BOLIVIA: PRE-MAY 4 DIALOGUE HOPES ON THE ROPES

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000751 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS OFDP OVIP BL AR CO BR SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: PRE-MAY 4 DIALOGUE HOPES ON THE ROPES REF: A. LA PAZ 747 ¶B. LA PAZ 735 Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Despite much-publicized government urgency to head off Santa Cruz Department's (state) May 4 autonomy referendum through dialogue with the opposition, Bolivian government contacts are privately accepting they cannot head off the referendum and are looking at a post-May 4 strategy. In the meantime, the government continues its flirtations with various potential third-party mediators (OAS, Catholic Church, and Brazilian/Argentine/Colombian governments), efforts that Morales used April 5 to warn opposition departments that the international community has declared their autonomy movements "illegal." Despite his newfound vigor for dialogue, Morales also laced his April 5 speech with legal threats against autonomy leaders and calls for his base to mobilize against the referendum. Rather than actually proposing a concrete role for a "Group of Friends," Morales used his meeting with Colombian and Argentine delegations April 3 to lambaste Santa Cruz oligarchs, the USG, and Ambassador Goldberg, according to the Colombian DCM. ¶2. (SBU) Although the opposition is politely meeting with proposed facilitators, it has been steadfast that it will not postpone the May referendum for another open-ended dialogue (earlier attempts at compromise in the Constitutional Assembly, in Congress, and with prefects ended acrimoniously). Opposition leaders view the government's dialogue push as either an empty PR gesture to curry international and domestic support and/or as a strategy to strip the opposition of what they perceive as a winning hand on May 4. End Summary. ¶3. (C) During an April 4 lunch of mission DCMs, Colombian Charge Adriana Patricia Arbelaez provided DCM with a readout of the April 3 meetings the Colombian Vice Foreign Minister Camilo Reyes and Argentine Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana had with government and opposition leaders. The two were invited by the Bolivian government ostensibly to lay the groundwork for a "friends group" of Latin American governments to facilitate/mediate negotiations between the deadlocked government and opposition leadership. Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim was also invited, but was not able to arrive in La Paz the evening of April 4. Argentine DCM Jorge �0A;Gomez, also present at the lunch, confirmed Arbelaez's version of events. Evo Strong on Blame, Weak on Direction -------------- ¶4. (C) Arbelaez said Bolivian President Evo Morales blasted the U.S. and opposition "oligarchs" for a straight hour with Reyes and Taiana. Among Morales' "unbelievable" accusations: the United States is funneling funds to Santa Cruz Department's (state) opposition leadership and Ambassador Goldberg is masterminding the autonomy movement behind the scenes. Morales added boilerplate criticisms that opposition oligarchs are concerned only with protecting their wealth and privileges at the expense of the common people. Morales allegedly challenged the popular support for the May 4 Santa Cruz autonomy referendums, asserting that if it wasn't for an alliance between Goldberg and a small group of business oligarchs, "there would be no referendum." (Note: Government Minister Alfredo Rada April 6 publicly accused the Ambassador of trying to "dismember" Bolivia. Reftel a. End Note.) ¶5. (C) Arbelaez said Reyes asked Morales, Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera, and Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca repeatedly "what do you want us to do?" Although none of the government leaders laid out any options for a charge or mandate for the nascent "friends group," Garcia Linera allegedly asserted the government would be willing to make changes to the draft constitution and redirect petroleum revenues to departments if the opposition dropped autonomy referendums (which are also scheduled for three other departments). (Comment: This is the same line Garcia Linera used during negotiations with the opposition in Congress, which ended in blocking the opposition from a Kangaroo session to pass legislation making department autonomy referendums explicitly illegal. End Comment.) Choquehuanca, however, indicated he did not share this view and would not support any compromise that included changing the draft constitution. Evo Not so "Friendly" with Colombia -------------- ¶6. (C) According to Arbelaez, Morales did not shake hands with Reyes and ignored him throughout the meeting. Arbelaez explained that Reyes defended the United States' intentions, although she did not go into specifics. Mexico Standing in for "Unacceptable" Peru -------------- ¶7. (C) The Mexican DCM added that Mexico is being considered for a friends group to appease the opposition, and only because the opposition's first choice, Peru, was unacceptable to the Bolivian government. She explained the Mexican Foreign Minister is waiting for a readout on the Argentine/Colombian meetings before committing to an official visit to La Paz. According to press accounts over the weekend a Mexican delegation is forthcoming, though no dates were provided. Brazilian FM Notes Will/Lack of Will on Dialogue -------------- --- ¶8. (SBU) Among others, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with President Morales, Public Ombudsman Waldo Albarracin, and opposition leaders Samuel Doria Medina (National Unity),Jorge Quiroga (PODEMOS),Oscar Ortiz (PODEMOS Senate President),and Santa Cruz Prefect Ruben Costas April 5 and 6. Following his meeting with Morales, Amorim said he was "concerned with the disposition of both sides to open a dialogue." Perhaps recognizing how pessimistic the comment appeared in the press, Amorim seemed to reverse course the next day, saying "despite the difficulties " there is a desire on both sides for dialogue." In a public roundtable sponsored by the Brazilian Embassy later in the day, Amorim compared Morales favorably with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Da Silva, who also was not initially liked by "the establishment." Quiroga said he told Amorim that any international efforts to mediate the conflict should be subordinated and coordinated with existing mediation efforts of the Catholic Church in Santa Cruz. Church Tries to Revive Moribund Facilitation Role -------------- -------------- ¶9. (U) Meanwhile the Catholic Church plans to meet with opposition prefects (governors) April 7 to explore mediation options. The Church has blamed the lackluster progress of its efforts to move a dialogue forward, underway since March 14, on the lack of will from both sides to negotiate. Bolivian Cardinal Julio Terrazas said on April 3 that he believes it is now "impossible" to facilitate dialogue between the government and the opposition due to an environment of mutual suspicion, pressure and violence. Terrazas lamented that the two sides seem to appreciate force and pressure over rational arguments. These comments came only one day after Bolivian President Evo Morales appealed for mediation by the Catholic Church in the conflict. President Morales has also appealed for mediation assistance from the OAS (reftel b). Evo's Schizophrenic Dialogue/Confrontation Message -------------- -------------- ¶10. (U) Despite talking dialogue with FM Amorim in the morning, Morales talked later April 5 about mobilizing his base against the referendum (although he did not specify advocate violence). Morales also threatened legal prosecution against opposition autonomy leaders. "If these prefect officials are investigated, I am certain they will be thrown in jail," said Morales, specially citing prefect misuse of government funds. Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera followed Morales' statement with a call for government supporters to mobilize against the referendums. "If they (opposition) want to try something, it will be illegitimate, unconstitutional, and will provide the basis to take them to court for their misdeeds." Evo: Internationals Love Me, Love Prefects Not -------------- - ¶11. (U) Morales attacked the legality of "seditious" Santa Cruz autonomy statutes, specifically its supposed creep into federal prerogatives. Morales warned prefects not to "deceive themselves" concerning the legality of autonomy referenda and assured the prefects they would not be able to count on the support of the international community. MFA Director Advises Deemphasizing May 4 -------------- ¶12. (C) MFA Director of Bilateral Affairs Jean Paul Guevara told Poloffs April 4 that both sides needed to "de-dramaticize" the May 4 referendum so that "it doesn't become an artificial impediment to dialogue." Guevara said it had been a strategic mistake of the GOB to initially give so much importance to the May 4 vote, and the GOB was now looking beyond May 4 ) "not everything has to be worked out before then." Guevara said dialogue was unlikely before May 4, but that both parties should renew efforts post May 4, which is why the government is engaging the OAS, Catholic Church, and the international community. Guevara said the Bolivian government would still consider a U.S. mediation role "as we discussed with (Assistant Secretary) Tom Shannon," but that for the moment no such role was "under discussion." ¶13. (C) Ultimately, Guevara conceded the referendum would pass, though not in the landslide estimated by the opposition. He argued, however, that it would not matter whether they win by "70, 80, or even 90 percent" because "it will still be illegal." He said the government would ignore any vote not recognized by the National Electoral Court or international observers. "Not even the police will participate other than to carry out their normal functions." Guevara also pointed out that although the government did not desire or plan a police/military "state of siege" in Santa Cruz May 4, it had every legal right to do so. Guevara said the government would not be instigating its supporters to violence May 4 and that if the opposition did the same "there will be no violence." ¶14. (U) Separately, the press reported over the weekend that a letter sent by FM Choquehuanca to Bolivia's foreign missions ordered Ambassadors to campaign publicly against the autonomic referendums. MAS Deputies "Not Worried" -------------- ¶15. (C) Ruling MAS party deputies Tony Condori and Ramiro Venegas told PolOff April 4 there would be no large-scale violence May 4. They believe the autonomy referendum will be not be conclusive enough to put it beyond dispute and "hopefully" would become just another bargaining chip in government/opposition negotiations. They foresaw a post-May 4 grand compromise that would meld opposition autonomy and budget concerns into the draft-constitution. ¶16. (C) Condori postulated the government could actually beat the opposition at their own referendum, as pollsters and politicians routinely underestimate the government-sympathetic rural vote, "as they did in 2005." (Note: A March 16 Equipos Mori poll estimated a nearly 80 percent vote in favor of autonomy in Santa Cruz. End Note.) Condori estimated a 70 percent support for the referendum in urban communities, with at least 70 percent opposed in rural areas. With about a million voters each, the urban/rural split makes the outcome "too close to call." Anything less than a landslide would be considered a defeat, according to the MAS deputies. ¶17. (C) Although they discounted the probability the government would encourage supporters to confront the referendum process violently, they conceded it remained an option both for May 4 and beyond. They added that skirmishes with opposition supporters were inevitable May 4, but would generally be confined to posturing and "people yelling at each other." Condori contended, "Bolivians are not violent people, we always work something out before it comes to that." Condori said citizens from his city of El Alto would mobilize if they could be convinced Santa Cruz was blocking the government's agenda or threatening recent Aymara immigrants, but that such a mobilization would "not be automatic," as Altenos were more inclined to support a peaceful dialogue than fight. He added that "no one is talking about it" and that "there is no need" to use the military or outside government supporters, since there are already enough government supporters in Santa Cruz. Separately, MAS Lower House leader Cesar Navarro said publicly April 4 that "the only way to prevent the referendum is to intervene military and we will not do that in any way." MAS Moving Red Lines Post-May 4 -------------- ¶18. (C) Venegas opined that if Santa Cruz does pull off a clear victory "it will be the end to dialogue" and maybe the beginning of a government crackdown. Condori echoed sentiments from Director Guevara that he was not worried about May 4, but rather actions Santa Cruz might take afterwards to exercise authorities reserved for the national government, such as setting up its own police force, negotiating with foreign governments, or disputing federal land distributions. "If they start acting like a country, the government will have no choice," asserted Condori. "No national government on earth would put up with the Santa Cruz statutes." Opposition: May 4 or Bust -------------- ¶19. (C) However genuine (or not) the government's dialogue overtures are, it does not appear that the opposition is inclined to participate in a dialogue prior to May 4, at least one without conditions. Bolivian Senate President Oscar Ortiz told the Argentine/Colombian "friends" delegation that nothing would stop the May 4 Santa Cruz autonomy referendum from going forward. According to Arbelaez, Ortiz explained the opposition has been burned too many times in negotiations with the government to sacrifice the one card they have left: departmental autonomy referendums (Note: Since November, negotiations in the Constitutional Assembly, Congress, and between Morales and the departments all ended acrimoniously for the opposition, with the government forces moving forward with their agenda under legally dubious and exclusionary processes. End Note.) Ortiz indicated the opposition would be willing to negotiate, but only after the May 4 referendum, when it would be a position of greater strength. Arbelaez and Gomez agreed the opposition gave a more cogent and relevant presentation than the government. ¶20. (C) Santa Cruz Department Prefect (state governor) Ruben Costas made similar points in his meeting with Reyes/Taiana, according to prefect sources, but dramatically added that the timeline for the May 4 referendum was out of his control. "I can't stop the May 4 referendum; the people would tear me apart." Following his April 6 meeting with Amorim, Costas stressed hopes for a peaceful, democratic May 4: "We are not in agreement with violence. ¶21. (U) After his meeting with FM Amorim, Quiroga unequivocally placed the burden of creating conditions for dialogue with the government, for example by annulling acts arrived at undemocratically, such as the draft constitution and laws passed during a government blockade of opposition congressmen. The same day, Santa Cruz autonomy authority Carlos Dabdoub assured there was no "legal capacity or dialogue that could stop the course of this (autonomy referendum) process Comment -------------- ¶22. (C) The group of friends make-up for now has pro-government leaning Argentina and Brazil balanced with Colombia and Mexico, at the opposition's request. But this may only be much ado about dialogue, as neither side appears serious about negotiating before May 4. The government appears to realize it cannot forcibly stop a May 4 referendum from occurring and is working a post-May 4 strategy. Part of that strategy in the near term appears to be "de-dramaticizing" May 4, as the MFA's Guevara put it, emphasizing the government's legal arguments, and projecting a facade of reasonability, to include insinuating support from the international community. ¶23. (C) Morales' tone shifted from benevolence to confrontation April 5, as it often does when addressing his coca-growing radical base in the Chapare. His statements implying the international community backs him against the Media Luna's autonomy referenda are a misrepresentation of international statements and postures to date and reveal the true intentions of inviting foreign ministry delegations from Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia to La Paz, ostensibly here to explore mediation options. They were instead paraded out as a supposed sign of international sympathy for the Morales administration. Instead of providing guidance on how the delegations might utilize their good offices to initiate a dialogue, the government lectured these diplomats and used them as public props. Although the government has misrepresented international concern about the political situation in Bolivia for Morales administration support in the past, this is the most flagrant example. What remains to be seen is if these countries will attempt to clarify their positions publicly or go willingly along with the role Evo has cast them in. End Comment. GOLDBERG