EU POLITICAL DIRECTORS LUNCH FOCUSES ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000020 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/NCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2017 TAGS: PREL EUN PGOV ECON ENRG SI SUBJECT: EU POLITICAL DIRECTORS LUNCH FOCUSES ON KOSOVO Classified By: CDA Maryruth Coleman for reasons 1.4 (b,d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) At the January 11 EU luncheon, EUR A/S Dan Fried urged the EU Political Directors not to delay Kosovo's independence, anticipated after the second round of the Serbian elections February 3. The Slovenian Chair, Political Director Mitja Drobnic, and A/S Fried both recognized how far the EU had come since the EU Political Directors meeting last summer: now almost all are prepared to support Kosovo's independence and most will recognize Kosovo. The question, however, is timing: the Swedes, Spanish and Portuguese all pushed for postponing Kosovo's coordinated declaration of independence (CDI) until March, which A/S Fried strongly countered. End Summary. Progress on Supporting Kosovo -------------- ¶2. (C) Slovenian Political Director Drobnic opened the discussion by noting the EU had come a long way since the last Political Directors meeting in Estoril. He explained that the December European Council conclusion on the ESDP mission for Kosovo clearly demonstrated the EU decision to play a leading role in Kosovo. He expressed appreciation for the U.S. contribution to the ESDP Mission. A/S Fried welcomed the closeness of our cooperation. He told the EU political Directors that the EU had been right to make the case for the 120-day troika process, which concluded on December 10. He noted the U.S. had also agreed to wait past December, and then again until after the Serbian elections; but that we must move swiftly. Some Member States Advocate Waiting on CDI -------------- ¶3. (C) The Italian, German and UK Political Directors supported the USG position. The Italian Political Director stressed that the sense of urgency must be matched with unity. He noted that the status quo could not hold for much longer and said as many European countries as possible should decide to recognize Kosovo. He also said that Italy supported signing an SAA with Serbia as soon as possible, but that the EU had not yet reached consensus on that. ¶4. (C) The UK Political Director gave the most positive intervention. He said that it was clear that Serbia and Russia would never accept the process, and the EU needed to acknowledge that and move ahead. It was important too for the EU and the U.S. to move ahead in a coordinated way - quickly. He noted that Pristina had been patient. While explaining that the EU had a lot of process that needed to be done, after CDI there needed to be quick recognition. He said the UK would be in the forefront. While the German Political Director said that Germany intended to recognize Kosovo, he did not comment on the need to move swiftly. The French Political Director did not speak. ¶5. (C) Comments from the non-quint Political Directors were varied, but most emphasized the importance of ensuring EU unity. The Danish Political Director said her government agreed on the need to move swiftly after Serbian elections, but cautioned that "swiftly" might have different meanings. However, she concluded that the EU should be ready to move by mid-February. The Hungarian Political Director was the first of the skeptics to argue that the EU needed more time to work on cooperation and building unity. His justification for a go slow approach was the need to develop "comprehensive and thorough" plans. He also expressed concern that Kosovo accompany its CDI with references to the Ahtisaari Plan, which A/S Fried noted Kosovo was likely to do. The Austrian Political Director said quick action was important because uncertainty was a source of instability, but he also noted that it was important to get wide support for CDI. ¶6. (C) The Swedish, Portuguese and Spanish Political Directors each pushed for waiting until March. The Swedish Political Director suggested waiting until the February GAERC to launch the ESDP and for a CDI in March. (Note: The Slovenian Deputy Director later dismissed this position as "unreasonable." End note.) The Spanish Political Director pulled aside A/S Fried and argued heatedly that Kosovo's independence before Spain's elections in March would "destabilize" Spain because of the Basque issue. The Portuguese Political Director asked for more time to ensure that everything was "totally ready within the EU." LJUBLJANA 00000020 002 OF 002 A/S Fried Pushes Back - Time is No Longer on Our Side -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) A/S Fried pushed back in the general session and in private pull-asides. He explained that time was no longer on our side. More delay weakened the credibility of the U.S. and EU; could shake the confidence of the Kosovar leadership; and would confirm for Serbia and Russia that Europe was irresolute and could be bullied. Waiting weeks after February 3 would leave the field open for Russian and Serbian mischief making on the ground and internationally, generating more arguments among the Europeans for yet more delay. He reminded the Political Directors that Ministers had already agreed to move promptly after February 3 and that we should not re-visit this understanding. The moment for proceeding on Kosovo independence would be most favorable immediately after February 3, when expectations and our credibility were at a peak. Waiting could unravel what we had achieved. He urged the Political Directors in strong terms not to let this favorable moment pass. Dealing with Russia - "Unrequited Enmity" -------------- ¶8. (C) A/S Fried briefed the group on dealing with Russia. The U.S. had sought to cooperate with Russia and still sought to build on the areas where we were working well together. Nevertheless, and unfortunately, Russia seemed to view the U.S. and NATO in adversarial, zero-sum terms. (Karel Kovanda, Deputy Director of RELEX, termed the Russian view "unrequited enmity.") Fried explained that USG policy was not to respond in kind to Russian truculence, although we must be prepared to push back against Russia when necessary. One potential flashpoint could be Russian recognition of Abkhazia as a response to Kosovo's CDI. A/S Fried stressed that this would be a dangerous act of revisionism and we should be prepared to respond promptly and strongly, as well as to try to preempt such a move. ¶9. (C) Some of the newer EU member states (those closer geographically to Russia) shared A/S Fried's concerns. The Polish Political Director called for as much support as possible for Georgia, a key friend in the region. The Lithuanian Political Director noted that although Russia had changed, the EU's policies toward Russia had not. He expressed the hope that the EU could use the March Gymnich (informal foreign ministers meeting) to focus on that. The UK PD seconded the suggestion, citing the range of interests affected by Russia's adversarial stance. The Czech PD advocated a "realistic" approach, since an approach based on common values with Russia no longer was operable. A/S Fried concurred with the suggestion for realism, defining it as understanding what Russia is and being realistic about what we can achieve, while seeking to work together with Russia wherever possible. ¶10. (C) A/S Fried also encouraged the EU to focus on energy security. Helga Schmid, Director of the Policy Unit at the Council, said that Russia was desperately trying to stop the Nabucco pipelineQoject. She and Slovenian PD Drobnic stated that the EU was committed to pursuing energy diversity. A number of eastern member-states spoke out in favor of developing a common external energy policyQ ¶11. (U) A/S Fried and USEU Brussels PolCounselor Larry Wohlers have cleared this cable. COLEMAN