BOLIVIA CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXERCISE

UNCLAS LA PAZ 000900 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DIR FSINFATC FOR FSI/LMS/CMT SECSTATE FOR S/ES-O/CMS AND WHA/EX E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PREL AEMR BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXERCISE REF: FSINFATC 1303 ¶1. Summary: Mission Bolivia held a Crisis Management Exercise (CME) via digital video conference with Washington on April 7. Members of the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) and representatives from DEA Santa Cruz and Cochabamba were present. The scenario outlined a civil disturbance in La Paz with scattered violence throughout the country. Embassy La Paz had previously conducted a CME in November 2007 that included locally engaged staff and took place over two days. The April 2008 exercise included only direct-hire Americans and took only one day, revisiting and refining the earlier exercise with significant changes to the scenario. End summary. ¶2. The following comments are keyed to reftel paragraph 2, A-H. ¶A. Digital video conference format was effective. Three hours were sufficient, although some EAC members suggested that the 1-hour orientation be shortened to allow more time for the exercise and review. Audio and video quality were clear enough to allow for effective interaction. Because of the sensitivity of the microphone at FSI, we recommend that the microphone be muted when controller is not speaking, thus eliminating stray paper and movement noises. ¶B. The CME scenario was appropriate and worked well with a digital video conference format. Due to time limitations, the scenario had to be cut during the exercise: in the future, a shorter scenario might be better. ¶C. Intervention by the controller was appropriate and effective. ¶D. Post has drawn up an extensive list of lessons-learned based on this exercise. EAC will work with these lessons learned to modify reactions in the event of a real crisis. ¶E. The primary lesson learned, echoing the experience of 2007, was that action sooner is better than later. As a corollary, thanks to La Paz's unique setting sometimes even the earliest action does not allow sufficient time for an evacuation. La Paz is located in a narrow valley, and all roads out can be easily blocked by protesting crowds (as has occurred in the past.) Therefore, Embassy La Paz and the NAS/USAID building need to be prepared for a "shelter in place" situation. In both crisis scenarios, the EAC attempted to call for evacuation at the earliest indication of need, and both times significant numbers of employees remained in the city when the crisis came to a head and no travel was possible. As a result, another lesson learned was to attempt to revise our drawdown list, minimizing "essential" personnel so that a potential siege at the Embassy or NAS/USAID building would have less impact. Another lesson learned is the difficulty of getting out of the country in general. The primary mode of protest in Bolivia is street-blockades, and many of the major interstate roads are two lane and blocked with little effort. In the past, many Mission plans for evacuation have been based on the expectation that Santa Cruz could act as a temporary safe-haven on the way out of the country. With increasing turmoil in Santa Cruz, this assumption may no longer hold. Both official and private Americans may need to be ready to shelter-in-place and wait out a crisis if internal travel is impossible. Both CMEs emphasized the need for preparation as a best-practice for crisis management. EAC members suggested a dry run to test the set up of an alternate command center, both to have the experience of the quick conversion and also to determine what will be needed in the event an alternate command is needed. The EAC could then meet at alternate command centers occasionally, to familiarize themselves with these new areas. In anticipation that shelter-in-place may become necessary, EAC members suggested increased communication regarding stockpiling, the location of safe-houses, and exit strategies. EAC members also requested more information on the reaction time of various fly-away teams, including military support teams. Hands-on practice drills with partner Bolivian groups such as the National Police could also be valuable, although difficult to arrange due to the current sensitivities of the Bolivian government. The EAP will be updated to include recent contact information, a streamlined drawdown list for evacuation, and more information on shelter-in-place needs. ¶F. The overview training provided a good introduction to the various resources available in a crisis, particularly from agencies or departments that help State in a crisis. The overview training in DVC format was appropriate. Currently no overview training for LES or non-EAC Americans is scheduled, but Post plans to provide some of the information in upcoming townhall meetings with the Mission and American communities as appropriate. ¶G. Current schedule of CMEs seems appropriate. Post will continue to supplement this schedule with internal exercises, as in November 2007. Although some level of basic crisis training should be maintained for all posts (a plane crash or truck bomb can take place anywhere),it seems to make sense that posts that are more likely to face a crisis (based on current developments or historical trends) should receive more preparation and training. ¶H. Mission Bolivia appreciates CME coordinator Douglas Kinney's efforts in facilitating our most recent crisis management exercise. GOLDBERG