Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08LONDON103
2008-01-10 17:41:00
SECRET
Embassy London
Cable title:
(S) IRAN: UK READOUT ON EL BARADEI'S LONDON
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000103
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2018
TAGS: PREL KPRP PGOV PHUM IR UK
SUBJECT: (S) IRAN: UK READOUT ON EL BARADEI'S LONDON
MEETINGS: NOTHING NEW
REF: JANUARY 8 EMBASSY LONDON -- NEA/IR E-MAILS
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000103
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2018
TAGS: PREL KPRP PGOV PHUM IR UK
SUBJECT: (S) IRAN: UK READOUT ON EL BARADEI'S LONDON
MEETINGS: NOTHING NEW
REF: JANUARY 8 EMBASSY LONDON -- NEA/IR E-MAILS
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary. IAEA Head Mohammed El Baradei raised no new
points during his January 7 meetings in London with Foreign
Secretary Miliband and other senior UK officials, ahead of El
SIPDIS
Baradei's visit later this week to Tehran. Per ref, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) told London Iran Watcher
(Poloff) that El Baradei repeated what FCO called his
"standard arguments and criticism" that the E3 3 governments
are wrong to insist on suspension, "a strategic decision" in
El Baradei's words, before any E3 3 negotiations with Iran on
its nuclear program can begin. El Baradei continues to argue
Iran is unlikely to respond as desired to the dual track
approach. FCO contacts said Miliband and other senior UK
interlocutors, "pushed back" in defense of the E3 3 approach;
they told El Baradei the June 2006 incentives package is not
only generous but is well understood by Iran. Miliband
continues to find El Baradei a frustrating interlocutor, but
sees it as vital that the E3 3 continue to engage vigorously
with him, in order to reinforce El Baradei's intellectual
understanding that Iran has not done enough to win
international trust, as well as to counter El Baradei's
personal instinct to, in El Baradei's own words, "get Iran
out of the international dog house."
2. (S) Summary cont. Separately, FCO on January 8 provided
a copy (ref) of a November 16 letter on the nuclear issue
from Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki to Miliband and
Miliband's December 20 reply; neither letter appears to raise
new information or proposals. FCO also argued to Poloff
that, in the next UNSCR, the need for unity outweighs the
importance of a full designation of Bank Melli. End summary.
El Baradei Comes to London
--------------
3. (S) Poloff received a readout of El Baradei's London
meetings from FCO Iran Multilateral Team Leader Will Gelling
and FCO Counterproliferation Department Regional Head
Isabella McCrae; McCrae had not participated in the meetings,
but shared notes and comments from Simon Smith, the UK's
Ambassador to the IAEA. Smith had participated in El
Baradei's four January 7 meetings, with UK intelligence
officials; with Minister of State for Energy (i.e. junior
minister) Malcolm Wicks; with Simon McDonald, Gordon Brown's
senior foreign policy advisor in Number 10; and with Foreign
Secretary Miliband. PM Gordon Brown shook El Baradei's hand
SIPDIS
during the visit to Number 10, but reportedly had no
substantive exchange with him.
4. (S) According to Gelling and McCrae, El Baradei's London
meetings involved little more than a "mutual recitation of
(previous) positions." El Baradei reportedly went over
familiar ground with all his UK interlocutors, critiquing the
E3 3's dual track approach as unproductive and flawed in its
insistence on IRI suspension as a condition of negotiation,
and raising no new points or proposals on the Iran nuclear
issue. Miliband and other UK interlocutors reportedly
"pushed back hard" in defense of the E3 3 approach, defending
the incentives package on offer to Iran as generous. UK
further argued the incentives package was thoroughly briefed
to the Iranians, who should already be well aware of its
contents.
5. (S) McCrae said that, although El Baradei did not go into
the details of what he intends to say in Tehran, the FCO
expects he will not attempt to offer any new strategic-level
proposals to the IRI, but will in general focus on
implementation and technical issues arising from the IAEA
Work Plan.
LONDON 00000103 002 OF 002
Baradei's Personal Instincts: An Ongoing Project
-------------- ---
6. (S) McCrae said Ambassador Smith views El Baradei as
deeply, perhaps permanently, conflicted on Iran: torn
between El Baradei's evidence-based knowledge, (in Simon's
phrase, Baradei's "logical side"),of Iran's poor track
record in doing what it needs to win international trust on
the nuclear issue, and El Baradei's "North-South instincts"
which, according to Smith, continually drive El Baradei to
work, in El Baradei's own words, to "bring Iran out of the
international dog house." Foreign Secretary Miliband,
according to McCrae and Gelling, concurs in this view of El
Baradei and agrees with his FCO advisors that it will require
continual E3 3 engagement with El Baradei to counteract his
visceral, "North-South" view of Tehran's position and to
reinforce the intellectual understanding El Baradei's
"logical side" has reached on Iran's need to do a great deal
more to deserve full international trust.
Mottaki-Miliband Correspondence
--------------
7. (SBU) Also on January 8, Gelling gave Poloff hard copies
(ref) of a November 16 letter from Iranian FM Mottaki to
Miliband and a December 20 Miliband reply letter, on the
nuclear issue. Gelling said the UK had not previously shared
the letters with any other governments because in UK view
neither the Mottaki letter, nor Miliband's categorical reply,
raised any new issues or information. (Embassy comment.
Poloff's initial reading concurs with this UK judgment: the
Mottaki letter delves into the details of Iran's reprocessing
history in order to demonstrate IRI's innocent intent, while
Miliband's reply reviews the history of the international
community's objections to the Iranian program and says "the
choice of how the nuclear file is chosen is Iran's. End
comment).
Bank Melli in Draft UNSCR: UK View
--------------
8. (S) Gelling also shared that, with respect to ongoing
E3 3 consultations on UNSCR elements, UK Political Director
Mark Lyall Grant believes that an insistence in the draft
resolution on including Bank Melli as a full designation,
rather than simply as institution with respect to which UN
member states should exercise vigilance, is likely to delay
Russian and Chinese agreement to a resolution for at least
two more months. Gelling said Lyall Grant believes language
on exercise of diligence on Melli is a viable fall-back
position and that obtaining agreement on a third resolution
sooner rather than later should be the "E3 1" priority.
Visit London's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm
LeBaron
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2018
TAGS: PREL KPRP PGOV PHUM IR UK
SUBJECT: (S) IRAN: UK READOUT ON EL BARADEI'S LONDON
MEETINGS: NOTHING NEW
REF: JANUARY 8 EMBASSY LONDON -- NEA/IR E-MAILS
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary. IAEA Head Mohammed El Baradei raised no new
points during his January 7 meetings in London with Foreign
Secretary Miliband and other senior UK officials, ahead of El
SIPDIS
Baradei's visit later this week to Tehran. Per ref, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) told London Iran Watcher
(Poloff) that El Baradei repeated what FCO called his
"standard arguments and criticism" that the E3 3 governments
are wrong to insist on suspension, "a strategic decision" in
El Baradei's words, before any E3 3 negotiations with Iran on
its nuclear program can begin. El Baradei continues to argue
Iran is unlikely to respond as desired to the dual track
approach. FCO contacts said Miliband and other senior UK
interlocutors, "pushed back" in defense of the E3 3 approach;
they told El Baradei the June 2006 incentives package is not
only generous but is well understood by Iran. Miliband
continues to find El Baradei a frustrating interlocutor, but
sees it as vital that the E3 3 continue to engage vigorously
with him, in order to reinforce El Baradei's intellectual
understanding that Iran has not done enough to win
international trust, as well as to counter El Baradei's
personal instinct to, in El Baradei's own words, "get Iran
out of the international dog house."
2. (S) Summary cont. Separately, FCO on January 8 provided
a copy (ref) of a November 16 letter on the nuclear issue
from Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki to Miliband and
Miliband's December 20 reply; neither letter appears to raise
new information or proposals. FCO also argued to Poloff
that, in the next UNSCR, the need for unity outweighs the
importance of a full designation of Bank Melli. End summary.
El Baradei Comes to London
--------------
3. (S) Poloff received a readout of El Baradei's London
meetings from FCO Iran Multilateral Team Leader Will Gelling
and FCO Counterproliferation Department Regional Head
Isabella McCrae; McCrae had not participated in the meetings,
but shared notes and comments from Simon Smith, the UK's
Ambassador to the IAEA. Smith had participated in El
Baradei's four January 7 meetings, with UK intelligence
officials; with Minister of State for Energy (i.e. junior
minister) Malcolm Wicks; with Simon McDonald, Gordon Brown's
senior foreign policy advisor in Number 10; and with Foreign
Secretary Miliband. PM Gordon Brown shook El Baradei's hand
SIPDIS
during the visit to Number 10, but reportedly had no
substantive exchange with him.
4. (S) According to Gelling and McCrae, El Baradei's London
meetings involved little more than a "mutual recitation of
(previous) positions." El Baradei reportedly went over
familiar ground with all his UK interlocutors, critiquing the
E3 3's dual track approach as unproductive and flawed in its
insistence on IRI suspension as a condition of negotiation,
and raising no new points or proposals on the Iran nuclear
issue. Miliband and other UK interlocutors reportedly
"pushed back hard" in defense of the E3 3 approach, defending
the incentives package on offer to Iran as generous. UK
further argued the incentives package was thoroughly briefed
to the Iranians, who should already be well aware of its
contents.
5. (S) McCrae said that, although El Baradei did not go into
the details of what he intends to say in Tehran, the FCO
expects he will not attempt to offer any new strategic-level
proposals to the IRI, but will in general focus on
implementation and technical issues arising from the IAEA
Work Plan.
LONDON 00000103 002 OF 002
Baradei's Personal Instincts: An Ongoing Project
-------------- ---
6. (S) McCrae said Ambassador Smith views El Baradei as
deeply, perhaps permanently, conflicted on Iran: torn
between El Baradei's evidence-based knowledge, (in Simon's
phrase, Baradei's "logical side"),of Iran's poor track
record in doing what it needs to win international trust on
the nuclear issue, and El Baradei's "North-South instincts"
which, according to Smith, continually drive El Baradei to
work, in El Baradei's own words, to "bring Iran out of the
international dog house." Foreign Secretary Miliband,
according to McCrae and Gelling, concurs in this view of El
Baradei and agrees with his FCO advisors that it will require
continual E3 3 engagement with El Baradei to counteract his
visceral, "North-South" view of Tehran's position and to
reinforce the intellectual understanding El Baradei's
"logical side" has reached on Iran's need to do a great deal
more to deserve full international trust.
Mottaki-Miliband Correspondence
--------------
7. (SBU) Also on January 8, Gelling gave Poloff hard copies
(ref) of a November 16 letter from Iranian FM Mottaki to
Miliband and a December 20 Miliband reply letter, on the
nuclear issue. Gelling said the UK had not previously shared
the letters with any other governments because in UK view
neither the Mottaki letter, nor Miliband's categorical reply,
raised any new issues or information. (Embassy comment.
Poloff's initial reading concurs with this UK judgment: the
Mottaki letter delves into the details of Iran's reprocessing
history in order to demonstrate IRI's innocent intent, while
Miliband's reply reviews the history of the international
community's objections to the Iranian program and says "the
choice of how the nuclear file is chosen is Iran's. End
comment).
Bank Melli in Draft UNSCR: UK View
--------------
8. (S) Gelling also shared that, with respect to ongoing
E3 3 consultations on UNSCR elements, UK Political Director
Mark Lyall Grant believes that an insistence in the draft
resolution on including Bank Melli as a full designation,
rather than simply as institution with respect to which UN
member states should exercise vigilance, is likely to delay
Russian and Chinese agreement to a resolution for at least
two more months. Gelling said Lyall Grant believes language
on exercise of diligence on Melli is a viable fall-back
position and that obtaining agreement on a third resolution
sooner rather than later should be the "E3 1" priority.
Visit London's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm
LeBaron