BOLIVIA FORECAST: LEADING UP TO MAY 4

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000693 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2018 TAGS: ASEC PREL PGOV ECON EAID AGR BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA FORECAST: LEADING UP TO MAY 4 REF: LA PAZ 677 Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Short of an outbreak of widespread chaos and violence, the opposition-led department (state) of Santa Cruz is on track to hold a referendum on its autonomy statute despite President Evo Morales' attempts to stop or at least postpone it. The Catholic Church and the international community will likely fail to bring the opposition and Morales' Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) to the negotiating table prior to the May 4 referendum. Morales may offer some last ditch enticements to delay the referendum, or at a minimum to cast himself as a reasonable "peacemaker," but the opposition can be expected to proceed undeterred. Faced with the prospect that he cannot stop the referendum, Morales may issue a series of new "nationalization" announcements on or around May 1 to steal the political limelight. He might use food security as a pretext for such a move, which would also show action to reverse rising food costs, while simultaneously reinforcing blame on opposition businessmen for the inflation. It is also likely that Morales will step up attacks against USG/USAID, with the possible closure of one of USAID's programs, using an on-going bilateral portfolio review to support its action. The USAID democracy program is the most likely target. ¶2. (C) Recognizing he cannot block the referendum, Morales will likely avoid direct government intervention, instead continuing to play down the referendum's significance by denouncing it as illegal and illegitimate. Nevertheless there is a chance the he may resort to more drastic actions. Rumors are circulating that Morales is contemplating arresting Santa Cruz political leaders and that his government may take over some Santa Cruz agro-businesses. Both the national police and military are reluctant to interfere. However, Bolivia is slipping further into potential chaos with more strikes, blockades, and protest marches. In such an environment the central government may be able to convince security forces that they must establish order as constitutionally required. Alternatively, it is quite possible that, as in the past, Morales will send his "social groups" as shock troops to disrupt the referendum. This is the first of a two-part cable series looking at Bolivia's future pre- and post- May 4. This cable examines scenarios up to the May 4 referendum. End Summary. -------------- May 4: Santa Cruz Says Full Speed Ahead -------------- ¶3. (C) The Santa Cruz political leadership has made it clear that there is no turning back on their May 4 referendum to approve their department's (state) autonomy statutes. Opposition Senate President Oscar Ortiz (Santa Cruz, PODEMOS) tells us the referenda are inevitable and Congress no longer has any power to hold back prefecture governments from moving forward. While the other lowland departments will also hold referenda on their own autonomy statutes (Beni and Pando on June 1, Tarija on June 22),Santa Cruz' vote is the most important because it is first and Santa Cruz holds the undisputed leadership role amongst the opposition departments. -------------- Church Mediated Talks: A Road To Nowhere -------------- ¶4. (C) Church mediated talks will likely not proceed, and if they do move forward will almost certainly fail before May ¶4. Neither the MAS nor opposition are interested in real negotiations. As of March 25, Catholic Church officials stated that neither side had taken any steps to set an agenda, date, or place for talks )- indicating there is no will to negotiate. Although, Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera in a March 26 meeting with the Ambassador indicated that the MAS had sent the Church a proposed agenda. -------------- International Community: Interest Waning -------------- ¶5. (C) With the Catholic Church tapped as the "facilitator du jour" both the European Union (EU) and the Organization of American States (OAS) have put on hold their earlier offers to serve as mediators. Regional neighbors such as Brazil, Argentina and Peru )- who were once seen as potential facilitators -- are also waiting for a call to action. Most in the international community now see themselves being pulled into talks only after both sides accept the need for it, perhaps after a more direct confrontation. In his March 26 meeting with the Ambassador, the Vice President did bring up the possibility of having a "Friends Group" including Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and the United States act as facilitators. However the Vice President said thinking on such an effort was still evolving and that the timing was not yet right. As May 4 approaches, it is likely that the government will want international involvement if for nothing else than to portray itself as the "reasonable" party. -------------- Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures -------------- ¶6. (C) The Bolivian government is likely to make increasingly desperate offers to tempt Santa Cruz to postpone its May 4 referendum. Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera and other MAS leaders have occasionally stated that everything is "on-the-table" for discussion with regards to revising the MAS constitution. Such an offer should, in theory, be welcomed by an opposition that views the MAS draft constitution as a threat to their livelihood. However, since the MAS in practice has not acted on its previous offers to "revise" its constitution the opposition sees little reason to believe the MAS will do so in the run-up to the May 4 referendum. President Morales may offer a last minute compromise on the (IDH) funding cuts to the departments in exchange for postponing the May 4 referendum. Unfortunately, the opposition will likely disregard any offers (concessions) as disingenuous, as too little too late, or simply another clever government negotiating trick. Morales will paint the opposition's failure to accept the government's offers as proof that the Santa Cruz leadership is unreasonable and has "separatist" intentions. -------------- Rational Actors Wanted -------------- ¶7. (C) Periodically, rumors surface that the government may resort to more drastic actions such as the arrest of key Santa Cruz leaders, or the "nationalization" of certain Santa Cruz businesses. While such actions may appear irrational to us, increasingly Morales and his closest advisors seem to be making policy decisions based less on logic and more on impulse. For example, on March 19, the Ministry of Rural Development issued a decree prohibiting the export of cooking oil as a means to hold back inflation and ensure adequate cooking oil supplies for the domestic market, despite the fact that the domestic market represents less than 20 percent of the gross sales of cooking oil. Santa Cruz political and business leaders have denounced the measure as a political weapon meant to dampen their autonomy efforts. To justify its actions the government has been disseminating (largely false) information that cooking-oil in Bolivia is "the most expensive in the world" and that Santa Cruz agro-businesses sell their product overseas for less than it does in Bolivia. ¶8. (C) Initial reactions to the cooking-oil decree have likely surprised the Morales administration. Truckers blocked roads around the country, arguing the export prohibition is destroying their livelihood. While the truckers' strike seems to be waning, it could escalate and prompt a confrontation well before the May 4 referendum. Furthermore, Santa Cruz food producers are threatening to cut off food shipments to La Paz )- such an action could provoke the government to take more drastic measures (see paragraphs 12 and 13). Ironically, the government's distribution of subsidized cooking-oil has provoked anger within its own stronghold of La Paz, as people have had to wait up to four hours to get their &cheap8 oil. Meanwhile, the Santa Cruz Prefecture is contemplating authorizing exports of cooking-oil despite the government ban to help its local businesses, and as means to exercise its autonomy. Despite Santa Cruz, threats there are no signs the government will rescind its decree anytime soon. On March 27, the Minister of Development Planning stated it would remain in effect for six months. There are fears that the national government will use the cooking-oil protests to create chaos and disrupt the autonomy vote. Percy Anez Rivero, Vice President of Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz, told Emboffs that "we are painfully aware that the government may provoke violence as a means to suppress Santa Cruz. The (Santa Cruz) business and political leadership are making every effort to ensure this does not happen." Nevertheless, with neither side apparently ready to give in, serious confrontations could occur in the very near term. -------------- Gearing Up the Shock Troops -------------- ¶9. (C) Both sides, the government and the opposition, appear to be gearing up their shock troops in the run up to the referendum. Already, MAS-aligned indigenous groups and community leaders of "immigrant" communities (generally populated by altiplano or Cochabamba economic migrants) have stated that they will block roads starting May 3 in Santa Cruz to disrupt the election. The migrant communities of San Julian and Yapacani already saw violent clashes between pro- and anti-MAS groups in 2006 and 2007. President of the Eastern Indigenous Peoples' Confederation (CIDOB) Adolfo Chavez stated publicly that his organization would resist the autonomy referendum and is preparing for conflict with the Santa Cruz Youth Union. ¶10. (C) Members of the Youth Union have frequently attacked pro-MAS/government people and installations (including the government TV channel). Their actions frequently appear more racist than politically motivated. Several months ago, a group of mainly white Youth Union members attacked an altiplano migrant who they alleged was pro-MAS (anti-autonomy). The attack was televised. (Note: The government is certainly looking to capture on video an attack by a light-skinned pro-autonomy supporter on an indigenous person or persons on or around referendum day, as a means to discredit the entire referendum process. End Note). Such events provide fodder for the government's arguments that the Santa Cruz leadership is anti-indigenous and seeks to separate the country. The Youth Union and other pro-autonomy groups state they are forming a "guardia civil" (civil protection brigade) to guard polling places and prefecture installations. The Youth Union has boasted to the press that it has signed up 7000 members to participate in the guardia civil )- the number is likely inflated but many of those who have signed-on are militant. -------------- Bold Actions on May 1? -------------- ¶11. (C) In the past the government has used May 1 (International Labor Day) as a day to unveil its boldest initiatives )- in May 2006 it was the "nationalization" of the oil and gas sector. As May 1 falls just three days before the Santa Cruz referendum we can expect a number of "bold" announcements around that day to distract attention from May 4. Rumors are circulating that Morales will announce the "official" nationalization of other sectors of the economy such as mining, communications, or energy. While such a move would be largely symbolic as the government has already attempted to grab a larger stake in all three, it would be popular with more than just the MAS base. ¶12. (C) There are now rumors that the government is contemplating "nationalizing" the cooking-oil manufacturers, if companies do not abide by the government's March 19 decree. The government on March 26 announced that it would buy soybeans directly from producers, to essentially control the cooking-oil supply-chain. But, soy producers citing the government's previous delays in payments, have responded that they would rather let their crop rot than sell it to the government. Embassy contacts tell us the national government does not have the technical knowledge, must less the physical capability, to make good on their threat. ¶13. (C) An armed seizure of an agro-business company (or companies) in Santa Cruz would be viewed by the opposition as yet another government provocation and would likely result in confrontations between security forces and Crucenos (people from Santa Cruz). A seizure of one or more agro-businesses is a much more risky endeavor than the government's nationalization of the gas sector in May 2006. Unlike the demand to "nationalize" the hydrocarbons sector which was deeply rooted in the Bolivian political psyche (since at least 2003),there has not been the same historical demand for nationalizing agro-business interests. Demetrio Perez, Vice President of the Association of Seed Oil and Wheat Producers (ANAPO),told Emboff that his organization believes the export ban is less a move to provoke violence and more a move to try and pressure Santa Cruz into not holding the referendum. He is concerned that the government has hardened its position and places the blame directly on Vice President Garcia Linera, "the real force behind the export ban." -------------- GOB Target Acquired: Embassy and USAID -------------- ¶14. (C) May 1 (or before) may also mark the beginning of a new barrage of attacks on the USG and USAID. Morales will likely make new claims of USG/USAID support to the opposition as a means to undermine the autonomy referendum. The government is currently conducting a 30-day in-depth review of USAID projects. It is quite likely that Morales will use the "results" of this review as a pretext to demand the closing of one or more USAID programs. Vice President Alvaro Garcia told the Ambassador that government was seriously considering ending USAID's democracy program (reftel), although he claimed not to be aware of the on-going portfolio review. -------------- Where Do The Military and Police Stand? -------------- ¶15. (C) The conventional wisdom is that security forces (police and military) would be reticent to intervene in Santa Cruz. While the Morales administration continually argues the referendum is illegal, no one disputes that Santa Cruz referendum advocates collected enough signatures to call a referendum. (Note: The MAS' legal argument often cites a law they passed in Congress while their supporters forcibly prevented the opposition's participation that stipulates that only Congress can authorize a departmental referendum. End Note). Most in the military state they will hew closely to their role of defending the constitution, which does not necessarily mean they will defend Evo Morales' "political project." While the Armed Forces Commander General Luis Trigo has recently stated that the military will "defend Bolivia's unity" -- seen by some as a veiled threat against Santa Cruz -- the legal ambiguity surrounding the referendum gives lower ranking security forces enough cover to stay in their barracks. ¶16. (C) The arrest of Santa Cruz political leaders such as Prefect (governor) Ruben Costas or Civic Committee leader Branko Marinkovic remains a slim but not discountable possibility prior to the May 4 referendum. The Morales administration could justify their actions based on the notion that Santa Cruz leaders are promoting an illegal referendum, and that they have committed seditious acts. Arrests before May 4 would be hard for the government to coordinate without Santa Cruz's political elite learning of the plans. Arrests would enrage many pro-autonomy Crucenos and would likely lead to violence against security forces. The police would likely be reticent to act. Many in the police are angry with the government for failing to raise their salaries. Also, fresh in the memory of the national police is the attacks they suffered in Sucre (November 2007) defending the MAS' hastily convoked Constituent Assembly session. Sucre residents attacked officers and destroyed all of the police's installations in Sucre, and finally forced the police to flee the city for three days. Nonetheless, if Morales' government is looking to foment chaos to create a pretext for greater government intervention in Santa Cruz, arrests might serve this function. -------------- The Embassy's Plans: Keep a Low Profile -------------- ¶17. (C) The Embassy plans to keep a low profile in the coming weeks in order to lessen the government's ability to use us as a distraction. The Ambassador will minimize his travel to opposition-led areas before and immediately following the May 4 referendum to avoid providing Morales fodder for his accusations that the USG is "conspiring" with the opposition. Nonetheless, if history is a good predictor, Morales will soon launch accusations against us regardless of how low a profile we maintain. GOLDBERG