PORTUGAL'S ISAF CAVEATS

C O N F I D E N T I A L LISBON 000035 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016 TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL AF PO SUBJECT: PORTUGAL'S ISAF CAVEATS REF: SHAPE CAVEAT REPORT (NATO CONFIDENTIAL) Classified By: Ambassador Stephenson, REASONS 1.4 (D) ¶1. (U) Even before my arrival in Portugal, the status of Portugal's contributions to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was the most significant issue on our agenda. Following a review of the SHAPE Caveat Report, I believe it important to comment on the caveat priorities. ¶2. (C) Let me be clear: I subscribe entirely to the idea that caveats impede success in Afghanistan and need to be removed. However, while Portugal does have two de jure caveats regarding its ISAF forces, neither impede Portuguese operational availability -- and that seems, to us, to be the important thing. While the Portuguese Chief of Defense does have to approve redeployments of the Portuguese Quick Reaction Force (QRF) outside of its area of operations, that approval has always been immediately granted and the QRF has participated in some of the heaviest fighting in the volatile south, earning direct praise from the ISAF Commander, the SHAPE Commander, and the President of the United States. We agree with the SHAPE Caveat Report,s rating of this caveat as of only "marginal" importance, and thus we are surprised that removal of this marginal caveat is one of the seven priorities for SHAPE (out of 24 pages of other caveats, ranging from "marginal" to "severe"). Indeed, the Portugal caveat is the only marginal caveat included in the priority list. To us, it appears out of place. ¶3. (C) Given that the caveat does not impede operational availability, we do not believe it appropriate to expend significant time or political capital on its removal. We prefer to direct such resources towards expanding Portugal's contributions to the ISAF effort. As the Portuguese QRF's mandate expires in August, we intend to focus on encouraging the Portuguese to contribute additional Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLT) to the one to which they have already committed. Such contributions maximize the use of experienced personnel in the Portuguese armed forces and maximize the number of soldiers in the field by professionalizing and deploying Afghan National Army units. We and our colleagues will soon submit a plan to encourage further Portuguese contributions to ISAF and we look forward to comments and suggestions from Washington and Brussels. Ballard