MADRID ECON WEEKLY, OCT 6-10 - FINANCIAL CRISIS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001080 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED SENSITIVE CAPTION) SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/WE, EEB/IFD/OMA COMMERCE FOR 4212/DON CALVERT TREASURY FOR IA/OEE: W.LINDQUIST E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EFIN ELAB SP SUBJECT: MADRID ECON WEEKLY, OCT 6-10 - FINANCIAL CRISIS REF: MADRID 1050 MADRID 00001080 001.6 OF 002 1.(SBU) Summary: The international financial crisis and the GOS, reaction to it have dominated economic news in Spain this week. In the context of bank failures and dramatic policy shifts elsewhere in Europe, as well as worldwide stock market plunges, two extraordinary GOS measures have generated relatively little controversy. The GOS announced it would buy up to 50 billion euros of mortgage-based assets from Spanish banks; relative to the size of Spain's economy, this effort is comparable to the U.S. rescue fund. Reacting to Irish and German actions, the GOS also increased from 20,000 euros to 100,000 euros the guarantee on bank deposits. The stock market has followed world markets into a steep decline. The IMF again lowered its growth forecasts and now predicts the economy will contract in 2009 and unemployment will approach 15%. Despite concern about the broader economy and the worldwide financial crisis, authorities and banks insist that Spain,s banks are better able than some of their European counterparts to weather the financial crisis. The crisis will complicate GOS efforts to pass the 2009 budget, but the first serious tests of whether it has weakened support for Zapatero will not come until the Basque and Galician regional elections, which are expected to be held next April and June, respectively. End Summary. Lots of (Re)Action ) Deposit Guarantees and Bank Fund 2.(U) After President Zapatero met on October 6 with the heads of Spain,s three largest banks and three largest savings banks (cajas),the GOS announced that it would raise the deposit guarantee from the existing 20,000 euros, whether or not EU economy/finance ministers were able to agree to such an increase the following day. The ministers did agree on an increase to a minimum of 50,000 euros, but Zapatero then announced that Spain would guarantee deposits up to 100,000 euros. It is not clear who will pay for the increased guarantees; banks and cajas have financed the three existing funds that cover the 20,000 euro guarantee. 3.(U) Zapatero also announced a temporary 30-billion euro GOS fund to buy mortgages and mortgage-based assets from banks. Relative to the size of Spain,s economy, the fund, which can be increased to 50 billion euros if needed, is comparable to the 700-billion-dollar U.S. fund. However, the fund is different from the U.S. fund in that it will only buy top-rated assets from the banks, as it is aimed at injecting liquidity, not cleaning up bank balance sheets. It is more attractive to banks than using existing European Central Bank mechanisms because the ECB will only lend for 6 months, while the GOS plans to keep its holdings for up to 3 years. 4.(U) Second Vice President and Economy/Finance Minister Solbes has emphasized that the GOS does not expect to lose much, if any, money on the fund and that the only impact will be a manageable increase in the debt/GDP ratio from 39% to 42% for 3 years. (This is well below the average EU-15 ratio of around 60%.) Representatives of banking associations and leading cajas have said that the fund will allow them to meet their funding needs until at least the second half of 2009, even in the unlikely event that all other sources of credit were to be closed. 5.(U) On October 10, the Council of Ministers approved the deposit guarantee increase and creation of the fund and announced that the fund could make its first asset purchases before the end of the year. Press reports suggested that the GOS would purchase up to 10 billion euros this year and up to 20 billion in 2009. Also on October 10, Zapatero met with French president Sarkozy and urged Sarkozy to call a meeting of eurozone heads of state to address the crisis. Preferring EU Action ¶6. (SBU) The week,s events show how the GOS, actions have been influenced by external developments. Solbes has said frequently that he did not believe the deposit guarantee increase was initially necessary, and he has described it as a preventative measure. However, after Ireland and later Germany guaranteed all deposits, the GOS felt it had no choice in order to maintain public calm. The bank support fund may also have been in part a response to actions elsewhere. Zapatero and Solbes have called for coordinated EU-wide action in order to avoid situations like this. Without such coordinated EU action, the GOS faces competing concerns in its effort to maintain confidence ) inaction risks being seen as an inability or unwillingness to do anything to stop the crisis, while dramatic GOS measures that are not taken by all EU countries risk being seen as evidence that Spain,s situation is precarious. Banks/Cajas Believed to be Relatively Healthy MADRID 00001080 002.6 OF 002 ¶7. (SBU) The GOS and the financial community believe -) and authorities have repeatedly emphasized -- that Spain,s financial sector is in better shape than those in other large EU countries. Because of the Bank of Spain,s conservative regulation and Spain,s position as a net capital importer, Spanish institutions have almost no exposure to U.S. mortgage-based assets and have little exposure to Lehman Brothers assets. While the domestic construction collapse and the resulting slowdown in the broader economy have caused loan delinquencies to increase rapidly, they remain at manageable levels, at least for now. Mortgage delinquencies, though rising, are still at relatively low levels. The two largest banks, Santander and BBVA, are widely diversified internationally, and Santander has been looking to buy foreign banks at bargain prices. All Spanish banks have seen significant drops in their stock prices over the last year, but none are thought to be in imminent danger of collapse. Savings banks (&cajas8) are considered to be in slightly worse shape because of their greater exposure to mortgages, construction, and real estate. There is speculation that some of the smaller cajas may need to merge, and the GOS is considering legislative proposals that would enable the merger of cajas ) many of which are controlled by regional governments ) from different regions. Broader Economy Outlook Continues to Worsen 8.(SBU) Despite the relative strength of Spain,s financial sector, the financial crisis will certainly aggravate the damage the broader economy has already felt from the construction slowdown that started last year. This week the IMF again lowered its forecast for overall Spanish economic performance, predicting that 2008 growth would be 1.4% and 2009 would see a contraction of 0.2%. (Comment: Only 1.4% growth for the full year would imply that a recession has started in the year,s second half; this is consistent with widespread reports of an abrupt decline in economic activity.) The IMF also predicted that unemployment would average 14.7% in 2009. The stock market has responded to both Spain,s own deteriorating prospects and turmoil in international markets; after falling by over 5% on October 10, the IBEX-35 blue-chip index was down 18% for the week and almost 40% this year. Little Immediate Political Impact 9.(SBU) As post has reported previously, Zapatero has been criticized for what has been portrayed as unwillingness to admit ) especially during his successful re-election campaign earlier this year ) the severity of the economic situation. His insistence that criticism by the opposition Partido Popular (PP) is unpatriotic and his efforts to blame Spain,s economic difficulties on the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis also have generated skepticism. Unsurprisingly, the public is also unhappy that the GOS has not been able to prevent the financial crisis, although criticism may be muted by the sight of the apparently more serious troubles in the U.S., the UK, and Germany. 10.(SBU) Zapatero may be helped by the apparent inability of the PP to do much more than criticize his handling of the crisis. He is expected to meet with PP leader Mariano Rajoy in the next week or so to discuss the crisis, now that Solbes has held preparatory meetings with Rajoy,s economic team. The crisis and the economic slump,s impact on tax revenues will complicate the already-difficult prospects for passage of the 2009 budget, as the PSOE is slightly short of the necessary congressional majority. However, the issue will be resolved one way or the other by the end of the year; if no agreement is reached, the 2008 budget will be repeated. Otherwise, the first major post-crisis tests of Zapatero,s political strength will come with the Basque and Galician regional elections, which we expect will be held next April and June, respectively. AGUIRRE