CODELS MARTINEZ AND LIEBERMAN MEET WITH SPANISH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000114 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2018 TAGS: PREL SP SUBJECT: CODELS MARTINEZ AND LIEBERMAN MEET WITH SPANISH NSA CASAJUANA MADRID 00000114 001.4 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Eduardo Aguirre, Jr. for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Senators Martinez, Lieberman and Craig met with Spanish National Security Advisor Carles Casajuana on January 11, discussing Afghanistan, Lebanon, Morocco, Cuba, and the Alliance of Civilizations. Senator Lieberman asked that Spain work to clarify and if possible remove caveats on its ISAF forces. Senator Martinez emphasized the need for Spain and the U.S. to work together in Cuba. END SUMMARY. //Alliance of Civilizations First Forum// ¶2. (U) CODEL Martinez and CODEL Lieberman joined forces January 11 for a meeting with Spanish National Security advisor Carles Casajuana at Moncloa. Casajuana opened by apologizing for President Zapatero's unavailability due to his trip to France and preparations for the Alliance of Civilizations Forum (AoC). Casajuana said the Spanish were hopeful that the AoC would be a success, noting that several heads of government were attending, from Malaysia, Turkey, Slovenia, Algeria, and Senegal, as well as leaders from the Arab League and the Islamic Conference. Casajuana said that the Alliance would seek to bridge not the economic gap but the socio-cultural, education, and perception gaps between Islamic and non-Islamic populations. The AoC had asked each of the 68 countries of the Group of Friends to prepare an action plan on how these issues can be addressed within their own countries, and he said Spain's plan would focus on immigrant integration. He said that overcoming the common misperceptions regularly broadcast and perpetuated in both western and Islamic mass media would be a significant challenge. //Afghanistan// ¶3. (C) Senator Martinez asked Casajuana for his evaluation of Afghanistan, emphasizing that for the U.S., Afghanistan was essential to winning the war on terror. Martinez said it was necessary for NATO allies to step up and share more of the burden and sacrifice, since all agreed that Afghanistan was critical. Senator Lieberman added that he had just returned from Afghanistan where he observed that the lack of coordination between ISAF and OEF components and the caveats placed on some ISAF forces were "no way to fight a war." Casajuana replied that Spain is fully committed to staying in Afghanistan for a long time, and he agreed that Afghanistan must not be lost. He attempted to explain Spanish caveats by saying that in 2004 the GOS had needed to sell the mission as primarily a reconstruction and development mission in order to mark a clear distinction between participation in ISAF and the previous Spanish presence in Iraq. He said that the Spanish caveats were no different from those of other nations, and he underscored that the Spanish AOR was enormous, considering the size of their effective deployable force. Sen. Lieberman suggested that perhaps NATO could develop a coordinated set of caveats and rules of engagement for its forces. Casajuana also said that Spain favors the establishment of a UN Special Envoy, perhaps Paddy Ashdown, in order to increase coordination of efforts among different groups in Afghanistan - NATO, OEF, and EU. Sen. Lieberman said that during their meeting President Karzai had appeared somewhat receptive to a UN Special Envoy with the caveat that sovereignty remained with his office. //Lebanon// ¶4. (C) Ambassador Aguirre asked Casajuana for an update on Lebanon. Casajuana said that the situation remained extremely difficult, and perhaps more dangerous for Spanish troops than Afghanistan. He noted that Spanish troops deployed in southeast Lebanon were faced with the difficult task of gaining the cooperation of Hizballah and Syria. On the political process, Casajuana noted that the constitutional stipulation that there be consensus among the varying ethnic groups in Lebanon made progress very difficult. Spain supports the Arab League proposal of General Michel Suleiman for consensus President. He said Spain could support any consensus candidate; their main priority is to establish very clear rules for the political future of Lebanon that would not allow for a Syrian puppet regime to come to power. //Morocco// ¶5. (C) Turning to Morocco, Casajuana noted that Spain's MADRID 00000114 002.2 OF 002 southern neighbor takes up between 20 and 40 percent of Spain's foreign policy attention. He emphasized their strong links and excellent cooperation in counter-terrorism, as well as the strong Spanish conviction that a stable, progressive and prosperous Morocco was Spain's best defense against Islamic terrorism. As such, Spain was very active in Brussels and in other international fora to secure development assistance and other engagement with Morocco. He praised the GOM and said that they are fully committed and capable of modernizing the country. He said that Moroccan leaders themselves believe that a further five to ten years of relative stability and economic development will lift the Moroccan populace out of its traditional North African identity, awakening it to the potential and opportunity of the democratic West. ¶6. (C) Casajuana also noted the phenomenon of illegal immigration and organized crime elements who are trafficking people from as far as Bangladesh through West Africa in the hope of reaching Spain. He said that cooperation with Morocco and Senegal had succeeded in greatly reducing trafficking through those nations, but that there were ample other options in West Africa for organized crime to exploit. The Senators noted similarities between the Spanish and U.S. immigration problems and noted a need to establish more effective legal travel for purposes of employment. //Cuba// ¶7. (C) Senator Martinez turned to CUBA and said that at this point the U.S. and Spain were very clear on where they differed and where they agreed. He noted that it appeared the coming months or years would be a time of substantial change in Havana, and he emphasized that the U.S. would not legitimize a transfer of power from Fidel to Raul. He said the U.S. could not accept cosmetic change and reform but wanted democratic change, and political liberalization, including the release of political prisoners. He noted the importance of Spanish influence on the Cuban populace and said that Spain was uniquely positioned to push change in Cuba. Senator Martinez also cautioned that Raul was always perceived as the more die-hard leftist ideologue of the two brothers, so that expecting him to become an agent for change might not be realistic. ¶8. (C) Casajuana replied that of all nations, Spaniards feel most attached to Cuba. He said that the Spanish could never have a policy of absolutely no dialogue with the Cubans, but that they remained committed to democratic change in CUBA and would continue to meet with both the Castro regime and dissidents. The Spanish populace insists that its government discuss human rights abuses with the Cubans, he said, and the GOS did not want to legitimize the Castro dictatorship. Spain would, however, like the transition to take place without violence and could tolerate a slower transition than perhaps the U.S. Ambassador Aguirre noted that the USG and GOS have an ongoing dialogue and share the goal of a democratic Cuba. Senator Lieberman added that the Spanish had a special influence with the Cubans and could perhaps be the good cop to the U.S. bad cop provided we continued working toward the same end goal. //Al Kasser// ¶9. (C) Ambassador Aguirre concluded the meeting by thanking Casajuana for Spanish cooperation in the extradition of Monzer Al-Kasser, and Casajuana said that the successful extradition was very important to the GOS. ¶10. (U) CODELs Lieberman and Martinez cleared this message. LLORENS