PORTUGAL'S ISAF CAVEATS

C O N F I D E N T I A L LISBON 000035

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL AF PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL'S ISAF CAVEATS

REF: SHAPE CAVEAT REPORT (NATO CONFIDENTIAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Stephenson, REASONS 1.4 (D)


1. (U) Even before my arrival in Portugal, the status of
Portugal's contributions to the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was the most
significant issue on our agenda. Following a review of the
SHAPE Caveat Report, I believe it important to comment on the
caveat priorities.


2. (C) Let me be clear: I subscribe entirely to the idea
that caveats impede success in Afghanistan and need to be
removed. However, while Portugal does have two de jure
caveats regarding its ISAF forces, neither impede Portuguese
operational availability -- and that seems, to us, to be the
important thing. While the Portuguese Chief of Defense does
have to approve redeployments of the Portuguese Quick
Reaction Force (QRF) outside of its area of operations, that
approval has always been immediately granted and the QRF has
participated in some of the heaviest fighting in the volatile
south, earning direct praise from the ISAF Commander, the
SHAPE Commander, and the President of the United States. We
agree with the SHAPE Caveat Report,s rating of this caveat
as of only "marginal" importance, and thus we are surprised
that removal of this marginal caveat is one of the seven
priorities for SHAPE (out of 24 pages of other caveats,
ranging from "marginal" to "severe"). Indeed, the Portugal
caveat is the only marginal caveat included in the priority
list. To us, it appears out of place.


3. (C) Given that the caveat does not impede operational
availability, we do not believe it appropriate to expend
significant time or political capital on its removal. We
prefer to direct such resources towards expanding Portugal's
contributions to the ISAF effort. As the Portuguese QRF's
mandate expires in August, we intend to focus on encouraging
the Portuguese to contribute additional Operational Mentoring
Liaison Teams (OMLT) to the one to which they have already
committed. Such contributions maximize the use of
experienced personnel in the Portuguese armed forces and
maximize the number of soldiers in the field by
professionalizing and deploying Afghan National Army units.
We and our colleagues will soon submit a plan to encourage
further Portuguese contributions to ISAF and we look forward
to comments and suggestions from Washington and Brussels.
Ballard