TARIJA: DEFENDING THE HOME TURF -- PASSIVELY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 002480 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KDEM BL SNAR ASEC EFIN SUBJECT: TARIJA: DEFENDING THE HOME TURF -- PASSIVELY Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Brian Quigley for reasons 1.4 (b, d). - - - - Summary - - - - ¶1. (C) Opposition leaders in the southern, gas-producing Department (state) of Tarija are disheartened by their failure to halt the national advance of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) agenda. While the departmental government will come out officially against the new MAS constitution, a vigorous campaign is unlikely and all seem resigned to its passage. The talk now is about "defending the home turf" in the face of unrelenting MAS pressure in the form of social protests, a fiscal squeeze, and legal attacks on Prefect Mario Cossio. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - Defending the Home Turf - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) In a tacit admittance of national impotency, Mauricio Plaza, the Secretary General of the Prefect of Tarija, told Econoff that the current strategy of the prefecture was to look after Tarija first. He said that they would come out officially against the new constitution (the "no" vote),but were undecided if they would mount an active campaign. The answer seemed self-evident however, as Plaza complained that the prefecture simply had no resources left for another political campaign. By his count, they have had to mount seven such campaigns since Morales took power. That said, he observed that the regions are the only ones speaking out against the MAS constitution, as the opposition political parties are in disarray and mostly silent on the issue. He said that the opposition grouping of CONALDE was having difficulty acting as one following the arrest of Pando Prefect Fernandez, but that it "still has a role." The Prefecture's Secretary of Development Ernesto Farfan was not as optimistic, saying that CONALDE "has played out its hand" and has no real future. ¶3. (C) Plaza also claimed that Prefect Mario Cossio will not be a candidate for president in 2009, but instead will focus on a run in 2014 after completing his goals for the development of Tarija. The strategy for now is to pull back, take care of local issues, and wait for people to realize that the MAS is purely a political machine, unable to effectively carry out national programs or formulate a credible economic policy. - - - - - - - - The MAS Squeeze - - - - - - - - �0A;¶4. (C) Pulling back from national politics will not be easy. The biggest issue facing the Prefecture is the constant pressure being applied on their financial resources by the central government. For example, as a gas producer, Tarija gets a majority of their budget from royalties. It relies on the state hydrocarbon company (YPFB) to calculate what is owed and dispense the money. Intentional or not, a YPFB administrative slow-down, has left the production tally for June, July, and August unfinished. Further clouding the fiscal picture is the central government's threat to "take back" any unused allocations from last year's budget. Plaza maintains that this would be illegal, but he realizes that relying on legalities is not a wise strategy in dealing with the Morales administration. ¶5. (C) In addition to a fiscal squeeze, Plaza fully expects increasing pressure though MAS social groups and legal actions. There have been twelve charges filed against Cossio for corruption, six have been dismissed but the defense continues to stretch prefecture resources thin. Finally, Plaza pointed out how the national government is actively working around the prefects, by going directly to municipal LA PAZ 00002480 002 OF 002 governments. This is taking place not only with national programs and funding, but approved international donor programs are also being aimed directly at the municipal level. Plaza found it unbelievable that international organizations are donating money for anti-poverty programs, while the national government is spending over $1 billion dollars to reinitiate YPFB exploration and exploitation programs. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The "Strategy" from the Senate - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Tarija Senator Maria Paz reiterated that opposition political parties were now completely discredited in the eyes of the public. No effective campaign could be mounted from them and therefore many in the opposition were renouncing party membership in favor of "social groupings." According to Paz, there are now eleven such groupings (five in La Paz, three in Santa Cruz, and one each in Tarija, Sucre, and Cochabamba). To be considered a "social grouping," membership needs to reach five thousand voters. The idea is that these groups will form around issues important to the members and then (magically) they will coalesce and form a coherent, single opposition for the presidential elections in December, 2009. ¶7. (C) Meanwhile, the current Civic Committee in Tarija is divided and somewhat decapitated by the acquiescence of its President Reynaldo Bayard to MAS pressure. An outspoken, and fiery leader of the so-called "civic coup" in September, Bayard recently signed a public letter of regret for his actions. For many in Tarija, he is now considered a traitor. Civic Committee Director Freddy Castrillo told Econoff that Bayard was convinced to sign the letter under pressure from three Tarija Deputies, Wilman Cardozo, Rodrigo Paz, and Edwin Flores. He said that they argued that it was better to "get in line" with the MAS, than to continue with futile (and dangerous) opposition. There are calls for Civic Committee elections and Castrillo will be a strong candidate for the presidency of the committee. For now he continues to hold a hard line, saying that for many "the time has come where we can no longer accept a government from the altiplano." While this may be a common sentiment, there appears to be no coherent strategy to make it a reality. - - - - Comment - - - - ¶8. (C) As in other departments across the opposition "half moon," political leaders in Tarija are searching for a way to effectively contain the steady advance of the MAS agenda. They realize that for the moment none of the strategies appear very promising. Sadly, their best bet seems to be to wait for a complete economic collapse. In the meantime, a disheartened calm is the norm as people wait to see what the new MAS constitution will bring. URS