BOLIVIA: REQUEST TO LIFT AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002284 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA A/S SHANNON, DAS MCMULLEN, WHA/EX ROBERTSON STATE ALSO FOR S, D, P, E, T, M, G, R, S/ES, S/ES-O, A, CA, DS, RM, H, L PA, PM AND USAID-CARDENAS USCINCSO FOR COMMANDER AND POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018 TAGS: AMGT AEMR CASC KFLO AFIN ASEC PGOV BL SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: REQUEST TO LIFT AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE REF: A. LA PAZ 1951 ¶B. SECSTATE 98096 Classified By: Charge Kris Urs for reasons 1.4 b,d ¶1. (C) Summary and action request: The immediate threats that initially prompted Mission Bolivia's request for Authorized Departure status have dissipated, and an agreement between the national opposition and the government is likely to bring a period of calm as both sides prepare for a January 25 constitutional referendum and likely national elections in December 2009. On October 20 as up to 100,000 Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) supporters descended upon the city of La Paz, Minister of Government Rada publicly called for calm and said that the government intended to protect the Embassy. Police response during September 15-16 protests aimed at the Embassy was appropriate. The government's reaction to the earlier "perfect storm" of potential triggers for violence has been milder than anticipated. Although regional opposition groups are announcing their objection to the October 20 congressional agreement between the national opposition and the government, there are currently no armed-standoffs between opposition and government supporters in any of the regions and there are no calls for violence from any major groups. (Pando, the northern department bordering Peru and Brazil, is still under military control.) In light of this improvement in the security situation, Charge endorses the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) recommendation that Authorized Departure status be lifted at this time. End summary and action request. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Potential Triggers That Didn't Fire - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Leading up to the decision to request Authorized Departure, a number of conflicts threatened to erupt into violence. The city of Santa Cruz had been surrounded by MAS-aligned campesinos, violence had actually broken out in Pando (where up to 35 were reported dead),major protests were planned at the Embassy, and announcements on counter-narcotics decertification and suspension of ATPDEA benefits were expected. Washington's decision to delay announcement of the decertification decision until after the planned protest at the Embassy probably helped avert a major demonstration at the building; credit also goes to the Bolivian National Police for holding firm in the face of the protesters, and to Foreign Minister Choquehuanca and Government Minister Rada, for publicly discouraging the protesters from turning violent. Although the protesters did attempt to enter the southern residential area (where Embassy housing is located),the police blocked their advance just outside the area. ¶3. (C) Although the government has announced that it is still "reviewing" relations with the USG and considering the possible expulsion of USAID and DEA, the government's anti-USG actions did not escalate following the expulsion of Ambassador Goldberg as persona non grata. This unwarranted action on the part of the Bolivian government may have served as a pressure-release: the scheduled protest at the Embassy fizzled as protest leaders pointed out that their objective (of kicking out the Ambassador) had already been fulfilled. ¶4. (C) The government's reaction to upcoming suspension of ATPDEA benefits has thus far been dismissive: President Morales claims that the markets lost to (mostly El Alto textile) workers can be replaced by agreements with Venezuela and Iran. Although the effects of the suspension are just beginning to be felt (a company employing 40 women in El Alto closed October 20th, for example),the government's insistence that the U.S. market is not that important may serve to dampen protests in El Alto as people begin to lose their jobs. In addition, contacts in El Alto suggest that newly-unemployed workers may blame the government for its intransigence rather than the USG for the decision. Government and business leaders intend to testify at the October 23 hearing in Washington. That said, we cannot rule out demonstrations aimed at the USG once President Bush formally suspends Bolivia from ATPDEA in early November. With the Bolivian police expected to provide adequate protection if indeed such a demonstration occurs, it should not pose a threat to the mission. ¶5. (C) The October 17 anniversary of the fall of ex-President Gonzalo "Goni" Sanchez de Lozada's government did not bring the usual protest to the Embassy, partially because potential protesters were instead engaged in pressuring congress to pass legislation for a constitutional referendum. During the October 20 demonstrations at the congress a coffin covered in a U.S. flag was paraded through the main plaza, but no protesters targeted the Embassy. The Foreign Ministry delivered paperwork on the Goni extradition case on October 17, and the consular section is working to return these documents to them once they are notarized. The Goni case will continue to be a potential spark for protests, but the fact that the Bolivian government is proceeding along legal lines may encourage government supporters to stick to non-violent means of expressing their views. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Compromise in Congress Improves Overall Stability - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Although there is still a large gulf between the opposition (particularly the regional opposition) and the government, the October 20/21 compromise in congress in which changes were made to the MAS draft constitution and Morales promised to run for only one more term has yielded a more-stable political situation. The opposition and the government are now turning to their respective campaigns on the constitutional referendum. Traditionally in Bolivia, voting is not accompanied by widespread violence, and the fact that the referendum comes after the calm Christmas season will also serve to tone down the ambient level of confrontation. The start of the rainy season also tends to inhibit conflict in Bolivia, if only because transportation becomes difficult to impossible in some areas. ¶7. (C) The government has moved to arrest some opposition leaders, but the opposition response has thus far been restrained. The opposition has become more fractured since the breakdown of negotiations in Cochabamba, with the national opposition taking over the negotiations (in Congress) from the regional opposition. With one regional prefect (governor) under military arrest, the opposition seems to be welcoming this period of calm as a chance to regroup. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Importance of International Observers - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) President Morales has always seemed to value his international reputation, and the presence of international observers during the negotiations with regional opposition leaders in Cochabamba and national opposition leaders in congress probably encouraged the government to dissuade MAS protesters from violence. The establishment of the UNASUR parliament in Cochabamba--and the high-level attention from international leaders such as Chile's Bachelet and Brazil's Lula--also likely served as a check on MAS instincts toward violence-infused pressure tactics. - - - - - - - - Action Request - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) We recognize that Bolivia continues to be volatile and President Evo Morales remains unpredictable, particularly regarding USG interests. In light of the up-coming period of expected calm, however, and the Bolivian government's recent actions abiding by their commitment to protect diplomatic missions, the Charge endorses the EAC's consensus opinion that political conditions in Bolivia have improved to the point that Authorized Departure should be lifted at this time. URS