PAKISTAN: UK VIEWS ON DEALS WITH TRIBAL GROUPS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 001574

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER MCAP PINR PINS PK UK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: UK VIEWS ON DEALS WITH TRIBAL GROUPS IN
THE FATA

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly, for reasons
1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary. The UK is giving the Government of Pakistan
(GOP) "space to try making peace" in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) through deals with tribal
groups because the new government needs to be seen in
Pakistan as "in charge of security," but London is "under no
illusion that the deals will deliver." Two serious UK
concerns are that the Pakistani military appears to remain
the primary negotiator on the ground and that the military is
exclusively in charge of implementing them. The UK remains
publicly quiet on the deals themselves, but is concerned
about how to respond when the deals do not deliver. To guard
against outright failure, the UK is quietly encouraging the
GOP to make the terms of the agreements public and to take
decisive action when the deals falter. While it is unclear
what immediate action would be best, options include sending
in the Pakistani military and helping the Pakistanis make
targeted strikes. Long-term solutions, like the continued
capacity development of the Pakistani military, are more
complicated. The Security and Development Plan (SDP) is the
clear way forward, but Pakistani buy-in and a downward trend
in security cooperation are of great concern. FATA security
is a clear concern for the UK, and HMG welcomes further
dialogue with the U.S. on how to respond to the political
deals when they eventually falter. End summary.

Space to Make Peace in the FATA
--------------

2. (C) FCO Pakistan Team Leader Laura Hickey outlined to
poloff HMG thinking on deals with tribal groups in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) June 5. Despite
the numerous risks associated with the Pakistani efforts to
make deals, the UK has decided to give the Government of
Pakistan (GOP) "the space to try making peace" with tribal
groups in the FATA. Two serious concerns about the deals are
who negotiates them and who implements them. Although there
appears to be some civilian-military cooperation at the GOP's
higher-levels, the military remains the primary negotiator on
the ground. In Waziristan, for example, it appears "to be
the familiar cycle of military deals with no civilian
control." Secondly, there appear to be differences between
the text of the agreements and what is implemented. Since
there is no civilian GOP presence in the FATA, the military
ultimately decides what is implemented, independent of
civilian authorities.

Preparing for Failed Deals
--------------

3. (C) Despite these concerns, the UK government thinks that
allowing the GOP to attempt to improve security in the FATA
will force Pakistan to take ownership of its own security.
It is important that the "new government be seen to be in
charge of security." Hickey said HMG is "under no illusion
that the deals will deliver," and the UK largely expects them
to fail. Although the current situation "is no worse than
before," Hickey suggested it is important for the U.S. and UK
to consider appropriate responses for when the agreements
fail. The reaction time between an agreement's failure and
the response will be crucial because the ensuing lack of
security could increase cross-border activity and give
al-Qaeda (AQ) more space to operate.


4. (C) As a preemptive measure to guard against deal failure,
Hickey said it is important to help the Pakistanis enforce
the deals themselves. While remaining publicly silent on the
deals, the UK plans to quietly encourage the GOP to release
the terms of the agreements and to take decisive action when
the agreements falter. Additionally, development incentives
could be offered in areas where the deals are holding,
especially education and alternative livelihood programs.
While the UK does not have development programs in the FATA
because of the large amount of USG development resources in
the area, it does plan to encourage politically negotiated
peace in Baluchistan through its development programs.

Determining What Action to Take
--------------

5. (C) Less clear, Hickey said, is what immediate action

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should be taken when the agreements fail. Options include
sending in the Pakistani military, which has not been
successful in the past, and helping the Pakistanis make
targeted strikes. With the terms of the agreements made
public and decisive GOP action when the agreements falter,
Hickey suggested, the GOP would be able to send a clear
signal that it is serious about security in the FATA.


6. (C) In the long-term, the U.S. and UK need to continue
developing the Pakistani military's capacity, and the
Security and Development Plan (SDP) is the way to do that.
The problem is Pakistani buy-in. The GOP is currently
stalling the UK's counter-insurgency (COIN) training with the
military, and Hickey noted this seemed to be part of a
worrisome downward trend in security cooperation. Given the
vital importance of developing the Pakistani military's
capacity, Hickey suggested it might be beneficial to bring in
new partners who may have a less complicated relationship and
history with Pakistan. The Australians, she suggested, have
the ability and have expressed interest during multiple
visits to the UK in increasing their mil-to-mil training in
Pakistan. It would be of more concern, however, if the
problem is more fundamental, i.e., the Pakistani military
simply does not want to develop COIN capability at all.

On the Specific Agreements
--------------

7. (C) Hickey noted that the South Waziristan agreement with
Mehsud was of greater concern than, for example, the
agreement with Swat because the Mehsud agreement was with
Afghanistan Taliban rather than Pakistan Taliban. The
security consequences with the Mehsud agreement are much more
serious for the U.S. and UK. Additionally, in the Swat terms
of agreement, the GOP seemed to give way on less serious
issues than it had in the other agreements, as far as Hickey
knew.

On Timing
--------------

8. (C) Hickey thought it was important to pressure the GOP to
publish the terms of the agreements, especially the Mehsud
one, as soon as possible. The UK plans to communicate to the
GOP that, if these agreements are going to continue to take
place, it needs to make them clear, public, and transparent.
If the agreements are not upheld, the UK will then privately
inform the GOP that it needs to take action to enforce them.
If the GOP still does not deliver, HMG plans to re-consider.
Hickey noted that there are "no good short-term levers" to
influence the GOP on this -- all the instruments are "blunt
and might backfire." Public condemnation probably would not
help and is very difficult to back down from.


9. (C) She also said the U.S. and UK may have to raise names
of specific individuals with the GOP, as it becomes clear who
is causing the agreements to fail, and continue to press the
GOP to take action against those individuals. She noted that
USG overtures for action against specific individuals has
produced some success in the past.

Comment
--------------

10. (C) The UK is clearly concerned about deals with tribal
groups in the FATA and the direction of its security
cooperation with Pakistan more generally. Advanced thinking
on how to respond to faltering deals in the FATA, which HMG
thinks is inevitable, may quicken the reaction time and
reduce the ensuing periods of questionable security. The UK
is interested in further dialogue with the U.S. on this issue.

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