SCENESETTER FOR A/S FRAZER'S VISIT TO LUSAKA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUSAKA 000448 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/FO AND AF/S E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2013 TAGS: SADC PREL ZA ZI SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S FRAZER'S VISIT TO LUSAKA REF: A. LUSAKA 429 ¶B. LUSAKA 427 ¶C. LUSAKA 423 ¶D. LUSAKA 421 ¶E. 06 LUSAKA 963 ¶F. 06 LUSAKA 945 Classified By: Ambassador Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Your visit to Zambia is well-timed, in the aftermath of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Summit on Zimbabwe. Within the confines of SADC meetings, Mwanawasa has shown a willingness to address problems in Zimbabwe and confront Zimbabwe President Mugabe and South African President Mbeki. Although Mwanawasa will step down from the SADC Chair later this year, he can continue to play a constructive role by forming a coalition with other like-minded SADC Heads of State. There may also be a part for former President Kenneth Kaunda to play, as a respected senior statesman and possible envoy to Zimbabwe. During your meetings, you may also wish to raise the progress of the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA), Zambia's participation in regional peacekeeping operations, and anti-corruption issues. Mwanawasa has just returned from a SADC Summit on poverty in Mauritius, where he met with Mbeki, the Swazi King, and other SADC leaders. ¶2. (C) Although President Mwanawasa has shown leadership by placing Zimbabwe onto the SADC agenda, his public reticence suggests that he still prefers to do so only privately. It seems unlikely that, despite his differences with Mugabe, he will take a stronger stand or openly criticize Mugabe. In light of his sensitivity to criticism that he has been doing the bidding of the West, it will be important to carefully consider how to engage Mwanawasa in such a way that legimitimizes and supports his leadership. Mwanawasa reinforced this in a recent discussion with the Ambassador, during which he thanked the USG for "its discretion." In the event that SADC leaders appoint former President Kenneth Kaunda to be a special envoy to Zimbabwe (see para 9),we may want to direct some of our attention, and much of our message, to him. -------------- Overview/Introduction -------------- ¶3. (U) Zambia is rich in mineral, agricultural, and water resources and enjoys a history of peace and stability in a sub-region marked by conflict and instability. In 2006, the country conducted its fourth multi-party democratic elections since 1991. Democratic institutions are still developing, the Presidency retains a great deal of power, and administrative corruption continues to be rampant. The economy has experienced almost a decade of steady growth, but not enough to generate significant new job opportunities. About two-thirds of Zambia's 11.9 million people live below the poverty line, and under-five child survival rates and maternal mortality rates are among the worst in the world. The quality of teachers and the availability of teaching materials are poor. The HIV/AIDS pandemic cuts across all social and economic sectors. About 17 percent of the adult population is HIV-positive. -------------- USG Goals in Zambia -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The Mission's strategic focus concentrates on creating a more positive environment for private sector expansion through trade and investment, addressing enormous health and education challenges, and improving HIV/AIDS and malaria prevention, care, and treatment through the President's initiatives. In addition, reducing corruption and improving government accountability and capabilities will assist in attaining our top strategic objectives. -------------- U.S.-Zambia Relations -------------- ¶5. (C) Although the Government of Zambia often follows the AU or SADC consensus in UN and other international settings, occasionally a motivated and courageous GRZ official takes a stand on issues of interest to the U.S. Government, for example, to criticize Sudan's human rights record in Darfur. USG relations with the Government of Zambia are generally positive and cordial, but GRZ follow-through on joint activities and projects is often slow, not thorough, and heavy on formality. GRZ delays or failure to act sometimes stems from a lack of interest or commitment--Zambians are LUSAKA 00000448 002 OF 003 courteous and often too polite to say "no" outright--but other times is due to poor internal coordination and lack of capacity. -------------- SADC/Zimbabwe -------------- ¶6. (C) President Mwanawasa was appointed SADC Chair at the August 2007 SADC Summit, a position that he will hold until August 2008. During the August 2007 meetings, Mwanawasa expressed concerns about the speed and effectiveness of Thabo Mbeki's "quiet diplomacy" with Zimbabwe. According to some reports, Mbeki and/or Mugabe accused Mwanawasa of being manipulated by UK diplomats. This accusation, and the lack of support from Mwanawasa's SADC peers, extinguished the discussion on Zimbabwe. (Refs E, F). ¶7. (C) During the Extraordinary Heads of State Summit on April 12, Mwanawasa made a forceful opening statement that called upon Zimbabwe's leaders to exercise "humility" and overlook their own personal interests in finding a solution that reflects the will of the people (Ref C). After an all-night session, the leaders released a weak communique that called for the quick release of election results, but otherwise failed to acknowledge ZANU-PF's violence and intimidation tactics (Ref B). The Summit pointed to an emerging divide between SADC Heads of State who are prepared to address problems in Zimbabwe and others who prefer not to interfere. Press reports suggest that Botswanan and Tanzanian leadership supported Mwanwasa, while the Presidents of Malawi, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo backed Mbeki's faint engagement. The diluted communique suggests that Mbeki may have prevailed. ¶8. (C) Mwanawasa told the Ambassador, however, that the Summit was a signal to Mugabe that SADC will not support him unconditionally. He characterized Mbeki as counterproductive and insincere. He observed that many SADC leaders had changed their minds about the situation in Zimbabwe after hearing firsthand from opposition candidates Tsvangirai and Makoni about the electoral irregularities. MDC Secretary General Tendai Biti called the Summit "a major improvement" over Mbeki's attempts at mediation. Biti said that the communique "exposes the limitations of quiet diplomacy in comparison to the constructive engagement, which other countries pursued against the apartheid regime in South Africa." -------------- Mwanawasa As "Special Envoy?" -------------- ¶9. (SBU) On April 18, Government newspapers quoted Information Minister Mulongoti categorically rejecting opposition candidate Tsvangirai's call for Mwanawasa to take over Mbeki's mediation efforts. Mulongoti said that Tsvangirai had discussed this with Mwanawasa during the April SIPDIS 12 summit (and possibly during a reported half-day visit on April 16--we cannot confirm that this meeting took place), but Mwanawasa had no intention of taking up this assignment without a mandate from the SADC leaders. Mulongoti added that Zambia takes strong exception to Zimbabwe Minister of Justice Patrick Chinamasa's accusation that Mwanawasa's actions are part of a "regime change agenda." -------------- Possible Role for Kenneth Kaunda -------------- ¶10. (C) At a Ministerial meeting in August 2008, SADC leaders discussed the possibility of scaling up South Africa's engagement by appointing an "eminent official" as a special envoy to the crisis. Possible candidates included former Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and former Botswanan President Ketumile Masire (Ref F). Since August, Mwanawasa has raised this again, suggesting that Kaunda could be part of a regional commission of senior envoys. Kaunda may have credibility with Mugabe that some other SADC Heads of State, who do not belong to the first generation of African liberators, do not. Kaunda is also considered an ideal choice inasmuch as he peacefully stepped down from office after a twenty-seven year presidency, following strong public pressure and his unexpected loss in national elections. -------------- ACOTA, Peacekeeping, Anti-corruption -------------- ¶11. (C) Other items that you may wish to discuss with Mwanawasa or the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense LUSAKA 00000448 003 OF 003 could include: --ACOTA training: In 2007, the first group of 560 participants successfully completed ACOTA peacekeeper training. Despite the positive reception, the Ministry of Defense has yet to confirm the timing of the next round of ACOTA training. The Embassy has initiated a formal dialogue to set a date for training in summer 2008 but has not received a full commitment from the GRZ. --Peacekeeping Operations: The Zambia Defense Forces (ZDF) have been active in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and, currently, Southern Sudan, although they are not assessed as being particularly effective. The ZDF have not responded to offers by the DATT and the Ambassador to provide non-lethal equipment should the forces deploy to Darfur. Regarding deployment to Somalia, the GRZ advised informally that this is "off the table." The Chinese are almost certainly involved with the ZDF in the realm of training and logistics, although we have no hard data on the extent of their engagement. --Anti-Corruption: The President deserves praise for his focus on combating corruption. High-level cases have progressed slowly, with three convictions. Post has been pressing for a more holistic approach to corruption prevention, that includes legislative and institutional reforms. Some measures that require little more than political will, have long been pending Cabinet approval, including the establishment of an internationally compliant anti-money laundering regime. MARTINEZ