HMG AND DOD INTEL FLIGHTS: HOUSTON, WE HAVE A

S E C R E T LONDON 001159 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN STATE FOR PM ACTION TEAM AND EUR/WE/UK OSD FOR USDP EDELMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2018 TAGS: MARR MOPS PINR PREL UK SUBJECT: HMG AND DOD INTEL FLIGHTS: HOUSTON, WE HAVE A PROBLEM REF: A. LONDON 1115 ¶B. LONDON 1064 ¶C. TREMONT-PMAT EMAIL APRIL 16 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4, b/d. ¶1. (S/NF) Summary and action request. According to FCO and MOD contacts, HMG ministers are adamant that future requests to use UK territory to conduct DOD intel flights must be made "government-to-government" in "formal" (policy) channels, rather than through the working-level mil-mil channels currently used. British contacts outlined the proposed procedures for requesting use of UK territory for intel flights to PolMilOff and Air Attache April 22. Recognizing that there is inadequate time to gather the newly requested information before proposed May-August operations, HMG has agreed to roll over approvals given to January-April operations; any changes to January-April operations should be brought to Embassy London's attention immediately. Embassy assesses that this requirement indicates an element of distrust in the U.S.-UK mil-mil relationship. Embassy requests guidance for responding to the UK proposal. End summary and action request. New Clearance Procedures Outlined -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Following up on the HMG letter contained in ref a, MOD and FCO contacts outlined for Embassy London PolMilOff and Air Attache April 22 a proposed system for requesting use of UK territory to conduct DOD intel flights that scraps the currently used mil-mil channel for such requests. MOD noted that the mil-mil channel had become routine and technical, when in fact these flights carried political risks and sensitivities for HMG. The requests, therefore, need to be pushed up to a "formal" (read: policy) level so that Ministers could make the appropriate assessments in line with UK regulations. In HMG's view, the mil-mil channel has worked fine for routine operations, but when complicating factors are introduced, i.e. politically sensitive issues or other combatant commands are involved, HMG is unable to obtain the information that it needs to carry out its required legal and policy reviews. HMG, therefore, requires a unified USG request in writing conveyed through the U.S. Embassy in London. MOD contacts asserted that MOD PolDir Des Bowen and HMG ministers are adamant that this process is necessary. ¶3. (S/NF) Emboffs pushed back hard on establishing a more "formal" approvals process, arguing that the proposal adds a significant layer of bureaucracy to a system, that for the most part, has worked efficiently and effectively in the past. MOD disagreed; contacts cited instances in which Operations HIGHLAND WARRIOR and CEDAR SWEEP had been conducted from the UK Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri without the proper ministerial approvals. These flights entail political risk for HMG that require policy-level approval. In addition, HIGHLAND WARRIOR had raised tensions with the Cypriots, jeopardizing the UK's hold on Akrotiri. ¶4. (S/NF) Given these oversights, and other lapses that proved embarrassing to HMG (i.e., renditions through Diego Garcia and improperly documented shipments of weaponry through Prestwick Airport in Scotland),MOD wants to establish a file for each operation that will constitute an "audit trail" of approvals on which HMG can rely if called upon to explain itself. MOD proposed that, instead of the consolidated map and the table on these flights that it currently receives from EUCOM, MOD would like a map and one-page paper on each operation that contains the following information: a) The information currently contained on the table; b) The purpose of the operation; c) Any 3rd party awareness of the operation; d) Any intel-sharing we intend to conduct; e) Whether the operation is part of a wider agreement (e.g. Camp David Accords, UN resolution); and f) A couple of sentences on political and legal risks from U.S. political and legal advisors. (Embassy note. HMG does not expect us to be cognizant of its political sensitivities, but believes our assessment of political and legal risks will flag any issues for which HMG might need to seek more info or do its own assessment of. End note.) ¶5. (S/NF) MOD noted that after receiving this info for each operation, Embassy London would then follow up every four months (on the same schedule EUCOM currently uses) to ask for renewal of an operation's approval and/or outline any changes we intend to make from the previous approval. ¶6. (S/NF) Emboffs argued that the Embassy in London has little of value to add to these operational requests; but FCO and MOD contacts insisted that the Embassy in London could sensitize Washington to HMG's needs and ensure the information conveyed was adequate. Upcoming Intel Operation Clearances -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) MOD recognized that too little time remained before the beginning of May-August operations to implement this new procedure and gather the additional information. HMG, therefore, had already extended its approval of the January-April program through the end of May. MOD, however, advised that the package for the next period should be received by HMG no later than May 24 so it can coordinate ministerial approval by June 1. (Note: Any changes from the previous program of flights (January-April) to the ones we expected to begin May 1, should be notified to Embassy London immediately so we can work those separately. End note.) Comment and Action Request -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Embassy believes these proposed requirements suggest a new element of distrust has crept into the U.S.-UK mil-mil relationship. More broadly, they suggest a new unwillingness to take ANY political risk for the sake of our mil-mil cooperation after the oversights cited in paras. 3 and 4 put the UK's access to Akrotiri and its relationship with Cyprus on thin ice and the renditions revelation proved highly embarrassing for the Brown government. The British proposal for intel flights may be disproportionate, but is almost certainly an indication of the Brown government's sensitivity to any criticism over sensitive U.S.-related intel missions at a time Brown is facing increasing domestic political woes. ¶9. (S/NF) Embassy London cannot yet assess the resource implications for its PolMil and/or DAO officers should this proposal be implemented, but in the worst case scenario, an additional staff member may be required. Embassy requests guidance for responding to MOD's proposal. Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom TUTTLE