AMBASSADOR, FM AMADO DISCUSS IRAN AND KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LISBON 000183 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2018 TAGS: PREL PO IR SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR, FM AMADO DISCUSS IRAN AND KOSOVO Classified By: Ambassador Thomas Stephenson for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) . Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Foreign Minister Amado told Ambassador Stephenson on January 22 -- in the latter's initial courtesy call -- that he had agreed to Iranian FM Mottaki's request for a meeting in Lisbon the following day. Amado said Portugal and the U.S. agreed on the need to turn up the pressure on Tehran and he vowed, with no prompting, to deliver a very tough message. He promised a readout of their discussion. On Kosovo, he stressed the importance of a unified EU position, saying the likeliest outcome was an umbrella EU statement that allows Member States flexibility in the timing of a recognition of independence. Amado expressed his hope that both announcement of a common EU position and deployment of an ESDP mission would precede a Kosovar declaration of independence. End summary. ¶2. (U) Ambassador Stephenson called on FM Luis Amado on January 22, accompanied by the DCM and pol/econ counselor. Amado was joined by chief of staff Francisco Ribeiro de Menezes and diplomatic advisor Paulo Lourenco. U.S.-Portugal relations -------------- ¶3. (C) FM Amado underscored the strength of U.S.-Portugal relations, saying good transatlantic ties are a top priority of all three major parties in Portugal. Portuguese foreign policy has been stable and consistent since Portugal's transition to democracy in the mid-1970's, regardless of the party in power. Portugal looks to the United States as the anchor of its national security and defense, and Washington can always count on Portugal as a reliable ally. At the same time, he said, Europe must strengthen its military capacity so it can shoulder more responsibility in global hotspots. He reiterated the GOP's interest in collaboration with us in Africa, and the Ambassador agreed there is much we can do together there. Amado said the GOP has tried to provide us with a heads-up on issues that might trigger concern in Washington. Iran -------------- ¶4. (C) Amado noted that he had agreed to receive the Iranian Foreign Minister in Lisbon the following day. Amado emphasized that he strongly shared U.S. views on Iran and planned to press his Iranian counterpart hard on Tehran's nuclear program. Asked what Mottaki's agenda was, Amado turned to his diplomatic advisor, Paulo Lourenco, who said the nuclear issue and regional topics, including Iraq and Afghanistan. Amado noted with obvious satisfaction that European pressure on Iran had been increased during Portugal's recently-concluded EU presidency. He noted that the USG's recent National Intelligence Estimate had made this effort more difficult, as some Member States were now more reluctant to pursue tougher measures. The media headlines, the Ambassador replied, had unfortunately not been reflective of key elements of the NIE's content. The bottom line is that Iran remains a serious threat. Absolutely, Amado agreed, Tehran is acting unhelpfully throughout the region, and it is important to maintain pressure. He promised to provide a readout of his discussions with Mottaki. Amado noted that he had met Mottaki only once, at an Organization of Islamic Conference-EU gathering on the margins of UNGA last fall. ¶5. (C) Amado added that Iran had recently pushed hard for a range of bilateral events commemorating 500 years (in 2007) of ties between Portugal and Iran, and he suspected Mottaki would likely continue to press on that bilateral front. Kosovo -------------- ¶6. (C) Amado raised Kosovo, emphasizing the importance of a united EU position. He said he is convinced the international community needs to avoid a unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovars. A coordinated declaration of independence (CDI),in the context of the Ahtisaari Plan, is the best way forward. He thought the likeliest outcome would be an EU umbrella statement that provides flexibility to some Member States to recognize whenever they believe it is appropriate. It is individual Member States, he noted, that confer recognition, not the European Union. Amado reported that he is pressing the view with his European counterparts that Kosovars not declare independence before a common EU position is announced. In addition, he would like to get an ESDP mission on the ground before a CDI. Asked whether that was possible, Amado said he thought it was, but it would take close coordination with the United States. The bottom line, Amado said, is that everyone knows that Kosovo will be independent, and that independence will be declared within a matter of weeks. The only question now, he said, is how to manage it. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) This was the Ambassador's initial call on Amado, and the warm 20-minute discussion laid excellent groundwork for future collaboration. A thoughtful, relaxed Amado clearly thought it important to begin by stressing the centrality of the transatlantic relationship to Portugal's foreign policy priorities, a point he regularly -- and justifiably -- makes to other senior USG officials. On the Iranian Foreign Minister's visit, Amado's staff had given us a heads-up last week (which we passed to Washington). We believe Amado will indeed deliver his counterpart a tough message, as the Portuguese have consistently favored turning up the pressure on Tehran, likely a reflection of Amado's own belief -- which he expressed to Ambassador Stephenson's predecessor -- that Iran poses the greatest threat to global peace and security. On Kosovo, Amado was not specific about when he thought the EU would agree to a common position but he did acknowledge the imminence of a declaration of independence. Stephenson