A PREVIEW OF SEPTEMBER'S LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LUANDA 000555

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AO
SUBJECT: A PREVIEW OF SEPTEMBER'S LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

REF: LUANDA 0471

Classified By: AMB DAN MOZENA FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (U) SUMMARY: The September 5, 2008 legislative election
will be Angola's first in 16 years and only the second in its
history. Although the country's political landscape is
difficult to read, an analysis of Angola's electoral system,
the electoral playing field, and the results of the 1992
election sheds some light on what we can expect in the coming
months. END SUMMARY

The Angolan Electoral System
--------------


2. (U) The Angolan National Assembly is elected through
closed party-list proportional representation. Of its 220
deputies, 130 are elected at large in what is called the
National Circuit (NC),in which seats are allotted in
proportion to parties' nationwide vote tally, and 90 are
elected from the 18 Provincial Circuits (PC),or 5 deputies
for each of the 18 provinces. After the total number NC or
PC seats are allotted to parties in proportion to their
national or provincial tallies, individual candidates are
assigned seats based on their ranked order on the party's
closed list. In both circuits the method used to allocate
seats (the d'Hondt method) disproportionably favors larger
parties over small parties. Based on the number of currently
registered voters and predictions for generally high voter
turnout, we estimate that parties will need to win at least
60,000 votes to win a seat in the national circuit.

Election Assumptions: Peaceful, Credible...
--------------


3. (SBU) All indicators point to generally peaceful and
credible elections in September. Political parties, civil
society and religious leaders are united in their calls for
high voter turnout and the need to respect electoral
institutions and the poll results; all seek peaceful
elections. The MPLA is eager to cement its war-time victory
with a victory at the polls; UNITA is equally determined to
distance itself from its history of armed insurgency while
showing it is a political force to be reckoned with. There
is no expectation that the elections will provoke widespread
or organized violence, and, unlike 1992, the opposition does
not have an armed force standing by in case things go south.
Sporadic, spontaneous violence is likely, precipitated in
most cases by logistical snags or non-organized provocations
from local party zealots. Opposition parties have already
reported increased political tensions, which have in some
cases escalated into violence (reftel).

... but a Far Cry from Fair.
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4. (C) The playing field for elections will not, however, be
level - the ruling MPLA holds too many of the cards. The
government controls most media outlets, including the only
daily newspaper, the only TV network, and the only nationwide
radio station, all of whom allot only perfunctory coverage to
opposition party activities. Independent newspapers, radio,
and civil society elements are often critical of the
government, but routinely limit such criticism through
self-censorship and periodically face threats of suspension,
closure, or other legal action. The state, perceived by many
to be synonymous with the MPLA, is the country's largest
employer, and in most provinces virtually the only source of
employment in the formal, non-agricultural sector. Many
Angolans believe one must join the MPLA to get government
jobs, and opposition parties will have to work hard to debunk
the belief that jobs will be lost if the MPLA loses, or that
the MPLA has methods of discovering who did and did not toe
the line. The MPLA's influence extends to the village level;
in many provinces traditional leaders (sobas) are selected by
the MPLA rather than through traditional heredity lines. Yet
to be seen is the extent to which sobas can deliver votes to
the MPLA, or how many will use their local authority to block
opposition political parties from campaigning freely in their
village. Election officials have recently worked to educate
sobas around the country on electoral laws and codes of
conduct.

Building Democratic Institutions for the Future
-------------- -

5. (SBU) These elections will not be perfect, but are
expected to be an important building block in the
construction of democratic institutions in Angola. They are
the first elections under the 2005 Electoral Law, which was
drafted to address problem areas in the 1992 elections. As
the electoral law is untested, numerous regulatory and
logistical questions are rising; both the law and its

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accompanying regulations are vague and subject to varying
interpretations. September's legislative elections will help
work out the kinks prior to the big race, the presidential
election provisionally slated for 2009.

By the Numbers: A Look at the Provinces
--------------


6. (U) As the September 2008 legislative election is the
first in 16 years and only the second in Angola's history,
the political landscape is essentially a blank slate in which
little is known about the drivers that will affect voter
participation and selection. Almost half of the electorate
is comprised of first-time voters; there are over 3.2 million
more voters for this contest than in the 1992 elections.
Even indicators that are often reliable in other African
countries, such as links between ethnicity and voting
behavior, are unknown in Angola, as massive population shifts
during the war are believed to have weakened ethnic/tribal
ties. A look at past and current trends in various provinces
can, however, shine some light on what we might expect when
Angola's 8.3 million plus registered voters go to the polls.

Key Prizes: Luanda, Huila, Benguela, Huambo, Bie and Cabinda
-------------- --------------

LUANDA


7. (C) Luanda, the largest electoral prize, will be the
election's most fiercely-contested battleground. Its over
2.3 million registered voters represent more than thirty
percent of the total electorate. In 1992 the MPLA carried 8
of 9 municipalities and won 4 of 5 PC seats (UNITA won the
5th),but pundits question the MPLA's ability to repeat its
lopsided victory. Although the impact of ethnicity in these
elections is unclear, observers believe the large influx of
Umbundus, UNITA's traditional base of support, in Luanda
augurs well for UNITA. Discontent with the prevailing
poverty and the party deemed responsible for the city's
wretched condition runs high in Luanda; most residents face
extreme social-economic hardship and receive limited social
services while living in close proximity to the nation's
wealthy elite. Poor management and planning have impeded the
delivery of the government's post-war reconstruction efforts,
fueling the sentiment that the government is not acting in
the best interest of the people. Luandans also have much
better access to varied sources of information and ideas than
the rest of the country; Luanda-based independent radio
stations and newspapers often discuss social inequity,
corruption, and opposition political party calls for change.
Reflecting, perhaps, this discontent, a recent BBC poll
showed 70.5 percent of 499 people surveyed in the province
stated they intend to vote in September's election because
they want a change of government. (NOTE: The BBC poll is a
useful indicator of public opinion, but should be analyzed
with caution, as it was not conducted by random sample. ENE
NOTE)


8. (C) UNITA and other opposition parties are, therefore,
pinning their hopes on the discontent of the Luanda
electorate. Luanda is the province in which the MPLA party
structure, down to the neighborhood level, is least able to
exercise control over people's lives, due largely to the fact
that Luanda has more economic options outside the party and
the state. Opposition votes are, however likely to be spread
among various small opposition parties, notably the Front
for Democracy (FpD),which is popular among intellectuals and
artists, the Alliance of Youth, Workers and Peasants
(PAJOCA),which has attracted moderates and human rights
activists, and PADEPA, which has strong support among
Luanda's many disenfranchised youth. While the MPLA and
UNITA will likely split Luanda's five seats on the PC, the
small parties are angling to win a seat or two on the NC
register.

HUILA


9. (C) The more than 820,000 registered voters in Huila
represent ten percent of the electorate. The MPLA has
traditionally enjoyed strong support in this southern
province; it won 4 of 5 PC seats in 1992 and is likely to
dominate the province again. Huila has a strong independent
business community which benefits from the status quo and is
home to the largest Angolan white community, which
traditionally shows little support for UNITA. The province
was largely spared the hardships of the war, has been among
the first benefit from the war's end and the GRA's subsequent
rebuilding spree, and is home to many small ethnic groups
that prevent an ethic-based shift towards any one party. The
Liberal Democratic Party (PLD),FpD, and PADEPA hope to pick
up votes from both the MPLA and UNITA in Huila, contributing
to their chances for seats on the NC.

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BENGUELA


10. (C) The central coast province of Benguela is the third
largest circuit, with over 766,000 potential voters. Once a
UNITA province - the party won 3 of 5 PC seats in 1992 -
heavy GRA investment in the province has strengthened the
MPLA's position, especially in the relatively prosperous
urban centers of Lobito and Benguela. If ethnic factors
still factor strongly into voter's decision making, however,
Benguela's Umbundu majority may tilt the balance towards
UNITA's favor on the PC.

HUAMBO and BIE


11. (C) Huambo's 600,000 and Bie's 454,000 voters are in
the Umbundu ethnic heartland, and the provinces are still
seen as UNITA territory. The party won 9 of 10 PC seats in
the two provinces 1992. This hasn't prevented the MPLA from
trying hard to win over voters, and the extensive fighting
and damage in both provinces after the failed 1992 elections
have damaged UNITA's credibility. Insiders believe it is a
point of pride for the MPLA to have a strong showing there as
a sign of their complete victory against UNITA. It is
equally important for UNITA to show it can still rally the
party faithful. Small parties are likely to face problems
winning votes here. Some, including the Social Renovation
Party (PRS) and PLD, have worked to establish themselves as
viable alternates for people who became disenchanted with
both sides during the long civil war.

CABINDA


12. (C) Cabinda is a different sort of prize. Its 170,000
voters make it one of the smallest electoral circuits (12th
of 18,) but the MPLA wants to use Cabindan voter support and
turnout to discredit separatist elements in the province.
Opposition parties, however, see the province's discontented
elements as an opportunity to filch PC seats from the MPLA,
which won 4 of 5 seats there in 1992. Tensions remain high
in the province despite the August 2006 signing of a
Memorandum of Peace and Understanding between the GRA and one
faction of the separatist Front for the Liberation of Cabinda
(FLEC),and opposition parties, notably UNITA, FpD and PRS,
are working to capture the support of Cabindan civil society
and religious leaders, with the hope that voters will follow
their lead.

MPLA Strongholds: Kwanza Norte and Sul, Malange, Bengo,
Namibe, Cunene
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13. (C) This group covers a large swath of the country,
encompasses various ethnic groups, and ranges from the 5th
largest voting population in the country (Kwanza Sul, with
524,000 registered voters) to the smallest (Bengo, with more
than 134,000.) What they share is a history of strong MPLA
support; in 1992 the party picked up 27 of the 30 PC seats
held by these provinces. These provinces combined represent
over 1.5 million voters.

Up for Grabs: Zaire, Uige
--------------


14. (C) Zaire split between the MPLA (2 seats),Front for the
Liberation of Angola (FNLA, 2 seats) and UNITA (1 seat) in
the 92 elections; Uige split at 3 for MPLA and 2 for UNITA.
These provinces are home to the Bakongo, the FNLA's
traditional base of support. The FNLA has, however, been
weakened by years of infighting. Though the Constitutional
Court recently struck down one of the factions' leadership
claim, the party's ability to unite in advance of elections
remains unclear. Pundits consider the combined 587,000
voters in these two provinces to be in play.

The Wild West: The Lundas, Moxico and Kuando Kubango
-------------- --------------


15. (C) This vast, scantly populated region is often referred
to as "the end of the earth" due to its isolation from the
rest of the country. Vast swaths of land in these provinces
are virtually off limits due to diamond concessions; poverty
is grinding and social services extremely limited. Lunda
Norte and Lunda Sul, home to the ethnic Chokwe, are still
seen as the PRS stronghold; the party won took 3 PC seats in
the two provinces in '92. This was seen as an incredible
victory coming from a newly-formed party, and the PRS has
used the intervening years to attract members outside its
Chokwe base. The PRS is now seen as a contender in Moxico,
where over 250,000 returning refugees were repatriated to
Moxico by the GRA following the end of the civil war with
little more than a starter kit of domestic items and farming

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tools. Returnees, who in many cases received better
educational opportunities and were privy to wider sources of
information in refugee camps than those who stayed in Angola,
may serve to change the voting pattern in the province, which
in 1992 handed 4 PC seats to the MPLA and 1 to UNITA.
Returnees may also affect voting patterns in Kuando Kubango,
which in 1992 gave 4 seats to UNITA and 1 to the MPLA. These
four provinces combined represent over 827,000 registered
voters.

Comment: Much Ado About Something
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16. (C) COMMENT: Much is at stake in the upcoming elections.
The new National Assembly, which by law will form 30 days
after the results are announced, is responsible for drafting
a new constitution. The MPLA covets a large enough majority
to push through its governance plan and strengthen the power
of the executive; opposition parties desperately want enough
seats to make their voices heard at the bargaining table. In
addition, both the results and the conduct of parties during
the campaign will go a long way toward shaping strategies for
the 2009 presidential race. Perhaps most importantly, these
elections play an important role in calming the Angolan
electorate's fears about elections and mark an important
building block in the construction of democratic institutions
and traditions in Angola. END COMMENT
MOZENA