Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LONDON1135
2008-04-22 12:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy London
Cable title:  

(C) AN UPDATE ON HMG EXPECTATIONS AND PREDICTIONS

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL UN UK EU SA CH ZI 
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RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 0156
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1157
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 001135 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND EUR/WE/UK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UN UK EU SA CH ZI
SUBJECT: (C) AN UPDATE ON HMG EXPECTATIONS AND PREDICTIONS
FOR ZIMBABWE

REF: LONDON 1014

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 001135 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND EUR/WE/UK E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UN UK EU SA CH ZI SUBJECT: (C) AN UPDATE ON HMG EXPECTATIONS AND PREDICTIONS FOR ZIMBABWE REF: LONDON 1014 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The head of the Foreign Office's Zimbabwe section indicated on 21 April that time is running out for Robert Mugabe. Ineffective African mediation efforts may still yield positive results if all interested parties, including the African Union and the United Nations, coordinate with the Southern African Development Community. A proposal that respected African elder statesmen meet with Mugabe face-to-face is another "regional" tool worth bringing to bear. As violence within Zimbabwe is on the rise, the FCO also is proposing that HMG, the U.S., and France work to pursuade China to halt all arms shipments to Zimbabwe for the time being. In light of the lacklustre mediation shown by South African President Mbeki, Prime Minister Brown is scheduled to meet with ANC President Zuma on 23 April to discuss Zimbabwe. The ongoing crisis there continues to remain of very high interest to the Prime Minister's office, according to the FCO Zimbabwe section chief. End summary. ¶2. (C) In a meeting with Poloff on 21 April to discuss the latest developments in Zimbabwe, FCO Zimbabwe Section Chief Ben Llewellyn-Jones predicted that the current political stand-off could not last indefinitely and that Mugabe would be forced to leave office sooner or later. Finding the proper political levers to make this happen sooner is proving to be increasingly difficult, however, as HMG is "hitting the limit" of available options with individual actors or groups. In light of South African President Thabo Mbeki's moribund efforts to resolve Zimbabwe's crisis, for example, Llewellyn-Jones noted that PM Brown will hold a brief 30-minute meeting with ANC leader Jacob Zuma on 23 April. Zuma's past experience in dealing with prickly regional negotiations could well be useful, but corruption allegations and other "political baggage" Zuma carries illustrate that no particular African political figure can seemingly tackle the problem alone. Send In The AU Team -------------- ¶3. (C) Although the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) recent mediation efforts also have fallen short (reftel),and the regional UN representative in Harare appears to be doing Mugabe's bidding, Llewelyn-Jones maintained that Western nations should strongly encourage the United Nations and the African Union (AU) to engage more heavily on Zimbabwe. If SADC, AU, and even the local UN representative carry the same message that HMG, the USG, and the European Commission have been pushing recently, the message would resonate more convincingly with Zimbabwe's ruling elite. As another useful "regional" tool the SADC and AU could bring to bear, Llewelyn-Jones suggested that an entourage of respected African elder statesmen should visit Mugabe personally with the requisite assurances for his safety and immunity from prosecution, if he agrees to step down. Fending off the Chinese -------------- ¶4. (C) Llewellyn-Jones expressed unexpected delight that several of Zimbabwe's neighbors had thus far prevented the docking and unloading of the An Yue Jiang, a Chinese ship carrying arms and ammunition intended for Zimbabwe. He was not sanguine that Angola would act in the same way. In light of increasing reports of violent confrontations within Zimbabwe, he suggested that, through the UN Security Council, the P-3 (U.S., HMG and France) should push the PRC to halt all arms shipments to Zimbabwe for the foreseeable future. Elections Theft Rewarded? -------------- ¶5. (C) Llewellyn-Jones agreed that the initial "shock" of Mugabe's presumed electoral defeat has clearly worn off. Mugabe and his cronies gain more confidence with each passing day that the crisis continues, increasing the violence directed at opponents and ratcheting up pressure throughout the country while the voting "recount" proceeds at a snail's pace. Meanwhile, although Morgan Tsvangirai's repeated lobbying and concurrent regional travels have succeeded in keeping international attention focused on his homeland, Llewellyn-Jones wondered whether the MDC chief's extended absence from Zimbabwe would end up costing him ever-increasing political capital. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Zimbabwe continues to be of strong media interest in the UK and Llewelyn-Jones remains "without a doubt gainfully employed" in light of what he described as intense and repeated daily inquiries on Zimbabwe from the Prime Minister's office. Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom TUTTLE

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