EU POLITICAL DIRECTORS LUNCH FOCUSES ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000020

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/NCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2017
TAGS: PREL EUN PGOV ECON ENRG SI
SUBJECT: EU POLITICAL DIRECTORS LUNCH FOCUSES ON KOSOVO


Classified By: CDA Maryruth Coleman for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) At the January 11 EU luncheon, EUR A/S Dan Fried urged
the EU Political Directors not to delay Kosovo's
independence, anticipated after the second round of the
Serbian elections February 3. The Slovenian Chair, Political
Director Mitja Drobnic, and A/S Fried both recognized how far
the EU had come since the EU Political Directors meeting last
summer: now almost all are prepared to support Kosovo's
independence and most will recognize Kosovo. The question,
however, is timing: the Swedes, Spanish and Portuguese all
pushed for postponing Kosovo's coordinated declaration of
independence (CDI) until March, which A/S Fried strongly
countered. End Summary.

Progress on Supporting Kosovo
--------------


2. (C) Slovenian Political Director Drobnic opened the
discussion by noting the EU had come a long way since the
last Political Directors meeting in Estoril. He explained
that the December European Council conclusion on the ESDP
mission for Kosovo clearly demonstrated the EU decision to
play a leading role in Kosovo. He expressed appreciation for
the U.S. contribution to the ESDP Mission. A/S Fried
welcomed the closeness of our cooperation. He told the EU
political Directors that the EU had been right to make the
case for the 120-day troika process, which concluded on
December 10. He noted the U.S. had also agreed to wait past
December, and then again until after the Serbian elections;
but that we must move swiftly.

Some Member States Advocate Waiting on CDI
--------------


3. (C) The Italian, German and UK Political Directors
supported the USG position. The Italian Political Director
stressed that the sense of urgency must be matched with
unity. He noted that the status quo could not hold for much
longer and said as many European countries as possible should
decide to recognize Kosovo. He also said that Italy
supported signing an SAA with Serbia as soon as possible, but
that the EU had not yet reached consensus on that.


4. (C) The UK Political Director gave the most positive
intervention. He said that it was clear that Serbia and
Russia would never accept the process, and the EU needed to
acknowledge that and move ahead. It was important too for
the EU and the U.S. to move ahead in a coordinated way -
quickly. He noted that Pristina had been patient. While
explaining that the EU had a lot of process that needed to be
done, after CDI there needed to be quick recognition. He
said the UK would be in the forefront. While the German
Political Director said that Germany intended to recognize
Kosovo, he did not comment on the need to move swiftly. The
French Political Director did not speak.


5. (C) Comments from the non-quint Political Directors were
varied, but most emphasized the importance of ensuring EU
unity. The Danish Political Director said her government
agreed on the need to move swiftly after Serbian elections,
but cautioned that "swiftly" might have different meanings.
However, she concluded that the EU should be ready to move by
mid-February. The Hungarian Political Director was the first
of the skeptics to argue that the EU needed more time to work
on cooperation and building unity. His justification for a
go slow approach was the need to develop "comprehensive and
thorough" plans. He also expressed concern that Kosovo
accompany its CDI with references to the Ahtisaari Plan,
which A/S Fried noted Kosovo was likely to do. The Austrian
Political Director said quick action was important because
uncertainty was a source of instability, but he also noted
that it was important to get wide support for CDI.


6. (C) The Swedish, Portuguese and Spanish Political
Directors each pushed for waiting until March. The Swedish
Political Director suggested waiting until the February GAERC
to launch the ESDP and for a CDI in March. (Note: The
Slovenian Deputy Director later dismissed this position as
"unreasonable." End note.) The Spanish Political Director
pulled aside A/S Fried and argued heatedly that Kosovo's
independence before Spain's elections in March would
"destabilize" Spain because of the Basque issue. The
Portuguese Political Director asked for more time to ensure
that everything was "totally ready within the EU."

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A/S Fried Pushes Back - Time is No Longer on Our Side
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7. (C) A/S Fried pushed back in the general session and in
private pull-asides. He explained that time was no longer on
our side. More delay weakened the credibility of the U.S.
and EU; could shake the confidence of the Kosovar leadership;
and would confirm for Serbia and Russia that Europe was
irresolute and could be bullied. Waiting weeks after
February 3 would leave the field open for Russian and Serbian
mischief making on the ground and internationally, generating
more arguments among the Europeans for yet more delay. He
reminded the Political Directors that Ministers had already
agreed to move promptly after February 3 and that we should
not re-visit this understanding. The moment for proceeding
on Kosovo independence would be most favorable immediately
after February 3, when expectations and our credibility were
at a peak. Waiting could unravel what we had achieved. He
urged the Political Directors in strong terms not to let this
favorable moment pass.

Dealing with Russia - "Unrequited Enmity"
--------------


8. (C) A/S Fried briefed the group on dealing with Russia.
The U.S. had sought to cooperate with Russia and still sought
to build on the areas where we were working well together.
Nevertheless, and unfortunately, Russia seemed to view the
U.S. and NATO in adversarial, zero-sum terms. (Karel
Kovanda, Deputy Director of RELEX, termed the Russian view
"unrequited enmity.") Fried explained that USG policy was
not to respond in kind to Russian truculence, although we
must be prepared to push back against Russia when necessary.
One potential flashpoint could be Russian recognition of
Abkhazia as a response to Kosovo's CDI. A/S Fried stressed
that this would be a dangerous act of revisionism and we
should be prepared to respond promptly and strongly, as well
as to try to preempt such a move.


9. (C) Some of the newer EU member states (those closer
geographically to Russia) shared A/S Fried's concerns. The
Polish Political Director called for as much support as
possible for Georgia, a key friend in the region. The
Lithuanian Political Director noted that although Russia had
changed, the EU's policies toward Russia had not. He
expressed the hope that the EU could use the March Gymnich
(informal foreign ministers meeting) to focus on that. The
UK PD seconded the suggestion, citing the range of interests
affected by Russia's adversarial stance. The Czech PD
advocated a "realistic" approach, since an approach based on
common values with Russia no longer was operable. A/S Fried
concurred with the suggestion for realism, defining it as
understanding what Russia is and being realistic about what
we can achieve, while seeking to work together with Russia
wherever possible.


10. (C) A/S Fried also encouraged the EU to focus on energy
security. Helga Schmid, Director of the Policy Unit at the
Council, said that Russia was desperately trying to stop the
Nabucco pipelineQoject. She and Slovenian PD Drobnic
stated that the EU was committed to pursuing energy
diversity. A number of eastern member-states spoke out in
favor of developing a common external energy policyQ

11. (U) A/S Fried and USEU Brussels PolCounselor Larry
Wohlers have cleared this cable.
COLEMAN