IRAN: UK INTENDS TO GO FORWARD ON TAJIK

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 001580 SIPDIS DEPT OF JUSTICE FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION/OIA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2018 TAGS: CJAN PINS PREL PTER IR UK SUBJECT: IRAN: UK INTENDS TO GO FORWARD ON TAJIK EXTRADITION BUT CONCERNED ABOUT SAFETY OF ITS TEHRAN EMBASSY REF: LONDON 1509 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Taking a strong pro-extradition line, the UK still expects to extradite former Iranian Ambassador Tajik as soon as remaining medical-legal aspects of his case are resolved. Foreign and Commonwealth contacts underline, however, that HMG takes Iranian threats related to the Tajik case very seriously and that, if Tajik's arrival in the U.S. generates a high level of publicity, the safety of UK diplomatic personnel in Tehran, and the functioning of the UK Embassy there, could be at significant risk. FCO therefore hopes USG will do everything possible to minimize publicity surrounding the case after Tajik's arrival in the United States. End summary. Hard Deadline for Tajik's Lawyers -------------- ¶2. (C) The Home Office has told Tajik's lawyers June 11 is a hard deadline, and that, unless a full brief on medical issues is provided by that date, extradition of ex-Ambassador Tajik will go forward immediately at that time, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) contacts told London Iran Watcher (Poloff) on June 6; HMG reportedly expects to receive Tajik's brief by June 11, but an FCO contact cited the above Home Office warning to Tajik's lawyers as indicative of HMG's view of the importance of this extradition. ¶3. (C) As a further example of HMG firmness on the Tajik case, another FCO contact on June 6 flagged to Poloff a June 5 visit by an Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) delegation from Tehran which visited the UK Home Office on an unrelated matter. The IRI delegation, which Minister of State for Security and Counter-Terrorism Tony McNulty had kept waiting for an hour, unexpectedly raised the Tajik case. McNulty reportedly deflected their queries and showed them the door within twenty minutes. No Date Promised for Extradition -------------- ¶4. (C) In the absence so far of an updated medical opinion, FCO contacts decline to give a firm projected date by when all medical issues will be resolved, but think the net result of the medical issue will be a temporary delay, and unlikely to lead to permanent denial of extradition. The FCO remains confident Tajik will be unable to satisfy the high legal 
burden of proof needed to defeat extradition under UK law. UK Priority: Embassy's Safety -------------- ¶5. (C) Noting that Simon Shercliff at UK Embassy Washington had the lead for HMG on the Tajik issue, a working level FCO contact June 6 relayed to Poloff the same message which had been conveyed June 5 to Department officials by UK Political Director Mark Lyall Grant: HMG's main concern in the Tajik case is the safety of UK diplomatic staff in Tehran. FCO contact commented to Poloff that USG shares a fundamental interest in the safety of UK personnel and facilities in Tehran. Iranian Threats: Serious -------------- ¶6. (C) This FCO contact noted the IRI has made a continuing series of "veiled threats" to UK officials in Tehran concerning the possible consequences of Tajik's extradition; the contact said these threats are, in recent memory, unique to this case, but have not been specific as to what harm might result from an extradition. According to the FCO, however, these threats have been unmistakable, issue from the Iranian MFA, relate unambiguously to Tajik, not other issues, and are taken very seriously by UK Embassy Tehran and FCO. FCO Director for Middle East and North African Affairs John Jenkins told Pol MinCouns that the UK had noted a clear pattern of retribution against UK diplomatic personnel by the Iranians for any perceived slights: for example, the arrest for shoplifting of an Iranian diplomat some years ago had brought on the detention and beating of the UK Embassy DCM in Tehran, even though the Iranian had been released without charge. ¶7. (C) Jenkins and the working level contact both told us that HMG therefore hopes Tajik's arrival and handling in the United States will be handled in a low-key way, calculated to minimize any pretense for IRI publicity seekers in Tehran to lash out at UK personnel there. The contact said some angry public reaction in Tehran is likely no matter how the case is handled and reported. There have been no recent public statements and no public demonstrations related to the Tajik case; the issue is "how bad it becomes," and this contact repeated that USG handling will likely have an impact. ¶8. (C) The FCO contact said HMG does not see any danger of Iranian reaction to Tajik having any effect on other aspects of Iran's external affairs, specifically the pending P5 1 offer, but underlined the IRI public stance on Tajik, i.e. that the underlying "sting" operation was a frame-up and an outrage, remains unchanged and is shared widely across the Iranian political spectrum; the UK Embassy in Tehran learned that Tajik is reportedly a friend of former President Khatami. (Embassy note. Poloff has not been able to confirm this independently.) Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom TUTTLE