VICE MINISTER CACERES FLOATS DEAL FOR DEA STAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002375 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR ASEC PINR BL SUBJECT: VICE MINISTER CACERES FLOATS DEAL FOR DEA STAY REF: LA PAZ 2368 Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 b,d ¶1. (C) Summary: In a follow-up meeting with the NAS Director and DEA country attache after President Morales' November 1 announcement that DEA would be expelled, Vice Minister of Social Justice Felipe Caceres suggested an alternate solution, which he says he has run by Morales. Under Caceres' proposal, the USG will signal that it is willing to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding defining the role of the DEA and that it wishes to strengthen counter-narcotics cooperation while confirming that DEA is not "conducting operations" on Bolivian soil. (Charge and other Embassy officers have previously told Bolivian officials, including Vice President Garcia Linera, that we would be completely open to negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding covering DEA activities in Bolivia.) In return, Caceres believes he can convince Evo to tell the MFA to withdraw its diplomatic note of November 1, which announced the immediate expulsion of DEA. Caceres hopes that Evo can be convinced to postpone further action until he can negotiate with the USG under the Obama administration. In the early morning hours of November 6, Bolivian police executed a search warrant on a Special Investigative Unit (SIU, a vetted unit) location. Reached by phone, Caceres told us that the Bolivian government would probably raid all other SIU locations in the next hours but claimed that his proposal remained valid. End summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Caceres Stuck in the Middle - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) In a November 4 meeting with DEA Regional Director, DEA Deputy Director, and NAS Director, Caceres indicated that he was concerned his conversation was being recorded, turning up the radio seemingly in an attempt to confuse a recording device. Caceres blamed "radicals" (presumably Government Minister Rada and Presidency Minister Quintana) as being a "black hand" guiding President Evo Morales. Caceres claimed that the November 1 events did not technically constitute an "expulsion" and asked whether the USG would continue counter-narcotics cooperation. DEA Director pressed Caceres on the Bolivian government's unfounded public accusations against the DEA and criticized Caceres for publicly crediting the accusations. Although Caceres attempted to excuse himself saying, "we live in different realities", he acknowledged that most of the Bolivian government's charges were unfounded. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Evo's Hopes for a New US Administration - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) According to Caceres, Evo expects a significant improvement in relations under a new administration (at the time assumed to be an Obama administration) and wants to defer substantive discussion until the new administration takes over. NAS Director asked Vice Minister Caceres for advice on approaching the government to reconsider the expulsion decision. In response and at a later November 5 meeting, Caceres said that he had spent an hour the evening of November 4 with Evo and Minister Rada. Caceres described the mood of the meeting as upbeat, in part because of the U.S. electoral results. Evo talked of his close ties to "many democrats", while Rada (to Caceres' surprise) advised that the Bolivian government should not pick a fight with the USG on every issue. Evo reportedly went so far as to say that he did not have problems with the DEA as an institution (instead he blamed supposedly "rogue" agents.) - - - - - - - - - - - Possible Way Forward - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Encouraged by the positive atmosphere, Caceres told us he suggested to Evo a solution in which the USG signals its willingness to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding defining the role of the DEA and strengthening counter-narcotics cooperation while also confirming that the DEA is not "conducting operations" on Bolivian soil. In return, NAS Director suggested that the MFA would send a diplomatic note withdrawing its November 1 diplomatic note that demanded that DEA leave the country. This step back on the part of the Bolivian government would allow more time for negotiations, including time under the new U.S. administration that Evo believes will be more sympathetic. ¶5. (C) In the early morning hours of November 6, Bolivian police executed a search warrant on an SIU (Special Investigative Unit, a vetted unit) location. DEA Director Pat Stenkamp told the location commander to let the Bolivian police enter and review all files, as there is nothing to hide. Stenkamp later spoke with Caceres, who admitted that he knew about the raid and that all SIU locations would be raided today. Caceres assured Stenkamp that the deal on the table remains unchanged. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - A Little Help From Our Friends - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) On November 4, the Spanish Embassy convoked a MiniDublin group to discuss the expulsion of DEA. The Danish representative informed us that his government had previously spoken to Presidency Minister Quintana and advised the Bolivian government not to expel DEA; he indicated that his government would likely engage on the issue. After the meeting, the EU and Italian representatives also expressed their concern. EU engagement on this issue would have two clear benefits: 1) the more Evo hears that expelling DEA was a mistake, the more they are likely to be allowed to stay, and 2) the EU and member states would have a vested interest in DEA's continued presence. - - - - Comment - - - - ¶7. (C) During the meetings with Caceres, DEA Director was very clear that we could not agree to any language that implied that the DEA had acted inappropriately. The USG confirmation that DEA has not, does not, and will not "conduct operations" on Bolivian soil could provide Evo with political cover following his public accusations, and taking advantage of Evo's expectations for improving relations with a new U.S. administration may provide breathing room and a chance the Bolivian government will seek to negotiate a way to allow DEA to stay in country. That said, it is not clear whether Vice Minister Caceres can deliver this deal, but the proposed solution could provide a rare win/win opportunity for the Bolivian and U.S. governments, and therefore we believe it is worth pursuing. End comment. URS