ELECTORAL COURT RESOLUTIONS MUDDY WATERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000560 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2018 TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL BL SUBJECT: ELECTORAL COURT RESOLUTIONS MUDDY WATERS Classified By: A/DCM Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). - - - - Summary - - - - ¶1. (C) The National Electoral Court (CNE) issued two resolutions March 7 dealing setbacks for the referendum plans of both President Morales' Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) and the opposition. The first calls for a postponement of a national referendum on the MAS' draft constitution and requests that Congress pass new legislation that would give the CNE 90 days to organize an election. The second overturns the decisions of the departmental electoral courts (CDEs) in the opposition departments (states) to organize referenda on the departments' autonomy statutes )- referenda the MAS strongly opposes. The opposition-led departments' CDEs have announced that they will not follow the CNE's decisions. ¶2. (C) Comment: On the surface the resolutions appear balanced, hindering both the MAS and opposition; but in fact, they impart significant advantage to the MAS. By declaring the departmental courts' actions illegal, the CNE sided with the MAS' position that only Congress can convoke departmental referenda. As the MAS is committed to halting the autonomy statutes, the MAS-dominated parliament will likely be extremely slow to approve the autonomy referenda, if it ever does. The resolutions also provide the MAS political cover to backtrack on the clearly undemocratic actions it took on February 28, actions which have garnered significantly more condemnation domestically and internationally than the party was expecting. President Morales on March 11, recognizing the chance to appear democratic and conciliatory called on both sides )- the MAS and opposition -- to respect the CNE's decision. Morales' willingness to accept the CNE decision after the MAS went to such drastic measures on February 28 leads us to believe (as the opposition argues) that the government orchestrated the CNE's March 7 resolutions. Another reason the MAS may actually favor the CNE's recent resolutions is that some public opinion surveys show that the MAS constitution could lose at the polls. End Comment. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Resolution One ) Postpone Constitutional Vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (U) The National Electoral Court (CNE) issued two resolutions March 7. The first CNE resolution (013/2008) calls for a postponement of a national referendum on the MAS' draft constitution. The resolution also requests Congress pass new enabling legislation which would provide the CNE the minimum 90 days required to organize a national referendum. All three CNE justices signed on to the decision. ¶4. (U) The CNE's decision was a response to the events of the February 28 in which MAS Congress members rammed through legislation enabling a national referendum on the MAS' draft constitution while opposition parliamentarians were physically blocked from entering the legislature. The February 28 enabling legislation stipulated the CNE execute the referendum in 60 days, by May 4, the same day as the opposition-led Santa Cruz department's autonomy statute referendum. Under Bolivia's Electoral Code, the CNE requires 90 to 120 days to organize an election. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Resolution Two ) Revoke Referenda on Autonomy Statutes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (U) The second CNE resolution (014/2008) overturns the decisions by the lower electoral courts in the opposition departments (states) of Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz and Tarija to organize and administer referenda on each of the departments' autonomy legislation. (Note: The four opposition-led departments had presented their petitions to their respective Departmental Electoral Courts (CDE) to organize referenda on institutionalizing their demands for greater autonomy. A "yes" vote on the departmental autonomy statutes would greatly reduce the central government's control over the departments. End Note). While charging the lower courts had exceeded their authority, the resolution acknowledges (does not dispute) that the citizens in each of the opposition-led departments had mustered the requisite number of signatures to call for a referendum. The CNE resolution calls on Congress (to draft legislation) to convoke a referendum on each department's autonomy statutes. One (Jeronimo Pinheiro) of the three CNE justices dissented. ¶6. (SBU) There has been considerable debate on whether it was legal for the CDEs to sanction and execute referenda without Congress authorizing the referenda via legislation. Even some prominent opposition senators had pronounced that the CDEs' actions were on questionable legal ground. The MAS tried to eliminate any ambiguity regarding the issue by passing a law during its February Congressional session that stipulates that only Congress could convoke departmental referenda. However, because the opposition was locked out of the session, the opposition contends that any of the laws passed on February 28 should not be respected. - - - - - - - - - - - Reactions to the CNE - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) While the Human Rights Ombudsman and some human rights groups lauded the CNE's decisions, the resolutions managed to anger both the MAS and the opposition. MAS congressional representatives immediately responded by threatening impeachment trials against the CNE justices, arguing they committed a crime by not following the February 28 legislation regarding the constitutional referendum. However, by March 11 President Morales changed the MAS line, arguing that the CNE's decision should be respected. Morales stated, "I understand the court has to guarantee democracy, fundamentally based in legality and the unity of the country . . ." He continued, "If this institution (the CNE) makes a decision, they (the decisions) have to be respected by all Bolivians." (Comment: President Morales is seeking to capitalize on the CNE's resolutions to recast himself and his party as the protector's of democracy and democratic institutions. End Comment). ¶8. (SBU) The leadership of the four opposition-led departments has stated they will continue with their plans for autonomy referenda, regardless of the CNE's resolution. The CDEs of Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz and Tarija have also announced they will proceed with their respective departmental referenda, despite Exeni's pronouncements that the CNE will not respect the results if they do proceed. Santa Cruz Prefect (governor) Ruben Costas argued that the CNE had no authority to rule over the decisions of the lower courts, stating only the Constitutional Tribunal could pass such a judgment. Opposition figures such as the leader of the PODEMOS party Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga argues that CNE President Jose Luis Exeni (a Morales appointee) should resign because the CNE now lacks credibility, independence, and impartiality. - - - - - - Exeni Flips - - - - - - ¶9. (C) The March 7 resolutions are curious when one considers that they directly contradict what the CNE's justices told the Ambassador just four days earlier. On March 3, CNE President Exeni explained it was not the CNE's role to determine the legality of the convoking legislation -- be it the February 28 legislation for the constitutional referendum or the departmental petitions. On March 3, Exeni noted that the Constitutional Tribunal is only body permitted to overturns laws and decrees issued by the executive and legislative branches; but, by March 7 Exeni was comfortable with the CNE taking on this attribution. Although, the March 7 resolutions did acknowledge the Constitutional Tribunal's limited authority over the CNE. ¶10. (C) Comment: While we cannot definitively determine why Exeni and his colleagues flipped, Senate President Oscar Ortiz and his fellow opposition colleague Luis Vasquez shared with us their belief that the decision was orchestrated by Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera. We tend to agree with their analysis, as both President Morales and the Vice President readily accepted the CNE's decision. That the government would lay down without a fight is inconsistent with the considerable effort the ruling MAS exerted in order to pass the enabling legislation for the constitutional referendum on February 28. Polls showing weakening support for the MAS draft constitution and a stronger than expected adverse (domestic and international) response to the February 28 Congressional session seems to have steered the MAS toward pressuring the CNE. End Comment. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Constitutional Tribunal: The MAS' Next Target? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (C) The lack of a functioning Constitutional Tribunal continues to haunt Bolivia's fractured democracy. The Tribunal, not the CNE, should have ruled on the MAS' February 28 legislation and on whether the Departmental Electoral Courts have jurisdiction to organize a referendum without Congressional input. But, due to political pressure by the MAS only one magistrate remains on the Constitutional Tribunal leaving it without a quorum to function. The appointment of new Tribunal magistrates requires the approval of two-thirds of Congress, but thus far the MAS and opposition have failed to agree on appointments. The opposition argues the MAS is purposefully blocking appointments, the MAS blames the opposition. A non-functioning Tribunal greatly favors the MAS. Without the Tribunal there is no judicial check on the executive and legislative branches. ¶12. (C) However, the MAS has also threatened to stack the Tribunal. Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera on March 3 stated that the MAS might opt for an alternative (presumably extra-constitutional) mechanism for selecting Tribunal magistrates. Opposition Senator Luis Vasquez responded to Garcia Linera by stating, "I hope this is not a veiled threat against Congress, in that when Congress decides to select magistrates, they (the MAS) will encircle (Congress again) and will then choose MAS militants (to fill the vacancies)." (Comment: A MASista Tribunal will be rejected by the opposition leading it to undertake its own potentially extra-legal actions. Both the MAS and opposition now view the co-opting of institutions as a means to further their political agendas, regardless of the legality or damage they inflict on Bolivia's fragile democracy. The CNE appears firmly in the MAS' ranks, but the opposition manages to influence at least four of nine CDEs. The Constitutional Tribunal may be the next victim of this disturbing trend. End Comment). GOLDBERG