ramirez noted Spain had deployed 648 troops and could not increase that contribution. He spoke of alternative ways to improve security in Spain's area of responsibility, by ensuring and improving the quality (if not the quantity) of deployed troops, by using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),and by sponsoring an Afghan Army company. (DAO NOTE: For some reason Perez-Ramirez did not count the 52 OMLTs deployed in September 2007. Post calculates as of January 17 Spain actually had 700 deployed in Afghanistan and 52 over the Afghan border in Manas.) //AFGHANISTAN// ¶4. (C) Ambassador Nuland appreciated Spain's commitment to Afghanistan and asked the Spanish to consider Allied goals for Afghanistan by the time of the Bucharest Summit. The Bucharest Summit would be the last for President Bush, and the culmination of a six-year process of NATO transformation. The United States would go to Bucharest seeking to increase force generation, to fulfill the SECDEF's vision statement, to seize public diplomacy opportunities, and to enable the military and civilians to work hand in hand -- no security without development. Ambassador Nuland noted SecDef Gates's decision announced 15 January to put more troops in Afghanistan had been difficult. She said of the 3200 announced, 2200 would be available for ISAF and come with full enablers. Another 1000 Marines deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom would guarantee force protection for newly trained Afghan police. In the context of this 7-month temporary deployment, Nuland asked Cuesta and his team to brainstorm with her about ways to improve security. She opened the discussion by asking about the possibility of deploying Spanish special forces to assist with the effort. Cuesta dismissed the idea of providing Special Forces, but noted the naming of UN Special Envoy Paddy Ashdown to coordinate organizations was very important, and he hoped the appointment and subsequent provincial outreach would increase the positive involvement of Afghanistan's neighbors. Cuesta went on to explain that for the past 18 months, Spain had tried to strengthen Afghanistan's defense capabilities. He noted MOD Alonso had sought Spanish congressional approval to deploy OMLTS September 25 just a day after Spain lost two soldiers in Afghanistan (ref B). Cuesta cited additional proof of Spain's commitment: deployment of the three CH-47 replacement helicopters, the planned deployment of four UAVs and the troops to support them, and the running of another successful continuation Spanish Security and Defense course for Afghan officers. ¶5. (C) Cuesta highlighted Spain's offer to sponsor an Afghan unit and noted the NATO Ambassadors' involvement in the ongoing exchange of draft memoranda of understanding had been instrumental in eliminating prejudices (refs C and D). The company would be deployed in Badghis province, where Spanish troops were already building new barracks, clearing mines, and preparing to equip the eventual battalion to be headquartered at Qal-e-Now. According to Cuesta, CSTC-A and the Spanish MOD had agreed to satisfactory wording of a counter-proposal acknowledging Spanish red lines: two-year commitment to the company project and permanent placement of an ANA unit in the province to improve security. Cuesta noted the Spanish and CSTC-A had yet to resolve their divergence on the placement and command authority for the operational mentoring and liaison group (OMLG) which the Spanish insisted would operate only in the west region, subject to national restrictions, and in mandatory consultation with national commanders in Madrid. Addressing the specifics, Ambassador Nuland observed it was important to "fuzz the border" along the seam with Regional Command South, where there was greater need than in RC-West, which was manageable. Conceptually, however, improved communications on the ground and good teamwork were essential. The United States was intent upon building a mobile, national Afghan Army, as opposed to a Home Guard with a permanent security presence in Badghis. If in CSTC-A's view there was a security need in Badghis province, there would be no argument. However, the question of Spanish national authority over their OMLG was a different concept than whether the kandak were to be called out of Badghis. Ambassador Nuland urged the Spanish to take these and other issues directly to CSTC-A Commanding General Cone and ISAF Commander GEN Dan McNeill (COMISAF). We could not be hobbling or paralyzing ISAF and the ANA, she noted, stressing the importance of flexibility. Cuesta insisted he could not imagine a security situation in Badghis over the next two years that would lead CSTC-A to say that no kandak was needed there. The company's presence would always be justified amid deteriorating provincial security. Ambassador Nuland recommended that a senior Spanish officer get in contact with MG Cone to work out the issues and that the Spanish assign someone to CSTC-A to represent Spanish interests. ¶6. (C) Continuing the brainstorming, Ambassador Nuland floated the idea (subsequently requested by SECDEF Gates to MOD Alonso and his Interior Ministry colleagues in writing) of police enhancement options in Afghanistan using the Spanish Guardia Civil and Italian carabinieri in holding functions so that army personnel could be freed for military operations in the South. MG Cone referred to such maneuvers as "police transfusions." In addition to providing much-needed support, AMB Nuland noted such deployments would further debunk the notion of the Afghan National Army as a "home guard" and disabuse each kandak of the notion that it was based in a single province. Asked again by Ambassador Nuland whether he would think about sending more enablers later in the year, Cuesta said Spain would think about doing so -- but stipulated they would not send Special Forces. Ambassador Nuland pressed him, saying the Allies needed the support now. The question, she said, was when politically Spain could think about responding. At the invitation of Spanish PermRep Benavides, Cuesta reminded Ambassador Nuland that 37 Spanish officers had deployed the previous week to Kabul to staff ISAF headquarters. To send four UAVs, Spain would increase personnel by 40. Frankly speaking, Cuesta did not foresee governmental authority for Special Forces or for having Spanish troops engaged outside of Badghis province at the moment. ¶7. (C) Ambassador Nuland then previewed Allies' commitments in the lead up to Bucharest, with a special focus on rotary and fixed wing commitments. With significant pledges, the whole situation in Afghanistan could start to look a little better. Cuesta countered that Spain was a medium-sized country present not only in Afghanistan but in other demanding scenarios and with a political cap of 3,000 on overseas deployments. Ambassador Nuland did not desist: "You are well committed globally, as are we. That's why I'm not asking you for another battalion." Ambassador Benavides reiterated there would be expectations of Spain and other Allies at the Bucharest Summit. The Deputy Chief of Mission said it would behoove Spain to come up with a credible package following the elections, a new beginning in the Alliance for a new government. //KOSOVO// ¶8. (C) On Kosovo, Cuesta noted the main asset was European unity. He assured Nuland that Spain would maintain troops to preserve stability but could not support EU recognition of a unilateral declaration. Spain hoped for a coordinated approach in March or later to consolidate a unified EU position. He disputed whether UNSCR 1244 provided the legal basis for additional troops and training missions. Nuland promised to take the latter point back to see if the USG could help Spain with a legal justification to assume the training and other missions. On timing, however, she was unequivocal. The United States had been listening for two years, had already acceded to a later deadline following the February 3 Serbian elections, and wanted to recognize Kosovo in February to seize the strategic moment. This, she said, was the Alliance's contribution to stabilization. //MISSILE DEFENSE// ¶9. (C) Regarding Missile Defense, Cuesta noted its role in providing indivisible security but expressed concerns over the affordability of the program -- saying if Spain entered the program, they would have to find funding elsewhere -- and the breakdown of dialogue and cooperation between Russia and the United States. Ambassador Nuland stressed the importance of conceptual unity. At Bucharest the United States would be looking for acknowledgment that the threat from Iran was real and growing, and acceptance in principle of the need for full coverage to ensure indivisible security. The United States did not want to get ahead of NATO, particularly in view of French and German reluctance to fund the system. Noting the need for a commitment at Bucharest to go forward and look at the architecture, Nuland asked the Spanish to raise their and other Mediterranean voices loudly about their security needs. -------------- -------------- Kosovo: Agreeing to Disagree with MFA's Dezcallar -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Over lunch hosted January 17 by Spanish MFA Director General for Policy Rafael Dezcallar, Ambassador Nuland touched on a number of topics from Russia's withdrawal from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty to the Mediterranean Dialogue. Primarily, however, she again pressed hard on a timeline for recognition of Kosovo, especially in light of the upcoming Bucharest Summit at which NATO members would consider enlargement. The MOD's Cuesta also attended the lunch with MFA Europe and international security experts. In opening agenda-setting comments, the Spanish and U.S. sides mused aloud whether NATO could step up countries like Bosnia, Serbia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro. The Balkans' aspirations made the issue of recognizing Kosovo all the more critical up against the Summit to decide on enlargement, Nuland noted. She reminded Dezcallar the United States had given Spain and Europe until February. Dezcallar understood the need for unity but questioned the feasibility of launching a commission before the scheduled Serbian elections. Nuland insisted the Allies could not push the decision into March and could not wait until after Russian elections. When Spanish Ambassador Benavides tried to suggest there was still time and Dezcallar suggested the Kosovars did not mind delayed recognition, Ambassador Nuland refuted both notions, saying, "They are telling us they do." She feared NATO Allies would still be in the first explosive reactions to independence at the time of the Summit unless recognition were swift. Asked about Macedonia's prospects for joining NATO, Nuland opined Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis would veto such an invitation on the grounds of the former Yugoslav Republic's disputed name. She cautioned this was not an issue that could be postponed until Bucharest, and she expressed concern the sixth round of NATO enlargement was a door unlikely to open again. Nuland posited inviting Croatia alone would be a disaster scenario. Asking how NATO could leave one Muslim aspirant country on the cutting room floor, she asked Dezcallar for Spain's help to lean on the Greeks at every level. -------------- Afghanistan, Revisited -------------- ¶11. (C) Returning to the outstanding Spanish offer to sponsor an ANA company, Dezcallar said he hoped we could find a way to make the proposal work. Nuland agreed with Dezcallar the idea was a good one but noted communication on the project had been lost. Part of the problem, she stated, was there was no senior Spaniard in MG Cone's command. Dezcallar noted the need to better connect security and development strategy in Afghanistan and agreed with Ambassador Nuland on the importance of the public diplomacy aspects of letting Afghans take the credit for progress. Ambassador Nuland referred to Paddy Ashdown as "the glue," saying she hoped to feel the effects of his coordinating efforts by Bucharest and to get his input into the Summit declaration document. Nuland said force generation would be the U.S. priority at the NATO Summit. The 3200 U.S. troops would fill holes in RC-South and, it was hoped, could serve as a challenge pledge to other contributing nations to make commitments. Dezcallar assured Ambassador Nuland he would not exclude anything. The Spanish PermRep said the Spanish and other Allies should go to Bucharest with ideas. Working in tandem with her counterpart, Nuland described the Summit as a "covered dish" supper, a party to which no one would want to go empty-handed or "re-gifting" something. (NOTE: The idea of re-gifting contributions already announced and yet to be deployed may have eluded the Spanish, at least in translation. The GOS seemed to speak throughout Ambassador Nuland's visit of prior pledges and past accomplishments.) ¶12. (C) Continuing the discussion of security challenges in light of a complicated Afghan elections outlook, Ambassador Nuland broached anew the idea of sending Guardia Civil members to Afghanistan. She said the Spanish could put yellow or blue patches on their shoulders or whatever it took politically, so long as they could deliver them to the district. If France stepped up its involvement in the South as expected, Nuland added, police would become even more of a priority. She and MG Cone were pleased with EU police management at a provincial level, Cone had identified about 12 federal districts of concern where it was most important to fix the police through vetting and the aforementioned transfusion idea. Dezcallar asked about Afghan President Karzai's conciliatory position on Taliban participation in Afghan elections. Ambassador Nuland provided her "yes, if" list, accepting Karzai's efforts to broaden support on certain conditions. Among the red lines, Taliban must give up their weapons and support the Afghan constitution. There would be no "no go" zones, and the outreach could not include 100 black-listed Taliban offenders. -------------- -------------- Africa and Asia: Increased Engagement, Counter-Terrorism Cooperation -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) Dezcallar raised concerns about Darfur and lamented it had been too dangerous to go any faster there. He also likened donors' actions to throwing money into a bottomless pit. Ambassador Nuland spoke about the need for an African NATO to address the continent's serious security issues. She expressed hope NATO and the EU could work with the new African Command (AFRICOM),the first integrated civilian and military U.S. command. She asked about the possibility, mentioned by U.S. Ambassador Aguirre, of an AFRICOM footprint at Naval Station Rota in southern Spain. The Deputy Chief of Mission told the Spanish we hope to get AFRICOM Commander General Kip Ward to Spain to discuss African coordination, and Ambassador Benavides agreed such a visit was well advised if not overdue. Dezcallar said Spain was convinced of the utility of such collaboration given Spanish concerns about stability in the Sahel and the seriousness of illegal immigration to Spain from Africa. Ambassador Nuland built on this concern saying the U.S. was increasingly worried about the terror threat, including the morphing of al-Qaida, in East Africa and Algeria. -------------- --- Reinforcing the Messages to a Thinktank Audience -------------- --- ¶14. (SBU) Ambassadors Nuland and Benavides wrapped up their Madrid program by leading a roundtable discussion with international security scholars and analysts at the Royal Elcano Institute on the afternoon of January 17. Ambassador Nuland spoke of the role of the Alliance as viewed from Washington, with emphasis on NATO as a global security provider and trainer and on the transformation of the Balkans. She said Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia were knocking on NATO's door and hoping for invitations at the April Summit, even as the issue of independence for Kosovo loomed. Regarding NATO enlargement prospects, and Croatia's candidacy in particular, Ambassador Nuland noted the EU had quantifiable entry requirements whereas NATO accession was a political decision. She praised NATO aspirants who were contributing more per capita to European security than one-third of NATO's existing allies. Asked how NATO and the international community were doing in Afghanistan, Ambassador Nuland conceded that as an Alliance, NATO had never had to do it this way. Taliban threats had so far not been borne out. Drug trafficking was on the rise, however, and insurgents were finding sanctuary in Pakistan. "Every month we don't tackle these challenges is another month we add to the mission," she told the assembly. ¶15. (SBU) In the days following Ambassador Nuland's visit to Madrid, Spanish journalists ran fair coverage of her one-on-one interviews. A television interview with Intereconomia (audience of about 500,000) was broadcast several times during new programming. Weekly news Magazine El Tiempo published an article highlighting NATO cooperation in Afghanistan, and conservative newspaper ABC featured an article focused on Spain's role in NATO and in Afghanistan. A fourth private discussion with a journalist has not yet produced any commentary. ¶16. (C) COMMENT: The Bucharest brainstorming and groundwork both behind closed doors and in public set the stage for a broader discussion in Spain of the importance of its contributions to NATO and in Afghanistan in particular. Post subsequently received and transmitted the SecDef's request for additional support and possible Guardia Civil deployment to Afghanistan. Follow-on discussions with Spanish interlocutors have been informed by the perspectives shared by Ambassadors Nuland and Benavides, and the push alluded to in the lead up to the NATO Summit. Spain may not be in a position to step up its commitments between now and the March elections and formation of a new Spanish Government, but Ambassador Nuland planted seeds that may yet bear fruit before Bucharest. In the meantime, the DCM plans to continue to discuss Afghanistan commitments looking to Bucharest, including the SecDef request, with Luis Cuesta o/a February ¶14. The presence of CSTC-A's BG George, who will be in Madrid for an MOD-sponsored seminar on Afghanistan PRTs, affords an opportunity to strengthen communication between CSTC-A and senior Spanish defense officials. LLORENS