ZAMBIA: NEXT STEPS ON ZIMBABWE CRISIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUSAKA 000486

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM SADC AU ZI ZA
SUBJECT: ZAMBIA: NEXT STEPS ON ZIMBABWE CRISIS

REF: A. LUSAKA 477


B. LUSAKA 463

C. LUSAKA 453

D. LUSAKA 448

E. LUSAKA 429

F. LUSAKA 427

Classified By: Ambassador Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. President Mwanawasa remains committed to
addressing the crisis in Zimbabwe, but lacks wide support
from other SADC leaders. He has expressed an intent to send
a small delegation of SADC leaders to meet with Mugabe as
well as an interest in helping mediate a solution involving a
government of national unity. President Mwanawasa remains
sensitive to the perception that he is acting in response to
pressure from Western governments. Press coverage in Zambia
has reported on post-election violence and human rights abuse
and editorials have begun to reflect increasing public
perception that it is time for Mugabe to step down. Post
will continue it coordination with the GRZ and will broaden
its engagement with the media and civil society (see
recommendations in paras 9-13). End Summary.

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Mwanawasa Still Engaged
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2. (SBU) As Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Chair, President Mwanawasa has shown considerable leadership
by placing Zimbabwe more prominently on the SADC agenda and
introducing increased candor to the discussion of Zimbabwe's
problems. Subsequent to the April 12 SADC emergency summit
(Ref F),President Mwanawasa has been in contact with
opposition candidate Tsvangirai and other SADC leaders
seeking ways to move the issue forward. He also publicly
praised South Africa and Mozambique for refusing to offload a
Chinese arms shipment headed to Zimbabwe and called on other
countries to do likewise.


3. (C) In an April 26 meeting with A/S Frazer (Ref B),
President Mwanawasa expressed his intention to send a
delegation of SADC heads of state to meet with Mugabe. This,
he explained, would require the cooperation and endorsement
of President Dos Santos, as Chair of the SADC Organ on
Politics, Defense, and Security. President Mwanawasa also
indicated that he would be willing to play a mediation role
to further prospects of a government of national unity.
(Comment: Mwanawasa cannot be a facilitator, never mind an
honest broker, when Mugabe will not take his calls and Mbeki
confronts him.) Lastly, he referred to a possible mission
comprised of former SADC heads of state to entreat Mugabe.


4. (C) President Mwanawasa has identified former President
Kaunda, as a possible member of the delegation of senior
statesmen (Refs A, D). In many respects, Kaunda, who stepped
down from office peacefully following an electoral defeat
after 27 years in office, and who belongs to the first
generation of African liberation leaders, may have the
credentials to appeal to Mugabe. Hover, his comments to A/S
Frazer during her recent visit to Zambia (Ref A),and an
April 29 press statement in which he insisted that the
British Government is responsible for the problems in
Zimbabwe, suggest that he may not be suitable for convincing
Mugabe to step down.


5. (C) The Ambassador discussed recent developments with
Foreign Ministry Permanent Secretary Tens Kapoma on May 2.
Kapoma said that on May 3, the SADC Politics, Defense, and
Security Organ troika, comprised of Angola, Swaziland, and
Tanzania, will meet in Luanda, hosted by President Dos
Santos. When asked whether President Mwanawasa would
consider hosting a follow-up SADC emergency summit, Kapoma
said that it would depend on the outcome of the troika
meeting. Kapoma added that the possibility of another summit
"has not been ruled out."


6. (C) Kapoma also told the Ambassador that, in his view, the
level of violence and human rights abuse in Zimbabwe would
not lend themselves to a free and fair run-off election. He
indicated that he had been in touch with Zimbabwe opposition
leaders who, he conveyed, believed a run-off would be subject
to rigging and would lead to a situation "worse than before."
Kapoma acknowledged that President Mwanawasa had still not
succeeded in speaking with President Mugabe, despite repeated
attempts, beginning in early April, in advance of the
emergency summit.

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Paradigm Shift in Zambia?

LUSAKA 00000486 002 OF 003


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7. (SBU) Zambian newspapers and electronic media have in the
last week increased the number of stories reporting on the
post-election crisis in Zimbabwe. Media widely reported on
A/S Frazer's statements about violence and human rights
abuses in Zimbabwe that seems to have coincided with (or
perhaps helped steer) a shift in tone in media coverage.
Editorials in Zambia's daily independent newspaper, "The
Post," point to a change in the way Zambians are reporting
on--and viewing--the situation in Zimbabwe. On April 14, the
Post's editor, Fred M'membe, drawing on pro-Mugabe vitriol,
published an editorial entitled "Let the imperialists choke
on their frustration." However, responding to international
attention on violence in Zimbabwe, The Post increased its own
coverage of human rights abuse. An April 26, M'membe changed
his tune with an editorial that called upon ZANU-PF and
Mugabe to "accept defeat and step down."


8. (SBU) This invigorated local media response is
contributing to a change in public perception, with its
well-placed focus on human rights abuse. Much of this credit
also goes to President Mwanawasa who, through his leadership
in SADC, has helped open the discussion on Zimbabwe,
demonstrating by his own example that Zimbabwe's crisis is an
internal African problem and no longer "taboo." Many
Zambians seem to have reframed their perspective on
Zimbabwe's problems, looking beyond its economic woes (and
land reform issues),to broader issues of human right abuse,
poor governance, and disregard for democracy.

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Embassy Lusaka Broadens Its Scope
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9. (C) In addition to coordinating closely with State House
and the Foreign Ministry on GRZ next steps, particularly with
regard to SADC, the Ambassador will discuss the issue with
outgoing Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA) Secretary General Erastus Mwencha. Ambassador will
emphasize to Mwencha, the newly appointed African Union
Commission Deputy Chairperson, the problems that Zimbabwe
poses to regional stability and economic integration and
suggest that the AU might have a role to play. Post's Public
Affairs Section will reach out to local journalists to
provide resource material, including releases from Human
Rights Watch and Zimbabwe Peace Project, as well as web
resources that will help them monitor the situation in
Zimbabwe. Post's Political Section will meet with
influential human rights and governance NGO representatives
in Lusaka to increase civil society's awareness and
engagement, and hopefully will spur them to speak out on
Zimbabwe.

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Recommendations
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10. (C) Despite Mwanawasa's commitment to moving the issue
forward, he remains particularly concerned that this remain a
SADC-led initiative. During the emergency summit, he told
other SADC leaders that SADC "must solve, and be seen to be
solving," the problem because "by doing nothing, we are
inviting outside intervention" (Ref E). He remains sensitive
to the perception that he is acting in response to pressure
from Western governments. Post will continue to respect
these concerns by maintaining a strong dialogue that is
matched with public discretion.


11. (C) Some, including former President Kaunda, continue to
share the view that the crisis in Zimbabwe can be ascribed to
the UK and United States (Ref A). They have framed
Zimbabwe's problems in terms of a conflict between Mugabe and
Western countries. There is the danger that highly vocal
U.S. statements against Mugabe will play into their hands.
U.S. positions might be most effectively advanced in Zambia
and throughout the region by utilizing the voices of local
and African journalist and NGO representatives.


12. (C) President Mwanawasa also pointed to the difficulty
gaining consensus among SADC heads of state due to leaders
who continue to sympathize with Mugabe. Although Mwanawasa
is prepared to call for SADC sanctions, he believes that
other SADC leaders would oppose them. A great deal of
diplomatic work in other SADC capitals remains to be done to
enlarge the camp of like-minded SADC leaders.


13. (C) As the Department engages with SADC, it may want to
double-track these efforts through the African Union.
President Kikwete, for instance, may side with President

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Mwanawasa within SADC, but may be best positioned to address
the situation through Tanzania's Chair of the AU. Egypt may
also be concerned about resolving the problem before it takes
on the AU Chair, as it will likely not want the issue on the
agenda at Sharm El-Sheikh in July.
MARTINEZ