SPAIN: REACTION TO PLAN RE CONTINGENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001304 SIPDIS PASS TO JODY DANIEL AND BRECK HEIDELBERG OF ISN/RA AND TO ELAINE SAMSON AND STACIE ZERDECKI OF EUR/WE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2033 TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL SY IAEA TRGY SP SUBJECT: SPAIN: REACTION TO PLAN RE CONTINGENT IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA'S PROGRAM FOR SYRIA REF: A. SECSTATE 127578 ¶B. UNVIEVIENNA 640 ¶C. MADRID 1262 ¶D. UNVIEVIENNA 583 MADRID 00001304 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: DCM Arnold A. Chacon for Reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: POLOFF on December 10 delivered REFTEL A non-paper to Carlos Torres, Counselor for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament at the MFA's Sub-DG for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The Spaniard opined that he considered the USG proposal -- to make the implementation of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation (TC) plan for Syria contingent upon Damascus's resolution of outstanding concerns about its nuclear activities -- a very aggressive position and suggested it would be difficult to implement. He explained the reasons behind Madrid's stance to vote in favor of Syria's TC program at the IAEA November 24-26 meeting and requested further intelligence sharing to strengthen the case against Syria's alleged undeclared activities at the Al-Kibar plant. He effectively described Madrid as completely in the dark about Syria's nuclear activities and dependent upon the IAEA alone for information. He also offered his personal thoughts on a counter-proposal to the USG plan that he suggested might achieve the same purpose. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) After hearing POLOFF walk through the non-paper, Torres let out a long exhale and opined that the USG was taking "a very strong position." He specifically stated that he was not saying yes or no to the USG proposal on behalf of the GOS, but he suggested the plan would be very difficult. For one thing, personal relations is an important factor in the rather small field of nuclear experts and it is difficult to control their activities. (COMMENT: Torres perhaps was speaking from experience: he spent several years at the IAEA as a substantive expert on nuclear issues. END COMMENT.) He suggested that it is "the normal practice" for the IAEA's requests for technical assistance to go directly to individuals rather than to national capitals. In Spain's case, he said that all of the activities of Spanish nuclear experts are passed through Madrid, which monitors their activities. Normally, he said, the system works and it is possible to control their activities. He stated that what the GOS can do is to look very closely at what Syria requests from Spain. ¶3. (S) The conversation turned to the oft-used analogy (see REFTELS B, C, and D) that Syria must be considered innocent until proven guilty. Torres stated that there must be evidence of a crime and claimed that "these days" the GOS does not receive any intelligence on Syria's nuclear activities from the US. (COMMENT: POLOFF interpreted this period as a pointed reference to the period since the Zapatero administration came to office in 2004. END COMMENT.) , He also claimed that the UK, France and Germany do not provide the GOS with intelligence on this issue, all of which makes the GOS dependent on statements from the IAEA, particularly Director General Mohammed ElBaradei. He suggested that Western allies were "uncoordinated" on the Syria issue and suggested that, consequently, we do not know the magnitude of the problem we are facing. ¶4. (S) Torres, who is not a career diplomat but has worked at the MFA since 2006, further asserted that Syria is "very opaque" to Madrid. He claimed that, within the MFA, they know "absolutely nothing" about Syria's activities. Torres passionately declared that, if there is evidence to prove Syria's complicity in an undeclared nuclear program for military purposes, the GOS does not have it. ¶5. (S) Torres added that, for the GOS, relations with Syria are a very delicate issue because there are very close, long-standing personal relationships at the highest levels that "make things difficult." He suggested that the GOS policy needs to "face reality" and take less of a "theoretical position." He suggested that the Spanish Ambassador to the IAEA took a theoretical position in his approach to the Syria issue, and that as a result, "We are misunderstood" by allies, which he remarked was a shame. MADRID 00001304 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Returning to the USG proposal, Torres agreed to the notion that, as evidenced by the unanimous November 24-26 vote in support of Syria's TC, no one opposes technical cooperation for the Syrians, the question is how and when to manage the implementation. Offhandedly, he then offered his personal views -- not an official GOS counterproposal -- on an alternate method that might achieve the same goal. He suggested that the most intelligent way to buy time before the implementation of the TC is to go back to the IAEA and to propose a moratorium on the implementation of the TC for perhaps six months to give Syria time to clarify its activities and for the IAEA to learn more and issue a new report. (COMMENT: Torres's suggestion, however, is inconsistent with remarks by his superior, Gonzalo de Salazar, to POLOFF and POLCOUNS on November 28, in which he said the GOS does not want to politicize the IAEA by attempting to block the Syrian TC request there. END COMMENT.) AGUIRRE