SPAIN: CIVIL GUARD OFFERS INSIDER ACCOUNT OF ITS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001230 SIPDIS PASS TO S/CT'S MARC NORMAN AND EUR/WE'S ELAINE SAMSON AND STACIE ZERDECKI E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2018 TAGS: PINR PINS PREL PTER SP SUBJECT: SPAIN: CIVIL GUARD OFFERS INSIDER ACCOUNT OF ITS ROLE IN COUNTER-TERRORISM REF: 2006 MADRID 38 Classified By: DCM Arnold A. Chacon for Reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. During a counter-terrorism (CT) conference co-sponsored by Embassy Madrid, General Pablo Martin Alonso, the Head of Intelligence for the Civil Guard -- known in Spanish as Guardia Civil (GC) -- discussed the role of the GC in detaining radical Islamic jihadists within Spain's borders and liaison with international partners. He presented a case study of "Operacion Chacal" (aka Operation Jackal),which detained 22 jihadists in the greater Barcelona area in January 2006. Martin's remarks proved to be the most interesting among the GOS panelists. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) Embassy Madrid, led by its Cultural Affairs Office, has been a co-sponsor of an annual CT conference with the Jose Ortega y Gasset Foundation and others since the Fall of 2001, shortly after 9/11. This year's iteration of the conference took place during November 17-19 and was entitled, "Islamist TERRORISM Throughout the Mediterranean - What Risks and Threats?." The conference featured a who's who of CT watchers from academia and the public sector throughout Europe and the Mediterranean. Martin spoke as part of a panel of speakers from the Spanish security services, which spoke on the topic of "Considerations of Internal Security and Foreign Action." Other speakers on that panel were Eugenio Pereiro, Director of the National Antiterrorist Coordination Center (CNCA, Spain's NCTC equivalent),Miguel Valverde, Commissioner General for Intelligence at the Spanish National Police (SNP),Javier Zaragoza, chief public prosecutor at the National Court, and Carmen Bujan, Director General for Strategic Affairs and TERRORISM at the Foreign Ministry ¶3. (SBU) Martin opened his remarks by cautioning that radical Islamic TERRORISM in the Mediterranean is a complex phenomenon and, due to a variety of cultural, historical and geographic factors, cannot be regarded as a homogenous group. He then based his presentation on the role of the GC in Operacion Chacal. (COMMENT: Spanish media reports describe Operacion Chacal as an interagency effort that involved roughly 500 agents from the GC, the SNP and the CNI, Spain's National Intelligence Center. END COMMENT.) ; ¶4. (SBU) Martin noted that the GOS became aware of a support cell to the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group in Barcelona. There were 12-15 members with different levels of radicalization whose profiles suggested they were involved in activities to support radical Islamist jihad. Upon further inspection, the GC determined that the cell was involved recruiting and indoctrinating radical jihadists and then facilitating their travel to fight in IRAQ with money and false documentation. Martin remarked that the group's finances derived from legitimate enterprises, but with portions of the proceeds dispersed to Morocco and to London via Paris. He commented that two of the recruits were intercepted in Syria on their way to Iraq. One of the suicide attacks in IRAQ that was traced to the recruits sent by the Barcelona cell occurred in Nasiriyah on November 12, 2003, which targeted the headquarters of the Italian Carabinieri and killed roughly 35 people, including 19 Carabinieri. Operacion Chacal concluded in January 2006 (as reported in part in REFTEL) with the arrest of 22 individuals, mostly of Moroccan origin. ¶5. (SBU) Martin revealed some of the behind-the-scenes legwork that that GC was involved in on the case. As he explained, because the Barcelona cell had interacted with other countries, the GC's investigation therefore required it to request information from those countries. For example, the GC requested assistance from the governments of Italy and Algeria (the cell member who truckbombed the Carabineiri headquarters was Algerian) to secure DNA samples of relatives of the deceased. The GC also worked with the USG, as leader of the Coalition in Iraq. The GC reached out to Damascus because the jihadists had transited through Syria and to Rabat for more information on the backgrounds of the arrested Moroccan cell members. The GC investigation also involved Europol for aspects of the case that had broader European implications, i.e., money sent from Barcelona to London or the movement of cell members through France. Martin concluded with a schematic assessment of the GOS and GC strategy for international cooperation in the Mediterranean region. He stated that within the EU, there are mechanisms for multilateral and bilateral cooperation in investigations, MADRID 00001230 002 OF 002 but that for the rest of the Mediterranean (ie., the Maghreb and the Eastern rim) cooperation in practice existed only in a bilateral format. Martin also mentioned the GC's recent emphasis on placing attaches in Spanish embassies abroad to assist with this type of liaison work. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: Although Martin's remarks were based on an historical operation nearly three years ago and for the most part contained previously available information, they do highlight how the GC, founded as a paramilitary force providing security in rural areas of Spain, has internationalized its activities in support of its CT mission. His comments were also valuable for his assessments of the GOS's varied strategies for cooperation with its European and Mediterranean partners. END COMMENT. AGUIRRE