USUN AMB KHALILZAD REVIEWS IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 001620

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2028
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF IZ IR
SUBJECT: USUN AMB KHALILZAD REVIEWS IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN,
PAKISTAN AND IRAN WITH UK OFFICIALS

REF: MAY 30 EMAIL EMB LONDON (GAYLE)-DEPT (NEA/IR AND
P STAFF)

Classified By: Economic Minister Mark Tokola, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Amb Khalilzad told UK national security
advisor McDonald that he was realistic about the difficulties
of completing a SOFA and strategic framework agreement with
Iraq by July, but saw some progress on the ground. In
Afghanistan, he believed the SGSR needed to fill key slots
and approve an enhanced incentives package to attract staff.
McDonald reported that the UK needs a Chapter 7 mandate to
operate in Iraq. Once the UK completed training of the Iraqi
forces in Basra, it would be done there.


2. (S) In a second meeting, FCO Political Director Mark Lyall
Grant said Solana will visit Tehran June 14, and argued
another UNCSR will be necessary assuming Iran rejects the
P5 1 offer. Grant and Amb Khalilzad agreed Kai Eide's role
in Afghanistan should be boosted and that Karzai needs
sustained, structured help by western partners in making and
sticking to tough decisions; regional security consultations
with Pakistan may be a way to rebuild the Pakistan-Afghan
relationship. END SUMMARY.


3. (S) USUN Amb Zalmay Khalilzad met with Simon McDonald,
National Security Advisor to PM Brown at No 10 Downing Street
May 30. DCM LeBaron, ELAB McNamara (note taker) and UK
Cabinet Office Afghanistan desk officer Helen Evans sat in.
Khalilzad and DCM, and Poloff Gayle (note taker),also met
Friday May 30 with FCO Political Director Mark Lyall Grant.

Iraq
--------------

4. (S) McDonald and Amb Khalilzad agreed that everything to
do with Iraq takes longer than expected. Nevertheless,
there were some hopeful signs. The Iraqi operation in Basra
had a positive impact on the Sunni community's view of the
government, according to Amb Khalilzad. The military had
performed fairly well. Al Qaeda was weakening. Its tactic
of killing members of one community in hopes they would
retaliate against the other was not working. Moreover, the
government's improved standing with the Sunnis did not come
at the expense of opinion in the Kurdish or Shia communities.



5. (S) McDonald noted ruefully that most of the "outside"
forces performed well in Basra, but not the locally based
14th Division, which was plagued by desertions. The UK
would have to "up its game", he said, to improve their
training, and reconstitute a disbanded brigade. Then the
UK's mission in Iraq would essentially be done.


6. (S) Amb Khalizad told McDonald that the Iraqis had
recently begun to inquire with whether it would be possible
to do another Chapter VII resolution which would only have
the purpose of protecting them against foreign claims. Amb
Khalizad advised that the USG had not developed a position,
but that he could not imagine such a resolution without
including security elements. McDonald pointed out that his
legal advisors told him there were things the UK could not do
without a Chapter VII resolution.

Afghanistan
--------------

7. (S) Amb Khalilzad agreed with Grant that the situations in
both Afghanistan and Pakistan are in a very delicate phase,
and that messages of "tough love" are needed for Karzai, who
seems to be becoming even more paralyzed by the onset of 2009
elections. Grant ticked off several areas as showing "good
signs," including security in the south, a "slight
improvement" in counter-narcotic statistics, and the
performance so far of Kai Eide. On the other side of the
ledger however, according to Grant, was the general question
of governance, where the signs were "very poor" and reform,
especially of the Afghan police, were needed. Grant made the
general observation that the task in Afghanistan is "greater
than that in Iraq," and noted "it used to be hard get
Washington to focus" on Afghanistan, though that had changed.



8. (S) Grant said a "War Cabinet" group, established to help
Karzai at this difficult stage, should include the U.S. and
UK Ambassadors and Kai Eide as well. Grant said Karzai tends
to act according to the views of "the last person to whom he
spoke," and that he needs "professional staff to carry him
through."


9. (S) Khalilzad said Karzai seems "frozen". Grant asked
that USG work to persuade Karzai the UK is "on his side,"

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noting that Karzai's statements at Davos and elsewhere tend
to undermine the support for him in the UK; Karzai needs to
show leadership. Amb Khalilzad noted Karzai faces a tough
re-election fight. Grant said the UK assesses Karzai's
electability will depend on his improving the appearance of
his own ability to deliver.


10. (S) McDonald agreed with Amb Khalilzad that Kai Eide was
no Paddy Ashdowne, unfortunately, noting that there seemed to
be some unhappiness in the UN system there; many key
positions were still vacant. Amb Khalilzad described efforts
to offer incentives, as the USG gave its staff, for dangerous
duty in Afghanistan.

Pakistan
--------------

11. (S) Grant, who was once ambassador in Islamabad, said the
new government is in such "disarray" that it is not focused
on its relationship with Afghanistan, and that the role of
the Awami League adds the complicating element of the
"Greater Afghanistan" issue. Grant said "there will be great
temptation" for the USG to act on targeting intelligence, to
strike counter-terrorism targets inside Pakistan, but noted
the fallout and damage from such strikes would be great.


12. (S) With respect to Pakistani relations with Afghanistan,
Amb Khalilzad said there is an important UN angle, and that
the "spirit of Bonn," including a more regional focus needs
to be restored. Amb Khalilzad said an immediate step should
be a reinvigoration of Pakistani-Afghan military-to-military
consultations such as General Barno had conducted should be
restored. Grant noted several layers would be involved,
noted some meetings involving the Turks which had been
"helpful," and that it is key to include Pakistan's ISI and
its Afghan counterpart, on a continuing basis, "to build
trust." Grant noted new ISI head General Taj "is good," and
that in any arrangement Kay Eide must be made a player at the
highest level, along with Karzai.

Iran: We'll Likely Need Another UNSCR
--------------

13. (S) (S) As reported ref, Grant told Amb Khalilzad
Solana's office had just set a firm date, of June 14-15, for
the P5 1 offer to be delivered by Solana and Political
Directors in Tehran. Grant said it was unlikely there would
be an outright refusal of the offer by the regime, which was,
in Grant's view, likely to give an ambiguous answer.


14. (S) Grant argued the P5 1 group will then be in a
situation in which, in the UK view, it must push for another
UNSC resolution. Noting the Chinese have already told HMG
that there can absolutely be no more UNSC resolutions, Grant
said the UK knows the obstacles are great but that "we have
no choice," and that there must be a meaningful response if
the Iranians are to be shown they cannot reject the
international community with impunity. Grant argued partners
"might have to gut" such a UNSCR, making it a mostly symbolic
document, devoid of sanctions or teeth, but that such a
follow-up measure would have political resonance and
importance for Iran. Amb Khalilzad noted there is no USG
position for now on this particular question, but agreed with
Grant that the latest IAEA report is strong and serious.
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