ZAMBIA: NEXT STEPS ON ZIMBABWE CRISIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUSAKA 000486 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2018 TAGS: PREL PHUM SADC AU ZI ZA SUBJECT: ZAMBIA: NEXT STEPS ON ZIMBABWE CRISIS REF: A. LUSAKA 477 ¶B. LUSAKA 463 ¶C. LUSAKA 453 ¶D. LUSAKA 448 ¶E. LUSAKA 429 ¶F. LUSAKA 427 Classified By: Ambassador Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. President Mwanawasa remains committed to addressing the crisis in Zimbabwe, but lacks wide support from other SADC leaders. He has expressed an intent to send a small delegation of SADC leaders to meet with Mugabe as well as an interest in helping mediate a solution involving a government of national unity. President Mwanawasa remains sensitive to the perception that he is acting in response to pressure from Western governments. Press coverage in Zambia has reported on post-election violence and human rights abuse and editorials have begun to reflect increasing public perception that it is time for Mugabe to step down. Post will continue it coordination with the GRZ and will broaden its engagement with the media and civil society (see recommendations in paras 9-13). End Summary. -------------- Mwanawasa Still Engaged -------------- ¶2. (SBU) As Southern African Development Community (SADC) Chair, President Mwanawasa has shown considerable leadership by placing Zimbabwe more prominently on the SADC agenda and introducing increased candor to the discussion of Zimbabwe's problems. Subsequent to the April 12 SADC emergency summit (Ref F),President Mwanawasa has been in contact with opposition candidate Tsvangirai and other SADC leaders seeking ways to move the issue forward. He also publicly praised South Africa and Mozambique for refusing to offload a Chinese arms shipment headed to Zimbabwe and called on other countries to do likewise. ¶3. (C) In an April 26 meeting with A/S Frazer (Ref B), President Mwanawasa expressed his intention to send a delegation of SADC heads of state to meet with Mugabe. This, he explained, would require the cooperation and endorsement of President Dos Santos, as Chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security. President Mwanawasa also indicated that he would be willing to play a mediation role to further prospects of a government of national unity. (Comment: Mwanawasa cannot be a facilitator, never mind an honest broker, when Mugabe will not take his calls and Mbeki confronts him.) Lastly, he referred to a possible mission comprised of former SADC heads of state to entreat Mugabe. ¶4. (C) President Mwanawasa has identified former President Kaunda, as a possible member of the delegation of senior statesmen (Refs A, D). In many respects, Kaunda, who stepped down from office peacefully following an electoral defeat after 27 years in office, and who belongs to the first generation of African liberation leaders, may have the credentials to appeal to Mugabe. Hover, his comments to A/S Frazer during her recent visit to Zambia (Ref A),and an April 29 press statement in which he insisted that the British Government is responsible for the problems in Zimbabwe, suggest that he may not be suitable for convincing Mugabe to step down. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador discussed recent developments with Foreign Ministry Permanent Secretary Tens Kapoma on May 2. Kapoma said that on May 3, the SADC Politics, Defense, and Security Organ troika, comprised of Angola, Swaziland, and Tanzania, will meet in Luanda, hosted by President Dos Santos. When asked whether President Mwanawasa would consider hosting a follow-up SADC emergency summit, Kapoma said that it would depend on the outcome of the troika meeting. Kapoma added that the possibility of another summit "has not been ruled out." ¶6. (C) Kapoma also told the Ambassador that, in his view, the level of violence and human rights abuse in Zimbabwe would not lend themselves to a free and fair run-off election. He indicated that he had been in touch with Zimbabwe opposition leaders who, he conveyed, believed a run-off would be subject to rigging and would lead to a situation "worse than before." Kapoma acknowledged that President Mwanawasa had still not succeeded in speaking with President Mugabe, despite repeated attempts, beginning in early April, in advance of the emergency summit. -------------- Paradigm Shift in Zambia? LUSAKA 00000486 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Zambian newspapers and electronic media have in the last week increased the number of stories reporting on the post-election crisis in Zimbabwe. Media widely reported on A/S Frazer's statements about violence and human rights abuses in Zimbabwe that seems to have coincided with (or perhaps helped steer) a shift in tone in media coverage. Editorials in Zambia's daily independent newspaper, "The Post," point to a change in the way Zambians are reporting on--and viewing--the situation in Zimbabwe. On April 14, the Post's editor, Fred M'membe, drawing on pro-Mugabe vitriol, published an editorial entitled "Let the imperialists choke on their frustration." However, responding to international attention on violence in Zimbabwe, The Post increased its own coverage of human rights abuse. An April 26, M'membe changed his tune with an editorial that called upon ZANU-PF and Mugabe to "accept defeat and step down." ¶8. (SBU) This invigorated local media response is contributing to a change in public perception, with its well-placed focus on human rights abuse. Much of this credit also goes to President Mwanawasa who, through his leadership in SADC, has helped open the discussion on Zimbabwe, demonstrating by his own example that Zimbabwe's crisis is an internal African problem and no longer "taboo." Many Zambians seem to have reframed their perspective on Zimbabwe's problems, looking beyond its economic woes (and land reform issues),to broader issues of human right abuse, poor governance, and disregard for democracy. -------------- Embassy Lusaka Broadens Its Scope -------------- ¶9. (C) In addition to coordinating closely with State House and the Foreign Ministry on GRZ next steps, particularly with regard to SADC, the Ambassador will discuss the issue with outgoing Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Secretary General Erastus Mwencha. Ambassador will emphasize to Mwencha, the newly appointed African Union Commission Deputy Chairperson, the problems that Zimbabwe poses to regional stability and economic integration and suggest that the AU might have a role to play. Post's Public Affairs Section will reach out to local journalists to provide resource material, including releases from Human Rights Watch and Zimbabwe Peace Project, as well as web resources that will help them monitor the situation in Zimbabwe. Post's Political Section will meet with influential human rights and governance NGO representatives in Lusaka to increase civil society's awareness and engagement, and hopefully will spur them to speak out on Zimbabwe. -------------- Recommendations -------------- ¶10. (C) Despite Mwanawasa's commitment to moving the issue forward, he remains particularly concerned that this remain a SADC-led initiative. During the emergency summit, he told other SADC leaders that SADC "must solve, and be seen to be solving," the problem because "by doing nothing, we are inviting outside intervention" (Ref E). He remains sensitive to the perception that he is acting in response to pressure from Western governments. Post will continue to respect these concerns by maintaining a strong dialogue that is matched with public discretion. ¶11. (C) Some, including former President Kaunda, continue to share the view that the crisis in Zimbabwe can be ascribed to the UK and United States (Ref A). They have framed Zimbabwe's problems in terms of a conflict between Mugabe and Western countries. There is the danger that highly vocal U.S. statements against Mugabe will play into their hands. U.S. positions might be most effectively advanced in Zambia and throughout the region by utilizing the voices of local and African journalist and NGO representatives. ¶12. (C) President Mwanawasa also pointed to the difficulty gaining consensus among SADC heads of state due to leaders who continue to sympathize with Mugabe. Although Mwanawasa is prepared to call for SADC sanctions, he believes that other SADC leaders would oppose them. A great deal of diplomatic work in other SADC capitals remains to be done to enlarge the camp of like-minded SADC leaders. ¶13. (C) As the Department engages with SADC, it may want to double-track these efforts through the African Union. President Kikwete, for instance, may side with President LUSAKA 00000486 003 OF 003 Mwanawasa within SADC, but may be best positioned to address the situation through Tanzania's Chair of the AU. Egypt may also be concerned about resolving the problem before it takes on the AU Chair, as it will likely not want the issue on the agenda at Sharm El-Sheikh in July. MARTINEZ